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INTRODUCTION
In 1941, Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo,
and Myles Martinez, a Navajo, were married. The couple resided
on the Santa Clara Pueblo; they had several children. In 1939, the
Santa Clara Pueblo promulgated an ordinance detailing its mem-
bership rules. The ordinance provided that children of female
members who married outside the Pueblo would not be Santa
Clarans, while children of male members who married outside the
Pueblo would be members. In the early 1970s, Julia Martinez and
her daughter Audrey filed a lawsuit under Title I of the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968.1 Having been unsuccessful in
their efforts to persuade the Pueblo to change its membership
rules, Julia and Audrey Martinez asked the federal court for de-
claratory and injunctive relief - to invalidate the Santa Clara
Pueblo's ordinance and to require that the Pueblo count the Mar-
tinez children as members.
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez.' Justice Thurgood Marshall, writ-
ing for the majority, interpreted Title I of the ICRA to impose
"certain restrictions upon tribal governments similar, but not iden-
tical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment." 3 However, the only express jurisdictional and reme-
dial provision of the statute was habeas corpus. Martinez v Santa
Clara Pueblo thus raised the question of whether the federal court
should imply a right of action and federal court jurisdiction to hear
the alleged violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act. According to
1 25 USC §§ 1301-1303 (1982). This legislation borrows much of its language from the
federal Bill of Rights. See notes 3 and 265 and accompanying text. The lawsuit was filed
against both the Pueblo tribe and its Governor. The Supreme Court held that the "com-
mon-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers" such as Indian
tribes had not been expressly abrogated by the Indian Civil Rights Act, and thus the suit
against the tribe (but not its governor) was barred. Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US
49, 58-59 (1978). The holding parallels doctrine about states' immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment; while state immunity can only be abrogated by clear statements of Congress or
waived by the states, state officials can be sued. See, for example, Ex parte Young, 209 US
123 (1908).
2 436 US 49 (1978).
2 Id at 57 (footnote quoting the relevant provisions of ICRA omitted). The Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment do not constrain tribal government activities. Talton v
Mayes, 163 US 376, 384 (1896) held the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to a claim by a
Cherokee against the Cherokee Nation, whose powers of local government "existed prior to
the Constitution." For the series of cases which, building on Talton, held other aspects of
the Bill of Rights inapplicable to tribes, see Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 56 & n 7. For
analysis of Justice Marshall's approach to federal Indian law, see Robert Laurence,
Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Opinions, 27 Howard L J 3 (1984).
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the Court, implication of a right of action and federal court review
for claims such as those raised by Julia and Audrey Martinez
would undermine the Congressional purpose of preserving "tribal
sovereignty" and "self-government. '4 Therefore, no implied cause
of action existed, and the federal courts could not hear the dis-
crimination charge.'
Santa Clara Pueblo is a major case in federal Indian law.
Santa Clara Pueblo also offers a fascinating illustration of how the
United States government conceives of its citizens as holding si-
multaneous membership in two political entities. According to the
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, all Indians are United States citi-
zens, but that citizenship cannot "impair or otherwise affect" their
rights to tribal property.6 The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act pro-
" Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 62-64. Similar cases in Canada involve Indian women
who married non-Indians and were subsequently excluded from their status as Indians. See
Kathleen Jamieson, Indian Women and the Law of Canada: Citizens Minus (Canadian
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1978). In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court of
Canada ruled against the two women claimants who challenged the exclusion. Id at 84-85.
See also Attorney-General of Canada v Laveel; Isaac v Bedard, 38 DLR (3rd) 481 (1973).
Subsequently, in another case also involving the exclusion of an Indian woman (Sandra
Lovelace) from a reservation, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations found
Canada to be in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See
Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, 36th Sess, Supplement No 40
(A/36/40) (UN, 1981).
5 Under Navajo law, the Martinez children may have been eligible to be counted as
Navajos. The Navajo Tribal Code sets forth three categories of individuals who may qualify
for membership: those "of Navajo blood" who were on Bureau of Indian Affairs' rolls prior
to the time when the Navajos began to keep membership rolls; children of a member of the
tribe who are at least one quarter Navajo; and those of at least one quarter Navajo blood
who apply to the Enrollment Screening Committee, which considers a variety of factors
including whether an applicant lives on the reservation and whether the applicant speaks
the language. Navajo Tribal Code §§ 1-501, 551-553; 2-2201. The Martinez children, how-
ever, lived on the Santa Clara Pueblo, spoke Tewa, the language of the Pueblo, and were
religiously and culturally affiliated with the Santa Clarans.
6 Pub L No 175, 43 Stat 253 (1924). The current provision for Indian citizenship, codi-
fied at 8 USC § 1401(b)(1982), states that all persons "born in the United States to a mem-
ber of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian or other aboriginal tribe" shall be "nationals and citi-
zens" of the United States and their interests in tribal property shall not be affected.
Before 1924, a variety of provisions affected Indian citizenship in the United States.
Under the Civil Rights Act of April 10, 1866, ch 31, 14 Stat 27, Congress had provided that
"all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indi-
ans not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States." See also Elk v Wil-
kins, 112 US 94 (1884) (Indians not citizens for 14th Amendment purposes).
Nonetheless, Indians could obtain United States citizenship under certain conditions.
For example, some treaties provided for Indians to be citizens of the United States, as did
some statutes. At least in theory, other Indians could obtain citizenship upon receipt of land
allotments. See General Allotment Act (Indian Lands) § 6, 24 Stat 388 (1887). The Allot-
ment Act also provided citizenship to those Indians who had "adopted the habits of civilized
life." Id. In addition, under the Act of Aug. 9, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat 392, Indian women who
married citizens of the United States could also gain citizenship.
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vides that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-govern-
ment shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws."'7 Julia and Audrey Martinez represented a
group of Santa Claran women who had married non-Santa Clarans
and the children of such marriages. The Martinez women came to
federal court to obtain "equal protection." The obvious problem
with this claim was the tension arising from being a member of two
governments, the Santa Clara Pueblo and the United States.
That tension was addressed by the Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo when it declined to imply a private right of action. During
the late 1970s, the Court scrutinized a variety of statutory schemes
to determine whether private causes of action should be implied. A
year after Santa Clara Pueblo was decided, the Court faced the
issue again, in a different context. Geraldine Cannon sought recog-
nition of a private right of action under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which prohibits educational programs that
receive federal funds from discriminating on the basis of sex.' Ms.
Cannon sued the University of Chicago and other medical schools
and alleged that her application had been denied because she was
a woman. Unlike in Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court in Cannon v
University of Chicago held that, although unstated, Congress had
intended to enable private individuals to enforce claims of discrim-
ination - in this instance, against universities.9 Both opinions re-
quired the Court to make interpretive readings, as defendant insti-
tutions (universities and Indian tribes) claimed that Congressional
silence and specification of other remedies precluded additional
claims, while the women plaintiffs asserted that federal non-subor-
dination rights should be enforced by federal courts against insti-
tutions that sought insulation. i
In Santa Clara Pueblo, Justice Marshall described the extent
of federal control over Indian tribes: All "aspect[s] of tribal sover-
eignty... [are] subject to the superior and plenary control of Con-
gress."'1 But, Justice Marshall explained, Indian tribes retain a
substantial measure of sovereignty; they "remain a 'separate peo-
ple, with the power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions.'" 12 Thus, according to the Court, if federal courts were to
25 USC § 1302(8) (1982).
8 20 USC § 1681 (1982).
441 US 677, 711-16 (1979).
'0 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting the Regulatory State (Harvard, forthcoming 1990).
" 436 US at 58.
12 Id at 55, quoting United States v Kagama, 118 US 375, 381-82 (1886).
[56:671
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imply a power to "intervene" in tribal decisions, the courts would
undermine the authority of a group whose powers have already
been limited. "A fortiori, a resolution in a foreign forum of intra-
tribal disputes of a more public character, such as the one in this
case, cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to
maintain authority."' s Congress intended to protect the tribes
from "undue interference."1 Hence, the federal courts should not
imply jurisdiction and remedies beyond the one (habeas corpus)
specified in the legislation. Julia and Audrey Martinez were sent
back to the tribal forum, which had already refused their requests
for reconsideration of the tribal ordinance.
15
Two themes, power and sovereignty, were central to the Santa
Clara Pueblo case. Those themes also dominate the scholarship of
"federal courts" jurisprudence. 6 The theme of power, of its alloca-
tion and constraint by separation of functions, is typically ex-
amined by discussion of the relationships between the federal
courts and the Executive, the Congress, and the agencies within
the federal government. The theme of sovereignty, often described
as "federalism," addresses the relationships among the governmen-
tal entities in the United States, and specifically, between the fed-
eral courts and the states. A central problem is how two "sover-
eigns" can and should coexist in the United States. These
questions of separation of powers and of federalism arise when
" 436 US at 60.
'4 Id at 63.
15 Martinez v Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F Supp 5, 11 (D NM 1975) "Julia Martinez,
individually and with the committee [of other women similarly situated], succeeded in hav-
ing a special meeting of the entire Pueblo convened to discuss the situation." However, they
were not able to persuade the Pueblo to change its rule. Under the Supreme Court ruling,
Ms. Martinez, her child, and the class they sought to represent could also have attempted to
seek relief from Congress, but, again according to the trial court opinion, Ms. Martinez had
already "attended hearings held by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where she sought the help of then Sena-
tor Sam Ervin, Jr." Id at 11. See notes 318-34 and accompanying text about current legisla-
tive efforts to overturn Santa Clara Pueblo.
1" For example, in the Preface to the First Edition of Henry M. Hart's and Herbert
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System xi (Foundation, 1953), the authors
described their subject matter as the exploration of "a legal system that derives from both
the Nation and the States as separate sources of authority .. " Also reprinted in Paul M.
Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System xxvii (Foundation, 3rd ed 1988). The opening epi-
gram in Felix Frankfurter's and Wilber G. Katz's Cases and Other Authorities on Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure (Natl Casebook Series, 1931) is from Benjamin R. Curtis. The
comment, written in 1864, reads: "Let it be remembered, also, - for just now we may be in
some danger of forgetting it, - that questions of jurisdiction were questions of power as
between the United States and the several States."
1989]
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considering the extent of Congressional control over the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, 17 the delineation of responsibilities
among the branches of the federal government,18 the relationship
between the state and federal court systems,1 9 and the distinctive
treatment accorded states as litigants in the federal courts.20
The bountiful literature of federal courts' jurisprudence does
not, however, consider problems of the relationship between Indian
tribes, the federal government, and the states. "We" who teach
and write about the federal courts, we who list ourselves as the
definers of the domain, speak and write relatively rarely about the
federal courts and their relationship to Indian tribes.2' Santa
Clara Pueblo and other "Indian tribe" cases are not often found in
books about "the" federal courts or in discussions about the
problems of multiple sovereigns coexisting in the United States.
While there is a wealth of scholarship about Indian tribes, 22 that
scholarship is not integrated into federal courts' jurisprudence.
This absence of discussion of cases involving Indian tribes is,
at one level, odd because these cases are rich in subject matter tra-
ditionally found in the federal courts' literature. Questions of
power and sovereignty are the questions when Indian tribes seek
help from the federal courts or try to resist federal decision mak-
ing. The issues raised are familiar ones: executive and congres-
" See, for example, Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court: 1980 Term - Fore-
word. Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisprudence of
the Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17 (1981).
18 See, for example, INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) (legislative veto); Morrison v
Olson, 108 S Ct 2597 (1988) (special prosecutor); Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 647
(1989) (sentencing guidelines); Northern Pipeline Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50
(1982) (relationship between Article I and Article III courts in the context of bankruptcy).
19 See, for example, Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971) (limiting federal courts' au-
thority to enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings).
20 See Martha A. Field, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The
Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv L Rev 84 (1985); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L J 1 (1988).
21 For discussion of the lack of integration of materials about Indians tribes in constitu-
tional law, see Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 Am Bar Found Res
J 1, 10-11; Charles F. Wilkinson, The Impact of Indian History on the Teaching of Ameri-
can History, Occasional Papers in Curriculum Series of the Newberry Library, D'Arcy
McNickle Center for the History of the American Indian, No. 2 (Chicago Conference, 1984)
("Indian History").
22 These sources are too numerous to list, and many are referred to in other notes in
this essay. For overviews, see, for example, Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time,
and the Law (Yale, 1987); Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Gov-
ernment and the American Indians vols I and II (U Nebraska, 1984); Russel Lawrence
Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty
(U Cal, 1980); Ball, 1987 Am B Found Res J 1 (cited in note 21).
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sional authority; 3 the implementation of Supreme Court decisions
by the Executive; 4 the allocation of power between the state and
federal courts,2 5 and between states, Indian tribes, and the federal
government;26 concepts of the attributes and prerogatives of "sov-
ereigns" '27 such as sovereign immunity28 and exhaustion of reme-
dies; 29 preemption of state or tribal law by federal law;30 deference
23 On the power of Congress, see Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v Weeks, 430 US 73,
84-85 (1977) (Congressional power is "plenary" but not "absolute" and the Court can review
congressional distribution of funds to specified Delaware Indians); United States v Kagama,
118 US 375 (1886); Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978); United States
v Sandoval, 231 US 28 (1913). On the power of the executive branch, see Kerr-McGee Corp.
v Navajo Tribe, 471 US 195 (1985) (Secretary of Interior approval not needed for Navajo
Tribe ordinance taxing businesses). See also United States v Wilson, 611 F Supp 813, 820-
21 (N D Cal 1985) (Department of the Interior lacks authority to abrogate fishing rights);
Mashpee Tribe v New Seabury Corp., 592 F2d 575, 580-81 (1st Cir 1979) (court declined to
await decision of Department of the Interior decision about tribal status and held trial on
issue).
1, See Worcester v Georgia, 31 US 515 (1832). After Chief Justice John Marshall up-
held the Cherokee Nation's "sovereign" powers that Georgia had infringed, President An-
drew Jackson is said to have remarked: "John Marshall has made his law, now let him
enforce it." Wilkinson, Indian History at 111 (cited in note 21).
21 See, for example, Three Affiliated Tribes v Wold Engineering, 476 US 877 (1986)
(North Dakota statute on tribal access to state courts preempted by 28 USC § 1360); Colo-
rado River Water Cons. Dist. v United States, 424 US 800 (1976) (even when the United
States litigates as trustee for some Indian tribes, federal court must sometimes abstain and
defer to on-going state litigation).
2' See, for example, McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 US 164 (1973)
(state lacks power to tax Navajos living on a reservation); Washington v Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 US 463 (1979) (the power of a state which acts, pursuant to federal statutes, to
exercise jurisdiction over cases arising in Indian territory); California v Cabazon Band Mis-
sion Indians, 107 S Ct 1083 (1987) (preemption of state authority to regulate Bingo on a
reservation; revised by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub L No 100-497, 102 Stat 2467
(1988), to be codified at 25 USC § 2701 (1989), providing for system of regulation). See
generally Daniel L. Rotenberg, American States and Indian Tribes: Power Conflicts in the
Supreme Court, 92 Dickinson L Rev 81 (1987).
27 See, for example, Rice v Rehner, 463 US 713, 723 (1983) (state may regulate alcohol
sales on reservation); Fisher v District Court of Montana, 424 US 382, 389-90 (1976) (Mon-
tana court could not exercise jurisdiction in adoption proceeding involving members of a
tribe).
2' See, for example, Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58-59. See also Puyallup Tribe v
Washington Game Dept., 433 US 165, 171-72 (1977) (sovereign immunity does not protect
individual tribe members). Compare U.S. v Yakima Tribal Ct., 806 F2d 853, 858-60 (9th Cir
1986) (tribal court enjoined federal officials from relocating an irrigation canal; tribal court
cannot act against the sovereign, the United States absent its consent). The doctrine gov-
erning a state's power to enjoin federal officials is comparable; see Tarble's Case, 80 US 397
(1871) (state may not grant habeas corpus relief to an individual in federal custody). See
generally Frank Pommersheim and Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courts, and
the Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 SD L Rev 553 (1986).
29 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v La Plante, 480 US 9 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos.
v Crow Tribe, 471 US 845, 854-57 (1985); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US 49 (1978).
"' Kagama, 118 US 375; McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Comm, 411 US 164 (1973);
Rehner, 463 US 713.
1989]
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and comity;31 and the federal courts' common law making powers.2
Given the similarities between the themes of federal court litera-
ture and the subject matter of Indian tribe cases, and given the
number of Indian tribe cases decided during the relatively recent
past,3 the omission (in casebooks and other federal courts schol-
arly literature) about the relationship between Indian tribes and
the federal courts requires explanation.
Recent articles have attempted to understand what Richard
Fallon has called the "ideologies of federal courts law" 34 - to ex-
plicate the underlying assumptions and aspirations of the disci-
pline. This essay continues that enterprise: to consider why federal
courts jurisprudence has not spoken much about Indian tribes
when telling the story of the federal courts, and to learn what that
silence has to teach. I hope to show what Indian tribe cases have to
bring to federal courts' jurisprudence, to what is meant by the con-
cept of state sovereignty and allocation of power between the state
" Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 59-72.
2 Many federal Indian cases are common law interpretations - for example, those on
immunities and some of the jurisdiction cases. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v
Crow Tribe, 471 US 845, 850 (1985). See also County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation,
470 US 226, 237 (1985) (federal common law used as "necessary expedient," citing Milwau-
kee v Illinois, 451 US 304, 313-14 (1981)). See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:
The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv L Rev 883 (1986).
11 I list only recent cases with issues that fall within subjects often taught in federal
courts courses: Brendale v Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 109
S Ct 2994 (1989) (tribal authority to zone land owned by non-members on a reservation
depends on history of diminution of tribal interests and threat to tribal political integrity),
California v United States, 109 S Ct 2273 (1989) affirming by an equally divided Court 830
F2d 139 (9th Cir 1987) (extent to which United States waived sovereign immunity in litiga-
tion about a reservation's boundaries); Cotton Petroleum Corp v New Mexico, 109 S Ct
1698 (1989) (state tax on oil and gas production by non-Indian lessees of tribal land not
preempted); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 109 S Ct 1597 (1989) (under
the Indian Child Welfare Act, state court lacks jurisdiction over children born off the reser-
vation to members of the reservation who were domiciled there); Oklahoma Tax Comm v
Graham, 109 S Ct 1519 (1989) (despite question of Indian tribe immunity from taxation,
removal to federal court disallowed); Iowa Mut. Ins. Corp. v La Plante, 480 US 9 (1987)
(exhaustion of tribal court remedies required as a matter of comity in diversity case); Cali-
fornia v Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 US 202 (1987) (preemption of state Bingo
law on Indian tribal lands); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v Wold
Engineering, 476 US 877 (1986) (preclusion of state court jurisdictional scheme); South
Carolina v Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 US 498 (1986) (state statute of limitations applied to
dispute over tribal land); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v Crow Tribe, 471 US 845
(1985) (exhaustion of tribal remedies required before federal jurisdiction may be invoked);
Montana States Tel. & Tel. Co. v Santa Ana, 472 US 237 (1985) (authority of Secretary of
Interior under Pueblo Lands Act); Kerr-McGee Corp v Navajo Tribe, 471 US 195 (1985)
(Secretary of Interior lacks control over Navajo Council's decisions on taxation).
" Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va L Rev 1141
(1988). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story 102 Harv L Rev 688 (1989) (review of Bator,
et al, Hart and Weschler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (cited in note 16)).
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and federal governments.
In contrast to many of the states, 5 Indian tribes are arguably
truly distinct sovereigns, which did not cede sovereignty with the
adoption of the Constitution but which lost most of it anyway. Ex-
ploration of the responses of federal courts - when individuals ask
for federal protection from the tribal government, as in Santa
Clara Pueblo, and when tribes claim intrusion by the state and
federal governments - can inform contemporary discussions of
the domain of the federal courts. How the United States govern-
ment has treated Indian tribes and those in conflict with the tribes
teaches us about the enormous power of the federal government.
The capacity of the United States government to try to obliterate
smaller "sovereigns" illuminates reasons to respect and maintain
semi-sovereigns and demonstrates the complexity of the interac-
tion and interdependence of "sovereigns" in the United States.
Before beginning my exploration of the richness of materials
about Indian tribes for federal courts jurisprudence, three defini-
tional comments are in order. First, a word about the choice of
language, about my using the words "Indian tribes" rather than
"Native Americans." While the phrase "Native American" helps to
make the point that the United States was peopled prior to the
arrival of European settlers, the words "Native American" may
also suggest the similarity - and homogenization - of the exper-
iences of a variety of "ethnic" groups in the United States. "Native
Americans" might then be assumed to be similarly situated to
"Italian Americans" or "Polish Americans." Using the words "In-
dian tribes" (or the name of a specific tribe) underscores the dis-
tinct political experiences of Indian tribes, conquered by the
United States rather than entering the United States, as did waves
of immigrants. Further, using the names of specific tribes under-
scores the diversity of interactions between the federal government
and the many different Indian tribes.
Second, my purpose in this essay is to explore how learning
about the history and treatment of Indian tribes helps illuminate
the relationship between state and federal governments. This arti-
cle is not an exploration of what the relationship between the fed-
eral government and the Indian tribes should be, of when causes of
action should be implied from federal statutes, or of federal Indian
11 While states are typically assumed to share a uniform history of equal participation
in the forming of the Union, some of the states' "ratification" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was obtained by coercion. See discussion at notes 124-30. See generally Eric Foner,
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution (Harper & Row, 1988).
19891
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679 1989
The University of Chicago Law Review
law in general. Indeed, while thinking about tribes may enrich con-
versations about the states and the federal government, thinking
about the states may not be helpful to conversations about the
tribes and the federal government.3 6 Blurring the lines between
"state" and "Indian tribe" may obscure the political differences
between the two "sovereigns." At least in theory, states have en-
tered into a compact, called the United States Constitution, and
willfully ceded powers to a central government. At least in theory,
states participate via their representatives in Congress in the deci-
sions of the national government. Such claims cannot be made,
even in theory, for the Indian tribes, whose representatives neither
signed the Constitution nor sit in Congress.
Third, a word about my occasional use of the word "we." The
"we" here are those who have the capacity and authority to con-
struct the boundaries of an academic discipline. As Barbara Herrn-
stein Smith has commented, the "recommendation of value repre-
sented by the repeated inclusion of a particular work in
anthologies ... not only promotes but goes some distance toward
creating the value of that work, as does its repeated appearance on
reading lists, or its frequent citation or quotation by professors,
scholars, critics, poets and other elders of the tribe; for all these
acts have the effect of drawing the work into the orbit of attention
of potential readers and, by making the work more likely to be
experienced at all, they make it more likely to be experienced as
'valuable.' In this sense, value creates value."3 7 Hence, my objec-
tives: to learn what has been drawn into the circle of value, what
has been excluded, and what "we" can learn and should do in
response.
I. CREATING THE BOUNDARIES OF JURISPRUDENTIAL THOUGHT
ABOUT THE FEDERAL COURTS
Self-conscious examination of the contents and boundaries of
a given subject matter is by now a familiar activity. Literary critics
dispute the existence and content of "great" literature, 38 as we
36 In a recent Supreme Court case, "[a]ll of the Indian tribes that . . .filed amicus
curiae briefs addressing" the issue of whether tribes should be considered "states" for pur-
poses of the Commerce Clause "uniformly [took] the position that Indian tribes are not
States within the meaning of the Commerce Clause." Cotton Petroleum Corp v New Mex-
ico, 109 S Ct at 1715.
"' Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for
Critical Theory 10 (Harvard, 1988).
'8 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwomen in the Attic, ch 1, The
Queen's Looking Glass: Female Creativity, Male Images of Women, and the Metaphor of
[56:671
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come to understand that "the canonical work begins increasingly
not merely to survive within but to shape and create the culture
in which its value is produced and transmitted and, for that very
reason, to perpetuate the conditions of its own flourishing." 9 Tillie
Olsen entitles a book Silences and dedicates it to "silenced people,
... [t]heir art, which still they made ... anonymous, refused re-
spect, recognition; lost."'40 Issues are raised not only about who is
heard and who is marginalized or silenced, but also about how per-
spective and experiences shape the creation of value. Psychologists
note how the absence of women, as participants in or subjects of
psychological studies, affects the resulting assumptions about hier-
archies of moral development.41 In a similar vein, commentators
about the federal courts have examined how experiences of living
through the New Deal shaped the vision of the respective roles of
the federal and state judiciaries.2
A. A Course of Study
A first step is to consider how the boundaries of federal courts'
jurisprudence came to be delineated and whether cases about In-
dian tribes have always been excluded. Before engaging in "psy-
chological imperialism" '4 by assuming that my reality was the real-
ity, I reviewed the books, written for teachers, students, and
practitioners, that have shaped and defined the federal courts' or-
thodoxy. While teachers may choose not to discuss all the materi-
als in a book or may add materials, books intended to be used in
teaching a discipline provide a rough sense of what is understood
to be within a discipline's domain.
The Business of the Supreme Court, written in 1928 by Felix
Frankfurter and James M. Landis, is the contemporary landmark
of the self-conscious treatment of the federal courts as a topic of
study distinct from other areas of law.44 The authors claimed that
Literary Paternity 3-44 (Yale, 1979). Compare Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American
Mind (Simon & Schuster, 1987).
3' Smith, Contingencies of Value at 50 (cited in note 37).
40 Tillie Olsen, Silences dedication page (Delta-Seymour, 1978).
11 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard, 1982).
11 Amar, 102 Harv L Rev at 700-10 (cited in note 34).
43 A term I borrow from Catharine Hantzis, who explains that a person may assume
that his or her reality is the reality that others experience as well. (Correspondence, fall
1988) (on file with the author).
4" Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A
Study in the Federal Judicial System (MacMillan, 1928) ("Frankfurter and Landis") This
book is described as "[t]he classic and indispensable account of the history of the federal
judiciary acts" by the editors of the most recent edition of Hart and Wechsler's, The Fed-
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"scant attention" had been paid to the development of the federal
eral Courts and the Federal System at 30 n 2 (cited in note 16).
There are several earlier works on the federal courts. The list that follows includes
those, from the nineteenth and early twentieth century, that have been preserved by the two
law libraries in which I worked on this article. This list is not intended to be exhaustive but
exemplary and, for federal courts fans, helpful. For works that predate Frankfurter and
Landis, see Alfred Conkling, whose treatise went under a variety of names including, A
Treatise on the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts
of the United States 19 (Gould, Banks, 2d ed 1842) (Indian nations discussed as not being
"foreign states" in reference to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but rather
"domestic, dependent nations"); A Treatise on the Organization, Jurisdiction and Practice
of the Courts of the United States 46 (W.C. Little, 3d ed 1856) (same discussion of Indian
nations); A Treatise on the Organization, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the
United States in Suits at Law 22-23 (W.C. Little, 5th ed 1870) (same reference to Indian
nations); Stephen D. Law, The Jurisdiction and Powers of the United States Courts 10
(Little, 1852) (Indian tribes discussed as not being foreign states for purposes of federal
court jurisdiction); Benjamin R. Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice and Peculiar Jurisprudence
of the Courts of the United States 18 n 3 (Little, Brown, 1880) (mentioning Cherokee Na-
tion case, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831)); Benjamin V. Abbott, A Treatise upon the United States
Courts and their Practice vols I and II (Diossy, 1871) (vol II refers to a law giving "white
persons" the burden of proof when contesting title with an Indian (at 125); and "Indians" as
"competent witnesses" (at 136)); A. J. Peeler, A Treatise on Law and Equity as Distin-
guished and Enforced in the Courts of the United States (Swindells, 1883) (Indian treaties
and citizenship discussed); Samuel T. Spear, The Law of the Federal Judiciary: A Treatise
180 (Baker, Voorhis, 1883) ("for the purpose of making treaties with them, these tribes have
been recognized as States, in the general political sense they are not foreign States, and not
States of the Union, and, as tribes, not citizens or subjects of either class of States ...
[t]heir status is that of dependent nations within the general jurisdiction of the United
States."); Samuel A. Blatchford, General Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
(Banks & Bros., 1884) (no index reference to Indian tribes); Erastus Thatcher, A Digest of
Statutes, Equity Rules, and Decisions upon the Jurisdiction, Pleadings, and Practice of
the Circuit Court of the United States (Little Brown, 1883) (several references to Indians
and Indian country); A. H. Garland and Robert Ralston, A Treatise on the Constitution
and Jurisdiction of the United States Courts vols I and II (T.& J.W. Johnson & Co, 1898)
(several references to Indian territory and courts); Robert Desty, A Manual of Practice in
the Courts of the United States (Bancroft Whitney, 9th ed, 1899), in 4 vols (several men-
tions of Indian in index); Howard M. Carter, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts As Limited
By the Citizenship and Residence of the Parties, (Little Brown, 1899) (no index reference
to tribes); Charles Bunn, A Brief Survey of the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of
the United States (West, 1914) (no index reference to Indian tribes); Orlando F. Bump, The
Title Judiciary in the Revised Statutes of the United States and The Rules Promulgated
by the Supreme Court and Forms (Cushings and Bailey, 1881) (no index reference to Indian
tribes); Roger Foster, A Treatise on Federal Practice vols I and II (Callaghan, 3d ed 1901)
(reference to jurisdiction/Indians); John W. Dwyer, The Law and Procedure of United
States Courts 32 (Wahr, 1901) (Indian tribes in index); Robert M. Hughes, Handbook of
Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts (West, 1904) (no index reference to
Indian tribes); Robert M. Hughes, Handbook of Jurisdiction and Procedure in United
States Courts 196 (West, 2d ed 1913) (references to jurisdiction and Indian land); C. L.
Bates, Federal Procedure at Law, vols I and II (T.H. Flood, 1908) (Indian tribes discussed
in reference to jurisdiction and citizenship); John C. Rose, Jurisdiction and Procedure of
the Federal Courts (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1922) (reference to Indian jurisdictional issues)
(Matthew Bender, 3d ed 1926) (same references).
Other early books on the federal/state court systems include George C. Holt, The Con-
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judiciary's business since 1789, and that, given the powers that
the federal judiciary exercised, intense study was appropriate. 46 Al-
though the book is titled "The Business of the Supreme Court,"
the subtitle is "A Study in the Federal Judicial System, ' 47 and
much of the subject matter reflects the subtitle. Chapters are de-
voted to the circuit courts and specialized courts as well as to the
Supreme Court. The subject matter is wide-ranging, but the role of
the federal courts vis-a-vis Indian tribes is not considered.
A second major marker of a distinct jurisprudence of federal
courts is Felix Frankfurter's and Wilber G. Katz's (and later
Frankfurter's and Harry Shulman's) Cases and Other Authorities
on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure,5 which was published in
1931 as a vehicle for teaching students about the federal courts.49
current Jurisdiction of the Federal and State Courts (Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1888); John
Shields, Federal Courts and Practice (Banks, 1912); and Charles P. Williams, Jurisdiction
and Practice of the Federal Courts (F.H. Thomas, 1917), none of which focused upon the
relationship between federal courts and Indian tribes. Shields does have a chapter on Terri-
torial courts, in which mention is made of Indian Territory, and the five tribes, Cherokees,
Creeks, Choctaws, Seminoles and Chickasaws, described as "separate nations." Shields, Fed-
eral Courts at 133. George F. Longsdorf, Encyclopedia of Federal Procedure (Callaghan,
1930) includes three categories about Indian Tribes (Indian Lands, Indian Reservations, and
Indians); the 1939 supplement, edited by John M. Greenfield, substantially expands the
discussion of Indians.
"' Frankfurter and Landis, at preface, vi (cited in note 44).
" In the same year that the Frankfurter and Landis book was published, Armistead M.
Dobie, then a law professor at the University of Virginia Law School, published a book
entitled Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 1928). Professor Dobie
stated that he "had the practitioner primarily in mind" but hoped that law students would
also find his work "useful." Id at v. Indians are mentioned in the book, in relationship to
district court jurisdiction over allotment issues, id at 261-62, and in a discussion of the Con-
gressional power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, id at 50-51.
' Frankfurter and Landis at 1 (cited in note 44).
48 Frankfurter and Katz (cited in note 16); Felix Frankfurter and Harry Schulman,
Cases and Authority on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (Callaghan, rev ed 1937)
("Frankfurter and Schulman").
4" As mentioned in note 44, several textbooks and treatises were already in use. The
Frankfurter and Katz book was a casebook, rather than a treatise. Again, dependent upon
what law libraries have saved, I have found only two earlier casebooks on the federal courts.
In 1917, George W. Rightmire, a professor at Ohio State University College of Law, pub-
lished Cases and Readings on the Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (W.H.
Anderson, 1917). Professor Rightmire noted that, while the "traditional method" of teaching
had been by lecture and text, the case method seemed "as highly desirable" for teaching
federal jurisdiction as for other subjects. Id at v. Professor Rightmire excluded from his
materials "the large special subjects: bankruptcy, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and
patents" on the ground that they receive "adequate treatment" elsewhere in the curriculum.
Id. The book has no index, but neither its Table of Contents nor List of Cases makes refer-
ence to major Indian cases.
In 1926, Harold R. Medina, then a professor at Columbia University Law School, pub-
lished Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 1926). In his Preface, Professor
Medina stated that, given the "substantial expansion and extension of the federal judicial
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In the introduction to the first edition, the authors argued for a
place in the curriculum for a course on federal jurisdiction and
procedure, as distinct from federal "practice."50 The authors
sought to provide a curriculum appropriate to a "university law
school,"51 and they claimed that their subject - the structure of
the courts and the relationships between federal and state courts
- provided history, doctrine, and political science worthy of law
schools.52 The authors chose to exclude the "'federal specialties' -
admiralty, bankruptcy, the federal criminal law, Indian land litiga-
tion, patents" - from their book, because the jurisdictional and
procedural problems identified with these subjects were "so inti-
mately connected with their substantive law" that these fields were
better left to "specialists."" What remained within the canon were
discussions of categories familiar by virtue of contemporary con-
versations: the exploration of "case or controversy" requirements;
the power of the federal courts to make common law; the jurisdic-
tional boundaries described by diversity; federal questions; habeas
corpus; and the appellate and original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.54
Frankfurter and Katz were evidently hoping to influence the
choice of teaching materials used in on-going courses in law
power," lawyers need to have a "thorough understanding of the federal judicial system." Id
at iii. Professor Medina included some "details of practice," but his goal was to lay a "solid
foundation of principle and precedent." Id. The Index does not refer specifically to Indian
tribes and one of the cases included mentions the Cherokee Nation case, 30 US (5 Pet) 1
(1831). Id at 610.
50 Frankfurter and Katz at v (cited in note 16) (emphasis in the original). Statement
repeated in Frankfurter and Schulman (cited in note 48).
51 Frankfurter and Katz at v (cited in note 16).
62 Id at viii-ix.
11 Id at x n 1. In the 1931 edition, the specialties of "admiralty," "federal common law,
crimes," and "patent" were separately indexed at 755, 760, and 763, respectively. In the
1937 edition, all the "specialties" save "Indian law" were accorded separate headings in the
index (admiralty, id at 817; bankruptcy, id at 818; federal common law crimes, id at 822,
and patent, id at 828).
"4 Frankfurter and Katz (cited in note 16), Table of Contents at ix, and the chapters
noted therein. In the 1931 edition of the casebook, the major categories were: "case and
controversy," "legislative courts," "law applied in the federal courts," "jurisdiction" in the
trial courts, concurrent jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction, and Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Id at ix-x. For discussion of how, after the early 1930s, Frankfurter aided in the creation of
doctrinal limits on federal courts' jurisdiction, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan L Rev 1371, 1417-52 (1987). For
those who enjoy federal courts trivia, note that Herbert Wechsler did a book review of the
Frankfurter and Katz materials. Herbert Wechsler, Cases and Other Authorities on Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 32 Colum L Rev 774 (1932). ("[T]he book sets a stage for a
grand performance [but the book's] weakness [is that it] raises the vital questions but it
does not attempt to answer them, nor to provide the materials for doing so").
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schools. The third American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
directory, which appeared in 1924, listed a course in "federal juris-
diction and procedure,"55 and starting in 1932, listed the course as
"federal jurisdiction."56 In the 1931 edition of the AALS Direc-
tory,57 Felix Frankfurter (along with several others)" was de-
scribed as having taught a federal jurisdiction course for more than
ten years 59-indicating that in the 1920s and 1930s federal courts
courses were offered at several law schools.
60
The contemporary conception of a course about the federal
courts took shape in 1953 when Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler
published The Federal Courts and the Federal System. 1 "Hart
11 My reference to the third AALS directory again reflects library holdings. The AALS
was founded in 1900 but it did not have a permanent office until 1963; its files moved from
officer to officer. The AALS was incorporated in 1971 and its current files date from 1973. A
committee has been appointed to work on the Association's archives. Conversation with
Betsy Levin, Executive Director of the AALS (Nov. 23, 1988).
" Note that in 1986 the AALS added "sections" on both federal courts and Native
American Law. See Association of American Law Schools, Directory of Law Teachers, 1986-
87 932, 976 (West, 1986).
11 That volume, in so far as I can ascertain, was the first one to list teachers by subject
matter. See Association of American Law Schools, Directory of Teachers in Member
Schools 139-169 (West, 1931) ("Directory"). Before that, teachers were listed alphabetically,
with the courses taught listed after each name.
11 AALS, 1931 Directory 153 (cited in note 57). Included in the list of those teaching
"Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure" for more than ten years were: Edwin C. Brandenburg
(George Washington); Armistead Mason Dobie (Virginia); Ira Samuel Flory (Louisiana
State); Felix Frankfurter (Harvard); Jason E. Payne (South Dakota); and John Weld Peck
(Cincinnati). Id. As of 1915, John Wurts was described as teaching "Federal Practice" at
Yale Law School. Notes and Personals, 4 Am L Sch Rev 51 (1915). In 1904, Stuart MacKib-
bin at Northern Indiana Law School was teaching a course called "Federal Practice." 1 Am
L Sch Rev 242 (1904). See also Charles W. Needham, Schools of Law: The Subjects, Order
and Method of Study, 21 Reports of the ABA 615, 627 (1898) (advocating a course on fed-
eral jurisdiction in the third year of law school).
11 AALS, 1931 Directory at 153 (1931) (cited in note 57); see also 1932 Directory at 157.
10 According to another book review of the Frankfurter and Katz book, "about thirty"
law schools belonging to the AALS included a federal jurisdiction/courts course among their
offerings. Charles T. McCormick, Book Review, 80 U Pa L Rev 472, 474 (1931). In the 1930s
and 1940s, other books on federal courts were published, among them Mahlon E. Wilson's
Federal Courts (Grocer, 1930) (lectures at the Law Department of the University of Utah;
no mention of major Indian cases); W.S. Simkin and Alfred John Schweppe, Simkins Fed-
eral Practice (Law Co-op, rev ed 1934) (Indians referenced for allotment jurisdiction); Rob-
ert Jennings Harris, The Judicial Power of the United States (LSU, 1940) (Indian tribes
not mentioned in index); and George Foster Longsdorf, Cyclopedia of Federal Practice,
Civil and Criminal (Callaghan, 1928, with supp, 1939) (8 vol plus 1939 Supplement) (Indian
tribes discussed in relation to jurisdictional issues).
"1 Cited in note 16. A few other casebooks predated this one but were focused more on
procedure and federal jurisdiction than on the "federal system." See Charles T. McCormick
and James Chadbourn, Cases and Materials on Federal Courts (Foundation, 1946) (because
the federal court structure had changed a good deal over the past half century, the authors
stated that an "ordered reconsideration of the whole structure seems long overdue." Id at ix.
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and Wechsler" is an important touchstone for what federal courts'
jurisprudence has been from the 1950s to the present. In 1953,
Hart and Wechsler followed the choice made by Frankfurter, Katz,
and Shulman in the 1930s; Indian tribe materials were not listed
separately in the book's index.12 Unlike Frankfurter and his co-
authors, however, Hart and Wechsler brought the "federal special-
ties" of admiralty, bankruptcy, and patent in from the cold; they
were all listed as within the framework of "The Federal Courts and
the Federal System."63
Since the 1950s, many have written materials for the subject
matter denominated "federal courts", "federal jurisdiction", and
the "federal system". Most of the books refer hardly at all or only
in notes to Indian tribe cases."4 The silence has not been complete;
a few books have made references to federal treatment of Indian
tribes.6 5 In general, however, materials about Indian tribes are not
part of the federal courts' canon.
In the acknowledgments, they credited "those who have broken the trails which we follow -
Medina, Frankfurter, Dobie." (Id at xi); Armistead Dobie and Mason Ladd, Cases and
Materials on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 1940); Ray Forrester, ed, Dobie
and Ladd: Cases and Materials on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 2d ed 1950).
2 In the 1953 edition, Indians do not appear as a category, but under "legislative
courts" reference is made to the "Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship court" at 1436. In the
1973 edition of Hart and Wechsler by Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro,
and Herbert Wechsler, (Foundation, 2d ed 1973) the index does make a reference to "Indi-
ans," and the topics listed are "[e]ligibility for diversity jurisdiction" and "[j]usticiability of
political questions related to" id at 1645. Reference is also made to "Indian lands," with the
topic listed as including "validity of Congressional allotment acts," at 1645, and "Indian
Claims Commission," including "Indian claims against the US," id at 1645. In the 1988 Hart
and Wechsler (cited in note 16), neither Native American nor Indian tribes is a category in
the index. See pages 1890 and 1892. Indians are listed as a subcategory under political ques-
tions at 1893.
"s 1953 edition - admiralty at 1423, bankruptcy at 1424, patent at 1438; 1973 edition
- admiralty at 1631, bankruptcy at 1633, patent at 1649; 1988 edition - admiralty at 1879,
bankruptcy at 1880, patent at 1893. Federal criminal law continues not to receive distinct
treatment.
See, for example, the recent editions of David P. Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and
Materials (West, 3d ed 1982); Ray Forrester and John E. Moye, Cases and Materials on
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 3d ed 1977); Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries,
Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations (Foundation, 1987) ("Low and
Jeffries"); Charles T. McCormick, James H. Chadbourn, and Charles A. Wright, Cases and
Materials on Federal Courts (Foundation, 8th ed 1988); Martin Redish, Cases, Comments
and Questions on Federal Courts (West, 2d ed 1989); Charles A. Wright, Federal Courts:
Cases and Materials (Foundation, 1986).
5 See the 1973 edition of Hart and Wechsler for index listing on Indian tribes (cited in
note 62); Howard P. Fink and Mark V. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice
258 (Michie, 2d ed 1987) ("Fink and Tushnet").
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B. Premises of the Law of Federal Courts
Several of the current federal courts casebooks" begin with
Marbury v Madison,6 7 which is used to state basic principles: that
the government of the United States is one of "powers limited";
that the Supreme Court holds the power to decide when other
branches of the federal government have unconstitutionally "tran-
scended" their powers; and that the Constitution is the repository
of statements of the powers and limits of the federal government.6 8
Of course, the matters of "powers limited" is much more complex,
as each account of the federal courts' "story" quickly develops. For
example, when considering the power of the Congress over the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts, questions soon emerge about the
breadth of authority granted in Article III to the Congress. 9 Con-
gress is often said to have "plenary power" over the federal courts'
jurisdiction.70 But not quite. Most commentators assume that a
law that provided jurisdiction in the federal courts for white citi-
zens but not for blacks would be unconstitutional - not because it
violated the text of Article III, but because another part of the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, constrains congressional action.7'
66 See, for example, Hart and Weschler's Federal Courts, 3d ed at 72 (cited in note 16);
Low and Jeffries at 1 (cited in note 64); Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials 19
(cited in note 64). Compare Fink and Tushnet (cited in note 65) which begins with a discus-
sion of the "allocation of power between state and federal courts." Id at 3-22.
67 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
68 Marbury 5 US (1 Cranch) at 176. ("The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
... The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if
those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed ... ).
69 Ex Porte McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) 506, 514 (1869) ("We are not at liberty to in-
quire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine its power under the Constitu-
tion; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by
express words"); Sheldon v Sill, 49 US (8 How) 441, 449 (1850) ("[H]aving a right to pre-
scribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enu-
merated controversies").
70 See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U Pa L Rev 157, 158 (1960); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev
1362 (1953). But see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:
A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U Pa L Rev 741, 796,
840-55 (1984).
71 See Sager, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 26-27 (cited in note 17) (a federal "court is obliged not
to participate in unconstitutional conduct, and. . . a restriction [based on race, religion, or
political affiliation] makes fidelity to that obligation impossible."). See also Clarke v United
States, 705 F Supp 605, 612 (D DC 1988) ("The authority retained by Congress... is ... as
broad as Congress' plenary power to legislate for the District, but that authority itself is not
limitless. . . . [T]hat exercise of authority must be constitutional") (emphasis in the
original).
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Constitutionality is at the heart of discussions of the federal
courts.72 From the principle of limited governmental powers con-
strained by constitutional commitment (if not always by the text
itself), a problem arises: how to explain and rationalize the growth
of national powers in the context of a history of dual sovereignty,
of a government founded on the idea that the states have con-
sented to some form of simultaneous yet non-identical power-hold-
ing by state and federal governments. The recurring questions are:
Who - the federal government or the states - gets to decide
what issues? What kind of deference is owed by federal courts to
the state courts? As federal courts' jurisprudence emerged during
the New Deal era, scholarship and course materials reflected some
ambivalence toward the federal courts. At once supportive of na-
tionalization but wary of expansive federal court activity, the 1953
Hart and Wechsler casebook underscored both the unity of the
federal court system and the importance of the state courts. As
Akhil Amar has described, the 1953 version provided a "modest
role" for the federal courts, both in their relationship to other
branches of the federal government and in their relationship to the
state courts.
73
The changing perception of the federal courts in the 1960s
during the civil rights era required some revision of the New Deal
understandings. For many "children of the 1960s," the federal
courts were special, populated by admirable spokespersons of na-
tional norms of equality and tolerance - heroes who vindicated
the promise of the Bill of Rights. A new generation of scholars
claimed a distinctive mission for the federal courts.7 4 Richard Fal-
lon's recent article captures the conversation between those shaped
by the experiences of the New Deal and those shaped by the civil
rights revolution of the 1960s. Fallon describes "two models of ju-
dicial federalism." He denominates one as "Federalist," rooted "in
a theory of the understanding that surrounded the framing and
ratification of the original Constitution in 1787 and 1788 ... [and
out of which comes an] interpretative framework [in which] states
emerge as sovereign entities against which federal courts should
exercise only limited powers, and state courts, which are presumed
2 In symbolic as well as textual terms. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 Stan L Rev 1, 17-20 (1984); Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil
Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev 113 (1987).
" Amar, 102 Harv L Rev at 698 (cited in note 34).
"' See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105 (1977); Owen M. Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 Yale L J 1103 (1977); Amar, 102 Harv L Rev 688 (cited in note 34).
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to be as fair and competent as federal courts, stand as the ultimate
guarantors of constitutional rights. '75 In contrast, the "Nationalist
model... emphasizes the vast reordering of federal relations inau-
gurated by the Civil War and Reconstruction . . . [from which
emerge] its premises that state sovereignty interests must yield to
the vindication of federal rights and that, because state courts
should not be presumed as competent as federal courts to enforce
constitutional liberties, rights to have federal issues adjudicated in




Efforts to encapsulate the issues of federal courts' jurispru-
dence as national versus state control leave out some concerns that
are, for me, of compelling importance. Current political and social
issues make state sovereignty and limited federal governmental
powers increasingly tenuous premises. The federal and state gov-
ernments are profoundly interconnected, as federal statutes pro-
vide for incentive grants, conditional grants, and joint welfare dis-
tribution programs.7 Delineations between the branches of the
federal government are also not sharp, as a rigid separation of
powers doctrine is rejected in favor of a less formalistic and more
fluid model. 8 The environmentalists warn about acid rain and
toxic waste, and homeless individuals migrate from place to place
in search of warmth and shelter. National programs, national
norms, and national environmental risks all challenge the rele-
vance of the geographic and political boundaries of states.
The task for federal courts' jurisprudence is to understand
what might be meant by a claim of allegiance to more than one
sovereign and what meaning, if any, inheres in the idea of states as
"sovereigns. '7 9 In an array of circumstances, federal courts' juris-
prudence must question whether shared and concurrent jurisdic-
tion remains viable and must explore whether to embrace or resist
7 Fallon, 74 Va L Rev at 1143-44 (cited in note 34).
76 Id at 1144-45 (footnotes omitted).
7 See generally Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum L Rev 847 (1979); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga L Rev
917 (1985); John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 79 Am Pol Sci Rev 994
(1985). See also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543
(1954).
78 Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 647 (1989) (sentencing guidelines, formulated
with judicial participation, do not violate separation of powers); Morrison v Olson, 108 S Ct
2597 (1988) (judicial role in appointing special prosecutor does not violate separation of
powers).
79 See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Fed-
eralism after "Garcia", 1985 S Ct Rev 341.
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the pressures towards nationalization and homogenization. Are the
states really coherent descriptions of viable political entities, or are
they a fiction left over from an earlier era?80 Will and should the
federal government tolerate sustained deviation from its norms?
Are the forces of centralization and assimilation so great that the
only laws that matter, ultimately, are national laws? Should the
country strive to have a central government (with some measure of
decentralization or delegation) or try to preserve some form of dis-
tinction between governments and encourage multiple sovereign-
ties, multiple court systems, and multiple norms? While some fed-
eral courts' scholars address some of these issues in the context of
state and federal relations,8 ' the law about Indian tribes helps un-
derscore the centrality of these questions for federal courts' juris-
prudence and helps to suggest some of the kinds of responses
available.
II. THE INDIAN TRIBES' RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES
I have had the opportunity to discuss the issues raised in this
paper with many people. I have learned that, at least within the
legal academy, a common perception is that federal Indian law is
complex, foreign, very different, and thus an area set aside for "ex-
perts" alone. This essay is an effort to demonstrate that one need
not know "everything" to speak a little, that just as those of "us"
(within the legal academy) who are not economists, philosophers,
political scientists, or feminist theorists integrate insights from ec-
onomics, philosophy, political science and feminist theory, we can
also integrate an area of law that challenges, admittedly and inter-
estingly, some of the rules we take for granted.
Since the starting point for federal courts' jurisprudence is the
Constitution, that is an appropriate place to begin a brief overview
of federal Indian law. The Constitution refers explicitly in three
places to Indians."2 First, Indians "not taxed" are excluded for
1o See Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and
the Spending Power, 57 U Colo L Rev 793 (1986).
" See especially the rich set of writings generated in the wake of National League of
Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976), and Garcia v San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 US
528 (1985), many of which are explored in Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum L Rev 1 (1988); in
Rapaczynski, 1985 S Ct Rev 341 (cited in note 79); and in Federalism and the Constitution:
A Symposium on Garcia (Advisory Comm on Intergovtl Relations, July 1987).
82 Charles Wilkinson states that tribes "were considered only six times in the Constitu-
tion." In addition to counting the two references to apportionment and the Indian com-
merce clause, he refers to Art I, § 8, cl 11 (Congress' war-making powers); Art VI, cl 2
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purposes of apportioning members of the House of Representatives
among the states.83 Second, the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes. 4 Third, the
Fourteenth Amendment reiterates the exclusion of "Indians not
taxed" for purposes of apportionment. 5 In addition to specific ref-
erences, the constitutional grants of power to the Congress to make
regulations governing the territories" and to the President to make
treaties8 have been read as empowering those branches to relate to
Indian tribes.
8
To the extent Indian tribes are discussed in the Constitution,
they seem to be recognized as having a status outside its parame-
ters. Indian tribes are treated as entities with whom to have com-
merce and to make treaties. The tribes also seem to be freed from
the taxing power of either the state or federal governments.89 The
constitutional references fit with the fact that the Indian tribes did
not take part in the Constitutional Convention and did not join in
the federation of powers. As many scholars have discussed, one
might describe the relationship between the Indian tribes and the
United States as that between two sovereigns, and locate the rele-
vant legal discourse as that of international law.90 Thus, one might
(treaties as supreme law); and Art II, § 2, cl 2 (presidential treaty-making powers). Charles
F. Wilkinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees when Indian Tribes Act as Majority Societies:
The Case of the Winnebago Retrocession, 21 Creighton L Rev 773, 774-75 (1988).
83 US Const, Art I, § 2, cl 3.
8, US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
85 US Const, Amend XIV, § 2.
86 US Const, Art IV, § 3, cl 2.
87 US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2.
88 Using these constitutional bases for Indian tribe/federal government relations is diffi-
cult for several reasons. First, during the treaty-making era, much of the treaty drafting was
done by federal officials and some have suggested that those who signed on behalf of Indian
tribes were not authorized to do so. Second, treaties were not made with all tribes, but
federal control has extended over all the tribes. Third, even before twentieth century expan-
sion of the "commerce clause" interpretations, the Supreme Court upheld broad congres-
sional powers over Indian tribes. See, for example, Indian Appropriations Act of March 3,
1885, 23 Stat 385; upheld in United States v Kagama, 118 US at 378-80. Finally, claims of
federal power based upon the authority to govern the "territories" depend upon whether
Indian country is properly construed as federal "territory." See generally Barsh and Hen-
derson, The Road at ch 7 (cited in note 22).
9 Barsh and Henderson, The Road at ch 4 (cited in note 22). On continuing "outside"
status, see Barsh and Henderson, The Road at prologue; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Alge-
bra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wisc L Rev 219. Charles Wilkinson argues that the
"Constitution recognizes a third source of domestic sovereignty - the governmental status
of American Indian tribes." Wilkinson, 21 Creighton L Rev at 774 (cited in note 82). Profes-
sor Wilkinson does, however, note the "Constitution's vague treatment of Indian tribes." Id
at 775.
90 See, for example, Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Prin-
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conclude, Indian tribes are not part of the federal system, and
hence, are appropriately not part of a discussion of federal courts
jurisprudence.
However, in 1871, the federal government halted its treaty-
making with the Indian tribes. By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the lack of participation by the Indian tribes in the federa-
tion process ceased to reflect the distance between the federal gov-
ernment and the Indian tribes, at least in so far as the federal
government was concerned. Congress regulated the internal affairs
of Indian tribes and the Supreme Court upheld such regulation as
within Congress's power to protect its "wards." 9' Although Chief
Justice John Marshall cast the emerging claim of federal plenary
power over Indian tribes in terms of the right of "discovery," 2 the
uncomfortable truth (referred to in several Supreme Court opin-
ions93) is that the "right," if that term is apt, derived from con-
quest. The United States had the physical power and used it.94 By
virtue of force, the federal government took land, removed people
from their homes, attempted to dissuade them from observing
their customs, and imposed its rule.95 The United States had offi-
cial policies aimed at "relocation"9 6 and "termination ' 97 of Indian
ciples of Federal Indian Law, 64 ND L Rev 73 (1988). For discussion of the pre-colonial
relationships that underscore the historical basis of an international law approach, see Rob-
ert N. Clinton, Proclamation of 1763, Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State
Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs (November, 1988) (manuscript on file with
the University of Chicago Law Review). See also Barsh and Henderson, The Road at ch 4
(cited in note 22).
91 United States v. Kagama, 118 US at 383. The Kagama Court spoke of the ward/
guardian relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government and the federal
government's "protection" of the tribes from the states.
92 Johnson v M'Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 573 (1823). Compare Joseph Story, A
Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States, at 14-15 (Hilliard, Gray & Co,
1834) ("it seems difficult to perceive, what ground of right any discovery could confer").
11 "Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were de-
prived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of
acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquer-
ors' will that deprived them of their land." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US
272, 289-90 (1955) (Reed, for the Court); "discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest .. . [c]onquest gives a title
which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny .. " Johnson v M'Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat)
543, 587-88 (1823) (Marshall, for the Court); "power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after
possession, are conceded by the world." Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 543 (1832).
" For more on jurisdiction by violence, see Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss, and Judith
Resnik, Procedure 1350-62 (Foundation, 1988) (discussing United States v Toscanio, 500
F2d 267 (2d Cir 1974)), and Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L J 1601 (1986).
9 See generally Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American
Justice ch 1 (U Tex, 1983).
96 In 1835, the United States government required the Cherokee Nation to move from
the South to the West. This trek came to be known as the "trail of tears" because thousands
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tribes, yet no document authorized that breadth of federal con-
trol.98 No consent of the governed (not even weak versions of con-
sent theory) can be offered in support of the authority exercised by
"the federal system" over Indian tribes.
Supreme Court case law repeatedly creates and then recog-
nizes the enormity of the "plenary" federal power over the Indian
tribes.9 Take, for example, a statement quoted in a recent Su-
preme Court case: "'[A]Ul aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject
to defeasance by Congress.' "100 Ordinary constitutional exegesis
perished as they moved west of the Mississippi. Other Eastern tribes followed thereafter.
See Treaty with the Choctow Indians (at Dancing Rabbit Creek) in Francis Paul Prucha, ed,
Documents of the United States Indian Policy 53 (U Nebraska, 1975) (Choctow removal).
11 In the 1950s, the federal government "terminated" its recognition of the sovereignty
of several tribes. HR Con Res 108, 67 Stat B132 (1953). In some instances, courts have held
that such "termination" was illegal. See Smith v United States, 515 F Supp 56, 58 (N D Cal
1978). For a list of many of the terminated tribes and discussion of termination, see Wilkin-
son, 21 Creighton L Rev at 777 (cited in note 82).
98 Some Indian tribes ceded some powers to the federal government-via treaties and
via constitutions and bylaws written under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (see notes
150-53, 184-96 and accompanying text). Neither kind of document supports the breadth of
actual congressional intervention. For a discussion of how to create constitutionally-based
limits on federal powers, see Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense
of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 Stan L Rev 979 (1981).
Clinton argues that the framers of the Constitution intended to give Congress power to
make treaties with Indians but not to control intra-tribal affairs. Clinton does note that the
"Indian commerce clause" could be read as expansively as the "interstate commerce clause."
Id at 997. Under such a reading, the constitutional limits on congressional power over In-
dian tribes may be more formal than real.
11 See Ball, 1987 Am B Found Res J at 46-59 (cited in note 21); Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U Pa L Rev 195, 197-
98, 207-28, 236 ("plenary power" doctrine has been narrowed since the 1930s, but limits on
congressional power still unclear); Comment, Inherent Indian Sovereignty, 4 Am Indian L
Rev 311, 316-20 (1976) (by Jessie D. Green and Susan Work). For debate about the utility
for Indian tribes of Congressional "plenary power," see Robert Laurence, Learning to Live
with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz L Rev 413 (1988)
(replying to Williams, 1986 Wisc L Rev 219 (cited in note 89)); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence, 30 Ariz L
Rev 439 (1988); Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated Hitter Rule and
"The Actual State of Things", 30 Ariz L Rev 459 (1988). For analysis of how the "mythol-
ogy" of "plenary power" grew and the harm that it does, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Emer-
gence of a National Indian Policy: Parens Patriae and Indian Tribal Sovereignty, (manu-
script on file with the University of Chicago Law Review).
110 National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v Crow Tribe, 471 US 845, 851 n 10 (1985), quot-
ing Escondodo Mutual Water Co. v LaJolla Bands of Mission Indians, 466 US 765, 788 n
30 (1984). See also Wallace v Adams, 204 US 415, 423 (1907) (Congress has plenary power
over tribal membership), and cases cited by Ball, 1987 A B Found Res J at 49-58 (cited in
note 21), and by Williams, 30 Ariz L Rev at 445-47 (cited in note 99). Recently, the Supreme
Court has begun to forge a doctrine of limitations on Congress's plenary powers, although
the contours are still ill-defined. See, for example, Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v
Weeks, 430 US 73, 84 (1977) (plenary power "does not mean that all federal legislation
concerning Indians is... immune from judicial scrutiny"); United States v Tillamooks, 329
1989]
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 693 1989
The University of Chicago Law Review
would oblige the Court then to make reference to some provision
in the Constitution, or other documents such as treaties, by which
the Indian tribes ceded powers to the central government. More-
over, ordinary constitutional exegesis would also describe federal
powers as having boundaries, albeit sometimes vague ones. Even
when constitutional theorists believe in the plenary power of one
branch of the federal government in particular instances, reference
is made to constraints, to power that is checked - either by politi-
cal recall, dependence upon other branches for implementation of
the decisions made, or by other constitutional guarantees.10 1 Recall
the example mentioned above, that Congress has "plenary power"
over the federal courts' jurisdiction. While federal courts scholars
are used to hearing that claim, they are similarly used to explain-
ing that "plenary power" always comes with the caveat: but see the
Bill of Rights.0 2
Not so for Congress's power over the Indian tribes. There is no
"but see the Bill of Rights" because the United States Supreme
Court has held that the Bill of Rights has little application to In-
dian law. Members of Indian tribes cannot make Bill of Rights
claims against their tribes,103 and Indian tribes are not protected
by the Bill of Rights from federal decisions. For example, the Su-
preme Court has stated that "Indian occupancy, [on land] not spe-
cifically recognized by action authorized by Congress, may be ex-
tinguished by the [federal] Government without confpensation."'' 4
US 40, 54 (1948) (plurality opinion) ("The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a
plenary nature; but it is not absolute"). For commentary raising concerns about the source
and nature of federal judicial power over Indian tribes, see Ball, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J
at 46-61 (cited in note 21). See also William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in
American Law Today, 62 Wash L Rev 1, 19-22 (1987).
101 See Morrison v Olson, 108 S Ct 2597, 2629 (1988) (Scalia dissenting) (presidential
powers to prosecute are exclusive but are checked by political scrutiny).
102 See, for example, Sager, 95 Harv L Rev at 26-27 (cited in note 17). As Sager dis-
cusses, in addition to the "external" constraint imposed by the Bill of Rights, many theo-
rists believe that Article III itself limits Congress's authority over federal court jurisdiction.
Another area of law in which "plenary power" may not be constrained by Bill of Rights
protections is immigration law. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 Colum L Rev 1, 18-24 (1984). See generally and Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M.
Smith, Citizenship without Consent (Yale, 1985).
103 See Talton v Mayes, 163 US 376, 384 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 56. But
see Collifiower v Garland, 342 F2d 369 (9th Cir 1965) (applying Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess protections to individual challenging tribal court action). As discussed, the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC §§ 1301-1303, creates statutory rights that are akin to much of
the Bill of Rights and that Indians may invoke against their tribe. See note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
104 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272, 288 (1955). According to that
case, aboriginal Indian land is not "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes absent a clear
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As William Canby has recently explained, "the sovereignty of the
tribes is subject to exceptionally great powers of Congress to regu-
late and modify the status of the tribes."1 5
Moreover, in contrast to the assumption that, whatever Con-
gress might be able to do about the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, Congress surely could not use race as a jurisdictional cate-
gory, 106 jurisdiction in cases involving Indians is jurisdiction based
in part upon race. The status of "Indian" is defined, to some ex-
tent and in some contexts, by virtue of the quantum of "Indian
blood" that an individual has.10 7 Federal courts have jurisdiction
over certain crimes committed in Indian country that involve "In-
dians,"'08 and Indian tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over
member "Indians" but not over non-Indians. 09
Even in an era when many are comfortable with penumbras of
constitutional interpretation," 0 it is difficult to "interpret" the
Constitution in a manner that supports the proposition that the
Congress has "plenary" control over intra-Indian tribe activities"'
or that Congress can make or sanction racially-based jurisdictional
congressional statement that Indian land is Indian land. Id at 278-91. See United States v
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 US 371, 415 n 29 (1980) ("Of course, it has long been held
that the taking by the United States of 'unrecognized' or 'aboriginal' Indian title is not
compensable under the Fifth Amendment"). Note that individual Indians can claim Fifth
Amendment protection from takings, Hodel v Irving, 107 S Ct 2076 (1987), and that the
Supreme Court has constructed a trust/fiduciary doctrine to afford some protection to In-
dian tribal land claims. See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment
Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the "Sioux Nation" Rule, 61 Or L Rev 245 (1982).
100 Canby, 62 Wash L Rev 1 (cited in note 100).
106 See Sager, 95 Harv L Rev at 26-27 (cited in note 17).
1 See, for example, 25 CFR § 20.1(n) (1988) (for purposes of certain "human services"
programs, 'Indian' means any person who is a member, or a one-fourth degree or more blood
quantum descendent of a member of any Indian tribe.").
108 See 18 USC §§ 1152, 1153, 3242 (1982). See United States v Dodge, 538 F2d 770,
786-87 (8th Cir 1976) (blood quantum test). See generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Ju-
risdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz L Rev
503, 513-20 (1976).
100 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978). An issue currently debated
is the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. See United States v Wheeler,
435 US 313 (1978); and compare Duro v Reina, 851 F2d 1136 (9th Cir 1987), denial of
rehearing en banc, 860 F2d 1463 (9th Cir 1988), cert granted, 109 S Ct 1930 (1989) with
Greywater v Joshua, 846 F2d 486 (8th Cir 1988). See generally Michael J. Proctor, Tribal
Authority over Nonmember Indians, (manuscript on file with the University of Chicago
Law Review).
, * See generally Grey, 37 Stan L Rev 1 (cited in note 72); Paul Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU L Rev 204 (1980).
. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 56. See also Ball, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J at
46-55 (cited in note 21). But see Wilkinson, 21 Creighton L Rev at 775 (cited in note 82)
(the Indian commerce clause gives Congress "very broad authority to legislate over the
tribes").
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decisions. Charles Wilkinson provides an apt description: the rela-
tionship between the Indian tribes and the federal government is
"both pre-constitutional and extra-constitutional."112 As a conse-
quence, federal Indian law throws into doubt some of the standard
assumptions made by the legal academy in federal courts' jurispru-
dence. Instead of the expected (if complex) references to consent
and to a federal government of limited powers, other, often unspo-
ken rationales - conquest, violence, force - are the primary
sources of the power exercised by the federal government over In-
dian tribes."1 '
One can readily see how, when Felix Frankfurter and Wilber
Katz were fashioning a course in 1931 about the federal courts,
they might have perceived Indian tribal issues as different, as a
topic for "specialists. '114 Further, while Frankfurter, Katz, and
Shulman disdained "practice," the courses they constructed may
well have been aimed at helping students prepare for practice. The
traditional practice for graduates of elite law schools was not one
in which Indian tribes were clients.
But more underlies the exclusion of Indian tribe cases than a
sense that they require command of a complex body of statutes,
executive action, and doctrine that law students may be unlikely to
use in practice. Indian tribe cases are excluded because they are
painful. The history of United States' dealings with the peoples
who inhabited the continent before Western Europeans arrived is
one of conquest, exploitation, and eradication. 11 5 Phrases like "al-
lotment," "discovery," and "relocation," capture events that are
deeply embarrassing to those committed to a vision of a United
States founded upon consent and dedicated to non-discriminatory
treatment.116 Unlike the disturbing history of slavery, no arguably
comfortable mileposts are available. No Brown v Board of Educa-
... Wilkinson, Indian History at 116 (cited in note 21).
"' Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S Cal L Rev 1 (1983); Robert A. Williams,
Jr., Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 Ariz L Rev 165, 167-70
(1987).
:14 Frankfurter and Katz, Introduction, at viii n 1 (cited in note 16).
" See generally, Ball, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J 1 (cited in note 21); Barsh and Hen-
derson, The Road (cited in note 22); Williams, 1986 Wisc L Rev at 219 (cited in note 89).
116 See, for example, City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 109 S Ct 706 (1989) (race-
based distinctions very difficult to justify). The Supreme Court has sanctioned Indian pref-
erence programs, in part on the theory that such preferences are not "racial" but "designed
to further the cause of Indian self-government." Morton v Mancari, 417 US 535, 554 (1974).
For discussion of the "blatant doubletalk" in federal court dealings with Indian tribes, see
Aviam Soifer, Listening and the Voiceless, 4 Miss Coll L Rev 319, 323 (1984) (The Law and
Southern Literature Symposium).
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tion exists for Indian tribes.
The difficulty of engaging with cases about Indian tribes is ex-
acerbated in the context of federal courts' jurisprudence. Federal
Indian law challenges the central premises of "federal courts' ideol-
ogy." If Richard Fallon is correct that two models, one Nationalist
and one Federalist, capture the landscape of much of the debate
about the role of the federal courts,117 what place is there in either
model for conquest and violence? While Nationalists and Federal-
ists might disagree about the allocation of power between state and
federal government, the shared major premise - for Nationalist
and Federalist alike - is of constitutionally justified and limited
power. Bringing federal Indian law into the federal courts conver-
sation unsettles some familiar assumptions about restraint upon
the United States' legal authority. No act of interpretation and no
elaboration of consent theory can explain federal exercise of power
and dominion over Indian tribes. 1 8 Materials about relations be-
tween the United States and Indian tribes undermine the central
tenets of federal courts' jurisprudence - that the Constitution is
the beginning of the analysis for the exercise of all the powers of
the federal government, and that, by constitutional interpretation,
the federal powers are limited and constrained.
One might then conclude that such differences result in an ap-
propriate exclusion of federal Indian tribe law from consideration
of the relations between state and federal governments. Before
reaching such a conclusion, however, one should be reminded
about aspects of federal/state relations that are not often stressed.
In addition to Marbury v Madison, another centerpiece of federal
courts law is the case of Ex parte McCardle."9 McCardle involved
congressional withdrawal, in 1868, of the United States Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over a pending habeas corpus claim.
William H. McCardle was an editor of a newspaper, the Vicksburg
Times. He wrote and published an editorial that stated that the
Northern generals, then governing, were "each and all infamous,
cowardly, and abandoned villains who, instead of wearing shoulder
straps and ruling millions of people, should have their heads
shaved, their ears cropped, their foreheads branded, and their per-
" Fallon, 74 Va L Rev at 1143-45 (cited in note 34).
,S See Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 53-54, 83, 88-91 (cited in note 22) (tracing
the evolution of the relationship from one of treaty making to one in which Indian tribes are
described as "domestic dependent nations" and as "wards" and the power to govern them
explained as based upon federal "ownership of the country" (citing Cherokee Nation v
Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 16-18 (1831) and Kagama, 118 US 375, 379-80 (1886)).
19 74 US (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
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sons lodged in a penitentiary.""12 For this and other statements
urging whites to boycott the state constitutional convention, he
was imprisoned by the military government. McCardle sought
habeas relief; the Supreme Court put his case over to the next
Term, by which time Congress had rescinded the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. The Court then upheld that rescission.' The McCar-
dle opinion appears in many books about the federal courts, but
often with scant elaboration of the nature of the offense that
formed the basis for the detention 22 or of the conflicts over Recon-
struction between the Southern states and the Northern govern-
ment and among the branches of the federal government.'23
Nor is there much discussion of the degree to which conquest,
and not consent, formed the basis for the inclusion of the Four-
teenth Amendment in the United States Constitution. As Bruce
Ackerman explains, that amendment was not enacted "constitu-
tionally," in the sense that the requirements of Article V of the
Constitution were not met.12 4 Although the amendment was pro-
posed by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate, as required
by the Constitution, 2 5 representatives from the Southern states
were excluded from that Congress.'26 Questions can also be raised
about the ratification - either that the time to ratify ended before
the requisite number of states had approved the amendment 27 or
120 William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz L Rev 229,
236 n 42 (1973), quoting Vicksburg Times (Nov 6, 1867).
121 Ex parte McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) at 514.
121 See, for example, Hart and Wechsler at 364-66 (3d ed, cited in note 60); for a bit
more detail, see Low and Jeffries at 169 (cited in note 64); Fink and Tushnet at 259 (cited
in note 65).
'23 Bruce Ackerman, The Great Transformation: Ratifying the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, ch 10, Discovering the Constitution 107-36; 146-60 (manuscript on file with the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review) (in "bringing McCardle's predicament before the Supreme
Court," his lawyers "had no intention of arguing their case narrowly. . . . [P]etitioners
launched a broad-based attack on the very foundations of Congress' authority to displace
the Johnsonian governments with new constituencies defined by federal law." Id at 108-09
(footnote omitted)).
124 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L J
1013, 1063-69 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Conventionalizing Congress: The Fourteenth
Amendment, ch 8 Discovering the Constitution (cited in note 123).
125 US Const, Art V.
126 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 1147 (1866) (Senate), 943-50 (House). See Walter J.
Suthon, Jr., The Dubious Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 Tulane L Rev 22, 29
(1953); Ferdinand F. Fernandez, The Constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 S
Cal L Rev 378, 392-407 (1966); Joseph L. Call, The Fourteenth Amendment and its Skepti-
cal Background, 13 Baylor L Rev 1, 10-12 (1961).
12*1 Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and the Threat that it Poses to our Democratic Government, 11 SC L Q 484, 489-90
(1959).
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that a majority of eligible voters in all of the Southern states did
not ratify their state constitutions, thus making problematic the
capacity of those governments to ratify the amendments. 12 8 Thad-
deus Stevens, a member of Congress, explained congressional con-
trol over the South as based upon a "law of nations" that recog-
nized the "conqueror's right" to dictate to the South.129 Yet, little
is said about the conquest of the South in federal courts' jurispru-
dence and in the many discussions that assume the existence of
"state sovereignty," that all states have the same history of con-
sent to federal governance, and that the national government has
circumscribed authority.
13 0
Just as federal courts' jurisprudence has (despite the Southern
conquest) created a set of legalistic relationships between federal
government and the states, many commentators on Indian tribal
law advance the possibility of creating a legally constrained rela-
tionship between the federal government and Indian tribes. Nell
Jessup Newton argues for application of equal protection and due
process principles to Indian tribes.' 3 ' Charles Wilkinson writes
about developing "the constitutional status of tribalism," based in
part on treaties among "the three landed sovereigns," Indian
tribes, states, and the federal government.'32 Robert Williams
wants to turn to international law paradigms to delineate discrete
spheres for Indian tribes, thereby enabling "Indian Nations to add
their own voice to the competing discourses of the international
community.' 1 33 Russel Barsh and James Henderson seek a tribal
federalism in which "[t]ribes must have no less political liberty
128 Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and
Reconstruction 1863-1869 315-17 (Norton, 1974); Ackerman, The Great Transformation
(cited note 123).
28 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 2d Sess 1076, 1268 (1867).
130 "[T]oday's lawyers blandly suppose that the Fourteenth Amendment is validated by
a straight-forward application of a single rule in Article V" of the Constitution. Ackerman,
Conventionalizing Congress at 100 (cited in note 124). "Indeed, many knowledgeable
professors of constitutional law do not even know that the Fourteenth Amendment uniquely
required two Proclamations to gain unquestioned legal validity." Ackerman, The Great
Transformation at 13 (cited in note 123).
'3s Newton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 236-88 (cited in note 99).
12 Wilkinson, American Indians at 6 (cited in note 22) and Wilkinson, Indian History
at 120 (cited in note 21). For commentary on Wilkinson, see Frederick E. Hoxie, War of the
Worlds: History Versus the Law in Charles Wilkinson's American Indians, Time and the
Law, 13 L & Soc Inquiry 791 (1988) (questioning Wilkinson's legal and historical
assumptions).
133 Williams, 1986 Wisc L Rev at 297 (cited in note 89); Williams, Emergence of a Na-
tional Policy, at 50-51 (cited in note 99) (suggesting that United States/tribal conflicts be
submitted to binding international arbitration or adjudication).
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than the states."1 4
What are the bases of a vision that recognizes the autonomy of
"sovereigns" within another sovereignty? What is meant by that
autonomy? How much of that autonomy is dependent upon a vi-
sion of "sovereignty" that, if ever true, has surely vanished? Theo-
ries of sovereignty have long rested on the primacy of territory, of
a government's control of and physical power over a specific area
of land. Listen to Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v Georgia
in 1832, describing the Indian tribes as "distinct political commu-
nities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive."' 35 Listen to Justice Field in 1878, proclaiming in Pen-
noyer v Neff that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."' 36 The
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the Pennoyer view that
physical power is the touchstone of a state's authority over civil
litigants. 37 The Supreme Court has similarly rejected Marshall's
description of Indian tribes' exclusive jurisdiction within their ter-
ritories." 8 While territory and physical power remain relevant to
jurisdiction today, 3 9 the statements in nineteenth century cases
rest upon a world without cars, without airplanes, without FAX
machines.
Federal courts' jurisprudence must struggle with claims of
"sovereignty." Inclusion of materials about Indian tribes does more
than deconstruct some of the traditional wisdom about the limits
of the federal government's power. Learning about the interaction
between federal, state, and Indian governments is learning about
1'3 Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 286 (cited in note 22). See also id at 209-15.
Many others have written about the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal gov-
ernment; the selections in the text are meant to illustrate a range of possible interactions.
For Supreme Court discussions of these issues, see Washington v Confederated Tribes, 447
US 134 (1980) (concerning power of states to tax activities of Indians on and off a reserva-
tion). Compare Justice Rehnquist's view that "Indian immunities are dependent upon con-
gressional intent," id at 177, with Justices Brennan's and Marshall's claim that Indian tribes
possess "aboriginal independence." Id at 167 (Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
135 Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 556 (1832).
13- 95 US 714, 722 (1878). See generally Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Sub-
stantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and "Pennoyer" Reconsidered, 62 Wash U L Q
479 (1987).
13I See Internat. Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945); Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US
186 (1977).
138 See Oliphant v Suquahamish Tribe, 435 US 191, 212 (1978).
139 See, for example, Asahi Metal Industrial Corp v Superior Court, 107 S Ct 1026
(1987). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Justifying International Acts (forthcoming Cornell,
1989).
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how some form of group identity and governance can survive in the
midst of domination - and learning that the survival of such iden-
tity and governance is a product of decisions by both the smaller
and the larger groups, and of their interactions. The point is not
that states and Indian tribes are equivalent. Profound differences
- of history, sociology, and politics - exist between a state and
an Indian tribe. But there is much to learn from thinking about
both the differences and the similarities.
140
The claim of sovereignty arises when one group makes a claim
to be or to sustain rules different from another. A central question
for federal courts' jurisprudence is how much difference between
state and national laws the federal government should encourage
or tolerate. The relationship between the federal and state govern-
ments and the Indian tribes reminds "us" to take claims of differ-
ence seriously and to explore the meaning of claimed distinctions
between "sovereigns." Perceiving "difference" between the Santa
Clara Pueblo and the United States may be easier than perceiving
difference between New Jersey and the United States. But the
very ease of perceiving difference between Indian and non-Indian
may also obscure interaction and influence. Exploration of the re-
lationship between the Santa Clara Pueblo and the United States
shows complex interweavings of two "sovereigns." Texts about fed-
eral Indian law enable insight into what deviations from its norms
the federal government will tolerate and what it will attempt to
preclude, and thus provide insight into what federal norms really
are.
III. REASONS TO GIvE VOICE
Analytically comparable problems, embarrassment, and a be-
lated sense of obligation to speak about the history of treatment of
Indian tribes are sufficient to give rise to a claim for inclusion of
materials about Indian tribes in federal courts' jurisprudence. But
Indian tribe cases offer more than a chance to display appropriate
sensitivity to the experiences of many within this country. Indian
140 Questions about the power of religions to live with rules different than that of the
federal government raise parallel issues. See Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An
Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J Family L 741, 743 (1987-88)
(" 'sovereignty' can be located in groups other than the state"). See also Lyng v Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 108 S Ct 1319 (1988) (conflict between Forest Ser-
vice road construction program and Indian tribes' observance of religion). See generally
John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J Legal Pluralism 1, 2 (1986) (defining legal
pluralism as a "state of affairs ... in which behavior pursuant to more than one legal order
occurs").
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cases provide vivid insight into three central themes for federal
courts' jurisprudence to explore: 1) whether and when the United
States will tolerate subgroups that seek to be different and distinct
and to express such distinctions by self-governance; 2) whether
such differences can be sustained, given the interdependencies of
the subgroup and the federal government; and 3) whether distinct
governance structures are to be desired and preserved or forbidden
and eroded.
A. The Interdependencies of Norms
1. Sovereignty and Membership.
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that sovereignty inter-
ests trumped inquiry about the legality, under federal law, of rules
that (at least from a feminist perspective) subordinate women.141
Justice Marshall's protection of the Santa Clara Pueblo's "ability
to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity"
14 2
has a good deal of appeal. Membership rules can readily be under-
stood as the core of any group's identity, and, hence, as appropri-
ately outside the realm of consideration by any other "sovereign."
As the district judge in the Santa Clara Pueblo case explained:
"The importance of this [membership rule] to Santa Clara or to
any other Indian tribe cannot be overstressed. In deciding who is
and who is not a member, the Pueblo decides what it is that makes
its members unique, what distinguishes a Santa Clara Indian from
everyone else in the United States." 4
But the issue of membership in the Santa Clara Pueblo re-
quires further examination. How did the concept of membership in
the Pueblo develop? Justice Marshall spoke of the "often vast gulf
between tribal traditions and those with which federal courts are
241 The question of perspective is ever-present. Might I, as a non-Indian, describe the
rule as subordinating, while insiders do not? The record suggests that, at least when arguing
to the United States Supreme Court, Pueblo defenders also described the rule as one of
subordination. According to the brief submitted amici curiae by a number of Pueblos proxi-
mate to the Santa Clara Pueblo, had the Tenth Circuit opinion finding for Ms. Martinez
been upheld by the Supreme Court, "a number of male-dominance rules" would have been
subject to attack. Motion to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae of the Pueblo
de Cochiti, et al, No 76-682 11 (Oct Term, 1976). See also attached affidavit of James R.
Martinez, Governor of the Pueblo of San Ildefonso ("The women are in charge of the house
... and other domestic chores to support the men as the men perform their obligations. The
women's obligations can be performed by outsiders without really interfering with the reli-
gious functions and obligations performed by the men"). Id at 12a.
142 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 72 (footnote omitted).
143 Martinez v Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F Supp 5, 15 (D NM 1975).
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more intimately familiar."144 Was this particular rule a "tribal tra-
dition?" How comfortable should the federal judges (all men) who
decided the case have been as they worked with an implied distinc-
tion between the "Santa Claran" membership rule and perhaps -
but never reached in Santa Clara Pueblo - a federal norm of non-
subordination?
Neither the Santa Clara Pueblo membership rule nor the Mar-
tinez lawsuit can be understood outside the context of federal In-
dian law. A brief summary of some of the relevant policies is re-
quired. In the General Allotment Act of 1887,1 5 Congress
authorized the President to "allot" land to individual Indians on
reservations. The act provided for allotted land to be held in trust
for a specified period of time and then conveyed to individuals.
Further, the act authorized the Secretary of Interior to negotiate
the purchase of "excess" lands remaining after allotment. Many
commentators describe allotment as intended to erode Indian iden-
tity; individual land-holding was designed to break tribal connec-
tions and encourage assimilation. 46 As Justice O'Connor has ex-
plained, the legislation "seem[ed] in part animated by a desire to
force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways . . . to 'speed ...
assimilation' and in part a result of pressure to free new lands for
further white development.
M 47
By 1934, Allotment Act policies had diminished Indian land
holdings from 138 million acres to 48 million acres.14 In 1928, a
group called the Institute for Government Research issued a report
leveling substantial criticism at the allotment program. 14 That re-
"I Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 72 n 32.
"5 24 Stat 388 (1887), also known as the Dawes Act, upheld in Lone Wolf v Hitchcock,
187 US 553 (1903).
"' See, for example, DeLorio and Lyttle, American Indians, American Justice at 8-12
(cited in note 95); Kenneth R. Philp, John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform 1920-1954
ix-xi (U Ariz, 1977); Newton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 223 (cited in note 99). Eric Foner indicates
that assimilationist policies existed during the Civil War. ". . . [N]early all military and
civilian officials shared a common assumption: that the federal government should persuade
or coerce the Plains Indians to exchange their religion, communal form of property, and
'nomadic' way of life for Christian worship and settled agriculture on federally supervised
reservations. In a word, they should surrender most of their land and cease to be Indians."
Eric Foner, Reconstruction, at 462 (cited in note 35).
M Hodel v Irving, 107 S Ct 2076, 2078 (1987).
'48 See William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 21 (West, 2d ed
1988). See also Indian Self Determination and the Role of Tribal Courts, A Survey of Tri-
bal Courts Conducted by the American Indian Lawyer Training Program at 20 (1977)
("Tribal Court Survey").
"' See Philp, John Collier's Crusade at 90-91 (cited in note 146). The Institute's report
is often cited as the Meriam report, because Lewis Meriam was the director of the Institute.
For description of how Indian children were forced to go to schools that prohibited them
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port helped influence the growing debate about federal Indian pol-
icy, and, in 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA).150 The IRA was at variance with the prior effort to end all
tribal identification. The act stopped allotment and required the
Secretary of the Interior to attempt to restore "surplus" tribal
lands acquired during allotment. The IRA also proclaimed Con-
gress to be supportive of Indian self-governance.15" ' To further that
goal, the IRA provided for the creation of tribal constitutions and
laws, but required that such enactments be submitted to the Sec-
retary of Interior for approval. 52 The Act did permit Indians to
decline to organize under its provisions, and some groups, includ-
ing the Navajos, have not done so.'5"
The Santa Clara Pueblo was among those tribes that organ-
ized under the provisions of the IRA." In 1935, the Secretary of
the Interior approved the Santa Clara Pueblo's Constitution and
Bylaws, which began with a preamble that states: "We, the people
of Santa Clara Pueblo, in order to establish justice, promote the
common welfare and preserve the advantages of self-government,
do ordain and establish this constitution."'55 Under the 1935 con-
stitution, membership in the Santa Clara Pueblo extended to four
groups of people: 1) those "of Indian blood" whose names ap-
peared on the 1935 census roll; 2) all "persons born of parents
both of whom are members of the Santa Clara pueblo"; 3) all
"children of mixed marriages between members of the Santa Clara
pueblo and nonmembers, provided such children have been recog-
from speaking their own languages, see Newton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 227 (cited in note 99).
" o 48 Stat 984, codified as amended at 25 USC § 461 et seq (1982) (also known as the
Wheeler-Howard Act). See also the following series of articles: Curtis Berkey, John Collier
and the Indian Reorganization Act, 2 Am Indian J 2 (July 1976); Curtis Berkey, The Legis-
lative History of the Indian Reorganization Act, 2 Am Indian J 15 (July 1976); and Curtis
Berkey, Implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act, 2 Am Indian J 2 (August 1976).
"I1 See Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat 984 (1934). Obviously, there are many histo-
ries about the motivation for the IRA. See generally Philp, John Colliers' Crusade at 113-86
(cited in note 146).
2 25 USC § 476 (1982). See also Philp, John Collier's Crusade at 159 (cited in note
146), for a general discussion of the IRA.
'53 Philp, John Collier's Crusade at 163 (cited in note 146) ("Eventually 181 tribes
which contained a population of 129,750 approved of the IRA, while 86,365 repudiated it,
including the important Navajos .. "). Subsequently, the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued a
regulation that provided for parallel treatment of tribes incorporated under the IRA and
those organized without it. See generally Lawrence C. Kelly, The Navajo Indians and Fed-
eral Indian Policy (U Ariz, 1968).
'5 Philp, John Collier's Crusade at 170 (cited in note 146).
"' Constitution and Bylaws of the Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico, approved Dec.
20, 1935, reprinted in Supreme Court Brief of the Petitioners, Santa Clara Pueblo v Marti-
nez, No 76-682, Appendix at 1 (Oct Term, 1976) ("Petitioners' Brief").
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nized and adopted by the council"; and 4) all "persons naturalized
as members of the pueblo.
156
After setting forth its articles of governance, the Santa Clara
Constitution provided for amendment, conditioned again on sub-
mission to and approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 157 On No-
vember 21, 1939, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior approved
an amendment that changed the statement of membership rules
that had been set forth in the 1935 constitution. The 1939 rules
extended membership in the Santa Clara Pueblo to only two
groups: "[a]ll children born of marriages between members of the
Santa Clara Pueblo" and "children born of marriages between
male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members.
'158
The other two possible membership routes set forth in the 1935
constitution were specifically extinguished, and with those provi-
sions went the possibility of the exercise of discretion by the mem-
bers of the Pueblo. The 1939 amendment stated: "Children born of
marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and
non-members shall not be members.. ." and that "[p]ersons shall
not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo under
any circumstances. ' 159
2. New and Old Customs.
One of the questions that preoccupied the district and appel-
late courts that decided Santa Clara was whether the Santa Clara
Pueblo had "changed" its membership rules in 1939. The parties
to the case offered evidence about how children of women married
to non-Santa Clarans had been treated prior to the 1939 Ordi-
nance, and about the inclusion of children of unmarried Santa
Claran women as members of the Pueblo. 160 The lower court con-
cluded that there had not been a "hard and fast rule" about the
treatment of children of mixed marriages, but case-by-case deci-
156 Id, Appendix at 1-2.
157 Id at 7.
1"8 Id at 16-18.
159 Id at 18.
180 Martinez, 402 F Supp at 16; 540 F2d at 1047. According to the Petitioners in the
United States Supreme Court, "the 1939 Ordinance is simply a written embodiment of a
preexisting unwritten rule of membership that has been in existence from time immemo-
rial." Petitioners' Brief at 9 (cited in note 155). The Supreme Court Brief of the Respon-
dents, Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, No 76-682 34, 42-43 (Oct Term, 1976) ("Respon-
dents' Brief") argued that the Ordinance was a response to changing economic conditions;
the "intent and purpose ... were to hold down the size of tribal membership so that there
would be plenty of money and land for the members." Id at 34; 42-43.
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sion making. 161 Given that the prior custom had not been reduced
to a single specified rule and that male lineage was not always a
prerequisite to being a "Santa Claran," the parties offered the
courts information from anthropologists and Pueblo members
about the impact of gender on one's life in the Pueblo.
The briefs and court opinions attempted to describe the Santa
Clara Pueblo's pre-1939 membership rule in terms of whether it
was matrilineal, matrilocal, and matriarchal or patrilineal, patrilo-
cal, and patriarchal.'62 These categories address whether member-
ship in a given culture, religion, or tribe is dependent upon the
genes of either mothers or fathers, whether choice of residence is
controlled by the location of the families of either women or men,
and whether power is held by either women or men. 6 ' These con-
cepts, formulated by Western anthropologists, assume gender as an
organizing category, assume the utility of description of societies
by these terms, sometimes assume interrelationship among lineage,
locality, and gender control, and generally assume that societies
are either one or the other.1
64
Diverse information is available about gender relations at the
Santa Clara Pueblo. Pueblo members and anthropologists (some of
whom testified at the trial) offer varying descriptions of whether
the Santa Clara Pueblo was matrilineal, patrilineal, or neither. 16 5
162 402 F Supp at 16. The appellate court reversed, stating that the membership ordi-
nance was "the product of economics and pragmatics" and "historically... cannot be said
to represent the Santa Clara tradition." Martinez, 540 F2d at 1047.
162 For discussion of these terms, see Carol Meyers, Discovering Eve: Ancient Israelite
Women in Context 37-46 (Oxford, 1988). See also Sandra Harding, The Science Question in
Feminism 128-35 (Cornell, 1987).
10' Meyers, Discovering Eve at 37-39 (cited in note 162). In Santa Clara Pueblo, some
of the participants did not assume the direct relationship amongst these categories. See, for
example, Respondents' Brief at 35-39 (cited in note 160); Martinez, 402 F Supp at 16; Mar-
tinez, 540 F2d at 1047.
164 Some anthropologists also seem to have assumed that matrilineal patterns were a
stage of development, followed by more "advanced" cultures' adoption of patrilineal rules.
See, for example, Lewis H. Morgan, The Iroquois Gens, in Kinship and Social Organiza-
tion, in Paul Bohannan and John Middleton, eds, Marriage, Family and Residence 166-67
(Natural History Press, 1968). For an example of the blurring of patrilineal and patriarchal,
see A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Patrilineal and Matrilineal Succession, 20 Iowa L Rev 286, 293
(1935) ("[wlhere rights and duties derived through the father preponderate ... we have...
a patrilineal system"). For discussions that distinguish matriliny, matrilocality, and matriar-
chy, see David M. Schneider and Kathleen Gough, eds, Matrilineal Kinship Preface at vi-
xiii (Cal, 1961).
165 Florence Hawley Ellis (also called Florence M. Hawley) testified at trial that the
Santa Clara Pueblo was patrilineal. Respondents' Brief at 36-37 (cited in note 160). See also
Florence Hawley, Some Factors in the Indian Problem in New Mexico (U NM, 1948) (con-
sidering the desirability of continuation of Indian culture; noting sexual equality as general
trait of variety of Indian tribes in New Mexico); Florence M. Hawley, Pueblo Social Organi-
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Prior to 1939, the Pueblo unquestionably made some distinctions
based upon gender. Role differentiation between sexes was re-
ported, but translating the meaning of the distinctions drawn is
more complex. For example, one anthropologist of Pueblo culture
has written: "Distinctions of sex are marked in the Pueblo culture,
in dress, in occupations, and in the ceremonial life. The distinc-
tions are a matter of division of functions between the sexes rather
than of subordination of one sex to the other." ' 6 In contrast, an-
other scholar has reported that "[w]omen were considered second-
class citizens at Santa Clara Pueblo.
167
zation as a Lead to Pueblo History, 39 Am Anthro 504, 508 (1937) (noting that men cus-
tomarily own houses in Tewa cultures (of which Santa Clara is a part), but not discussing
specifically the Santa Clara Pueblo).
See also W.W. Hill, An Ethnography of Santa Clara Pueblo New Mexico (U NM, 1982)
("the pattern of house inheritance was prevailingly patrilineal," id at 20; "patrilineal bias
was indicated in forty of forty-eight cases of house inheritance," id at 21; that personal
effects were normally equally distributed among children, as were orchards and land, id at
20-21. As of 1941, with information on 100 Santa Claran marriages, twenty nine to non-
Santa Clarans, twelve of those couples lived on the Pueblo, four of those twelve involved
Santa Clara women married to non-Santa Clara men. Hill makes no mention of children of
inter-marriage being disadvantaged.); Elsie Clews Parsons, The Social Organization of the
Tewa of New Mexico, 36 Memoirs of the Am Anthro Assoc 1, 31-35 (1929) (describing the
occurrence of "foreign marriages" and giving examples of Santa Clara women married to
non-Santa Claran men and living on the Santa Clara Pueblo; also mentioning the need to
marry outside to avoid too close kinship relations. No mention is made of the marriage
choice disabling the children from full participation); Elsie Clews Parsons, The Kinship
Nomenclature of the Pueblo Indians, 34 Am Anthro 377 (1932) (discussing significance of
lines of both mothers and fathers); Fred Eggan, Social Organization of the Western Pueblos
(Chicago, 1950) (does not deal in depth with the Santa Clara Pueblo, but describes Pueblo
culture in general. Does review the "eastern Pueblos," including Santa Clara, and notes the
"considerable variation in social structure" in those Pueblos. Id at 304-11. Eggan notes that
different anthropologists have described Tewa villages as patrilineal or matrilineal. Id at
305); A. Ortiz, Tewa World (Chicago, 1969) (discusses Tewa as classifying human and spiri-
tual "existence into a hierarchy of six categories, three human and three spiritual," id at 9;
argues that "moieties," summer and winter people, are central factors in Tewa life; "one is
not born into a moiety but is recruited into it, and the basis of this recruitment is flexible at
best.... There is no clear and unalterable rule of recruitment into the moieties, because
there is no clear and unambiguous rule of descent." Id at 57-58; critical of other anthropolo-
gists' focus on marriage systems, which Ortiz believes are not central, id and at 129-132;
religious ideas and practices are more central than kinship and marriage); Edward P. Do-
zier, The Pueblo Indians of North America (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970) (Dozier, who
describes himself as a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo [according to the Martinez's law-
yers, by virtue of his mother, as his father was French] discussed the Santa Clara practices
as included in the Tanoan Pueblos; "The household unit is thus a bilateral descent
group ... " "The Tewa 'clan names'.., are inherited variously from the father or the
mother," id at 165. "In summary, Tanoan Pueblos classify kin bilaterally on a principle of
generation, emphasize age, and generally ignore sex distinctions," id at 164-65). See also
Dozier, Factionalism at Santa Clara Pueblo, 5 Ethnology 172 (1966).
... Parson, The Kinship Nomenclature, 34 Am Anthro at 378 (cited in note 165).
"I Hill, An Ethnography at 169 (cited in note 165). See also Note, Tribal Sovereignty:
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Sovereignty 146 Years Later, 8 Am Indian L Rev
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The difficulty in interpreting this information stems from the
problem of disentangling the viewer from the viewed."' 8 Recent
feminist work has raised questions both about the perspective of
the anthropologists who study culture and about the patrilineal/
matrilineal categories themselves, which may reflect more about
the dualistic modeling of nineteenth and twentieth century anthro-
pologists than the societies that they study.6 ' In addition to per-
ceiving the inadequacies of the dichotomization, feminist anthro-
pologists have distinguished between the official holders of
positions of authority and those who hold power, and have at-
tempted to be careful about transplanting Western values about
roles onto other societies. 170 To be concrete, because the United
States' culture devalues the daily activities of food-making does
not mean that those who do such tasks in other cultures are simi-
larly devalued.17' Because United States culture exhibits dichoto-
139, 149-50 (1980) (by C.L. Stetson) ("As a patrilocal society, dependent upon a strong
sense of community for its survival, Santa Clara has always been antagonistic to the idea of
marriage outside the tribe.") (citing other works by E. Parsons, such as E. Parsons, I Pueblo
Indian Religion pt 1, 7 (1939)).
' Martha Minow, The Supreme Court: 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 Harv L Rev 10 (1987).
169 See Meyers, Discovering Eve at 24-37 (cited in note 162). See also Robert N. Lynch,
Women in Northern Paiute Politics, 11 Signs 352 (1986) (failure of anthropologists to con-
sider the roles of women in Indian culture); Rayna Green, The Pocohontas Perplex: The
Image of Indian Women in American Culture, 16 Mass Rev 698 (1975) (stereotypical treat-
ment of Indian women); Marilyn Strathern, An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Femi-
nism and Anthropology, 12 Signs 276 (1987) (incompatibility of assumptions of the two
disciplines); Jane Monnig Atkinson, Anthropology, 8 Signs 236, 238 (1982) (feminist anthro-
pology "tackling hitherto unquestioned assumptions about sex and gender"); Rayna (Reiter)
Rapp, Anthropology, 4 Signs 497 (1979) (review essay, discussing questioning of universality
of asymetrical gender relations) ("our public/private conflicts are not necessarily the same
as those of other times and places," id at 511). Compare the "theoretical discussion" of
matriliny provided by one anthropologist, who took as a "constant" that "the role of men is
defined as that of having authority over women and children .... Positions of highest au-
thority within the matrilineal descent group will, therefore, ordinarily be vested in statuses
occupied by men." Schneider, Matrilineal Kinship at 6 in Introduction (cited in note 164).
"I See, for example, M. Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere, eds, Women, Culture, and Soci-
ety (Stanford, 1974); M. Z. Rosaldo, The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on
Feminism and Cross-Cultural Understandings, 5 Signs 389 (1980); and the response by
Linda J. Nicholson, Comment on Rosaldo's The Use and Abuse of Anthropology, 7 Signs
732 (1982) (urging continued investigation of domestic/public category); S. C. Rogers, Fe-
male Forms of Power and Myth of Male Dominance: A Model of Female/Male Interaction
in Peasant Society, 2 Am Ethnologist 727 (1975); Meyer, Discovering Eve at ch 2 (cited in
note 162); Louise Lamphere, Anthropology, 2 Signs 612 (1977).
' Edward Dozier reports that the central issues for the Pueblos were the coordination
of communal activities, weather control, illness, warfare, maintenance of flora and fauna,
and village harmony. Dozier, The Pueblo Indians at 133, 151, 164 (cited in note 165). In
contrast, Hill seems to accept United States' categories and concludes that, because women
were not office holders in government nor initiates in the kachina organization, they were
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mized, stable gender-based hierarchies does not, inevitably, mean
that other cultures must.17 2 In short, the task of federal court con-
struction of a description of Santa Clara practices regarding
women risks imposing one culture's categories upon another. While
the 1939 Ordinance reflects a gendered hierarchy, 17 3 the prior prac-
tices about treatment of children of mixed marriages are less obvi-
ously male supremacist.
Although the Santa Clara Pueblo case was litigated with
much discussion of these issues, I must pause to ask whether it
should matter, to a federal court or the Congress, whether the
Santa Clara rule was an old or a new one. The longevity of a par-
ticular membership rule or of general rulemaking about member-
ship may not have any relevance. An alternative conception is that
tribal "sovereignty" means that its membership rules are not sub-
ject to another "sovereign's" authority. If the claim is that Santa
Clara Pueblo is itself "sovereign" (either because its political life
predates the federal government or because the federal govern-
ment recognizes the Pueblo's autonomy), then the sovereign is en-
titled to change its rules, to invoke rules of recent vintage as well
as those that rely upon ancient practices.17 4 The parties did not
dispute that in response to Julia Martinez's request that her chil-
dren be counted as "Santa Clarans", the tribal council refused and
relied upon its 1939 rule with its gender-based discrimination. The
Supreme Court opinion seems to have adopted (implicitly 75 ) the
view that the vintage of the rule was not relevant. The Court fo-
subordinated. Hill, An Ethnography at 169 (cited in note 165). Nonetheless, he notes that
"[w]hile women played subsidiary roles at Santa Clara Pueblo, outlets for their energies
were fairly numerous" and discusses women's control over food making, householding, plas-
tering, and participation in agriculture, handicrafts, trading, childcare, and the exclusive
women's religious group, the "scalp society." Id at 164. See also Vicki Camerino, The Dela-
ware Indians as Women: An Alternative Approach, 4 Am Indian L Rev 2 (1978) (assump-
tion that the Delaware Indians' role as "women" in Iroquois Confederacy was a lesser status
is erroneous).
172 See, for example, the literature on cross-gender females, Evelyn Blackwood, Sexual-
ity and Gender in Certain Native American Tribes: The Case of Cross-Gender Females, 10
Signs 27 (1984) (cross-gender females seen as valid role prior to non-Indian culture pres-
sures); Walter L. Williams, The Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual Diversity in American Indian
Culture, 77 (Beacon, 1986) (". . .American Indians see physical body parts as much less
important than a person's spirit or character").
173 "Why is excluding women always an option for solving problems men create be-
tween men?" Catharine MacKinnon, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo (1983) in Feminism Unmodified at 68 (Harvard, 1987).
1'74 In the words of Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 118 (cited in note 22): "Self
government transcends culture; it is the right to choose culture."
175 The Court makes reference to the fact that the trial had established that the rule
was of "recent vintage." 436 US at 55.
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cused upon potential federal court oversight of membership rules
and other intra-tribal matters176 and concluded that Congress had
not "intended" to enable that oversight via private causes of
action.
177
Questions about the consistency of treatment by the United
States of historically based claims and about the significance of
such claims emerge from this analysis. If the history of a given tri-
bal rule is not relevant to understanding whether federal norms
"intrude," how might one make sense of many other federal gov-
ernment practices that assume the relevance of historical practices
to claims made by Indian tribes? For example, the Department of
Interior distinguishes between what it calls "historic" Indian tribes
and "non-historic" Indian tribes. Historic tribes are those which,
according to the federal government, predated the United States
and lost their "external" sovereignty, but retained "internal" sov-
ereignty - "those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian
tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts
of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished.1' 7 The theory is that congres-
sional acts may limit tribal sovereignty but do not define its
"sources or positive content. 179 In contrast, non-historic tribes
have no "inherent powers" but only those powers delegated to
them by Congress or permitted to them by the Secretary of Inte-
rior.1 80 Similarly, groups seeking recognition as a "tribe" by the
federal government often rely upon historical continuity, defined
as identity over time. James Clifford has described the Mashpee
Indians' efforts to obtain possession of land on Cape Cod. Accord-
ing to Clifford, the purpose of the federal court trial was "to deter-
mine whether the group calling itself the Mashpee Tribe was in
fact an Indian tribe, and the same tribe that in the mid-nineteenth
century had lost its land through a series of contested legislative
acts." 1
8 '
176 Id at 55-58, 69-70.
177 Id at 71-72.
178 1 Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of Interior Relating to Indian Affairs
at 447 (Powers of Indian Tribes) (Oct 25, 1934) (emphasis in the original) (providing an
answer to the general question of what powers tribes have).
179 Id. The limitations occur, according the Solicitor, when "in the judgment of Con-
gress, these tribes" can "no longer be safely permitted to handle" certain matters. Id.
'80 U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Developing and Reviewing
Tribal Constitutions and Amendments: A Handbook for BIA Personnel, ch 1, 3 (June,
1987) ("BIA Handbook").
'81 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography,
Literature and Art 277 (Harvard, 1988). See also Paul Brodeur, Restitution: The Land
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Both the Department of Interior's distinctions between "his-
toric" and "non-historic" tribes and the federal court's effort to
decide whether current "Mashpees" are the same as past
"Mashpees" might be seen as foolish endeavors. Yet much of the
basis for the claim of a group's right to difference comes from the
existence of that difference over time. In the 1970s, the Mashpees
argued that the state of Massachusetts (in a past incarnation, one
hundred years before) had taken land from them and should re-
turn it to them because it used to be theirs. The Santa Clara
Pueblo claimed its right of sovereignty because it existed before
the United States came into being. If Congress sought to merge
Rhode Island and Connecticut, some of the protest to that proposi-
tion would be founded on the fact of history: that the borders have
been borders for many years.
One possible response to arguments based on historic con-
tinuity is to say that continuity over time has little normative sig-
nificance, that the Pueblo's authority to decide membership rules
should be grounded in a current right to be different rather than
upon proof that these membership rules were longstanding. To in-
sist upon historical continuity may be either a search by romantics
for the picturesque,"8 2 or by conservatives, unwilling to recognize
that which did not predate themselves and wanting the world as
they know it not to change. Yet neither the emotive power of long-
held traditions nor the potential for the oppression embodied in
those long-held traditions should be denied. Southern states had a
history of slavery and claimed their social self was constituted by
practices about which "outsiders" should not dictate.
The longevity of a tradition and the role that tradition played
in a community's social ordering is of relevance to the concern that
"outsiders" are "intruding." However, the existence of a tradition
does not decide whether the outsiders are really "outside," whether
intrusion is really "intrusive," or whether one should indeed in-
trude. Before sharing the Supreme Court's assumption that the
Santa Clara Pueblo's decision about its 1939 membership rules was
an act of sovereignty with which the federal courts should not in-
terfere, more information is required about the evolution of those
rules in the context of the relationship between the Pueblo and the
Claims of the Mashpee, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot Indians of New England (North-
eastern, 1985); Mashpee Tribe v New Seabury Corp, 592 F2d 575 (1st Cir 1979).
182 See Clifford's description of the federal court inquiry into whether individual
Mashpee learned Indian dancing, wore different clothes and the like. Clifford, Predicament
of Culture at 280-89 (cited in note 181).
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United States government.
3. Codification of Membership Rules.
The Santa Clara Pueblo membership rule is part of the writ-
ten codification of Santa Clara laws that began in 1934 with the
Pueblo's adoption of a constitution. Recall the words of the Santa
Clara Constitution's preamble: "We, the people of Santa Clara
Pueblo,... do ordain and establish ... . The phrases are famil-
iar because the words in the Pueblo document come from the
United States Constitution. Consider the process by which tribal
constitutions came into being. The Indian Reorganization Act gave
Indian tribes the opportunity to incorporate, to follow United
States models of lawfully chartered associations. 4 The Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) offered assistance immediately after the pas-
sage of the IRA and continues to help in constitutional drafting. In
the 1930s, the Department of Interior prepared model constitu-
tions for tribes. "The boilerplate provisions of this model were
adopted with a few alterations by virtually all tribes which voted
to organize under that Act.... Thus, although IRA was designed
to restore residual powers to tribal sovereignty, the extent and ex-
ercise of those powers were determined largely by the Interior De-
partment.118 5 Many of the constitutions contain identical clauses,
and many built in a subsequent role for the Secretary of Interior in
approving changes to the constitutions or to the ordinances
adopted pursuant to these constitutions.18 '
183 Petitioners' Brief, Appendix at 1 (cited in note 155).
18' Some Indian tribes had constitutions prior to the IRA. See William N. Fenton, Seth
Newhouse's Traditional History and Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy, Proceedings
of the American Philosophical Society 93 (1949); Arthur C. Parker, The Constitution of the
Five Nations, or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law, 184 New York State Museum Bulletin
12 (1916). The BIA, however, provides models based upon the United States Constitution.
181 Tribal Court Survey 23-24 (cited in note 148). See also Curtis Berkey, Implementa-
tion of the Indian Reorganization Act, 2 Am Indian J at 4 (August 1976) ("In retrospect the
Interior Department played a larger role than the tribes in drafting constitutions"). For
discussion of the continuity in United States policies-from relocation through tribal sover-
eignty and constitution-drafting to termination-as all based upon "white dominance," see
William H. Kelly, Indian Adjustment and the History of Indian Affairs, 10 Ariz L Rev 559
(1968).
18' Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 117-22, n 26 (cited in note 22). The authors note
that a requirement of subsequent Interior Department approval was included in an earlier
draft of the IRA and was supported by the BIA, but that the IRA as adopted by Congress
did not provide for subsequent Department o~ersight. Nonetheless, the Department did
succeed in having such provisions made a part of some of the constitutions drafted under its
supervision. See also Kerr-McGee Corp. v Navajo Tribe, 471 US 195, 198 (1985) (in the
1930s, BIA had a "policy of including provisions for Secretarial approval; but that policy
was not mandated by Congress;" IRA does not require that Secretary approve tribal power
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The BIA's 1987 book, entitled Developing and Reviewing Tri-
bal Constitutions and Amendments: A Handbook for BIA Person-
nel,187 details BIA policy for drafting constitutions. Under both the
IRA and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Interior, ap-
proval is only accorded to "appropriate" constitutions.'"8 The
Handbook specifies that the BIA provides assistance "from the be-
ginning of the constitutional development process." ' The Hand-
to tax, and IRA does not control those - such as the Navajos - who did not accept its
provisions). See generally Joseph R. Garry, Indian Reorganization Act and the Withdrawal
Program, in William H. Kelly, ed, Indian Affairs and the Indian Reorganization Act: The
Twenty Year Record 35, 36 (U Ariz, 1954).
George E. Fay has compiled the legal documents of many of the tribes. Fay's Charters,
Constitutions and By-Laws of Indian Tribes of North America 1-15 (Museum of Anthro-
pology, U N Colo, Greely, 1967-1972) ("Fay's"). While the canvassing is not completely
comprehensive, the assembled 125 constitutions, 60 charters, 20 articles of association and
the bylaws of 162 tribes provide insight into the documents generated. An example in Fay's
of a boilerplate provision promoted in the 1930s is: "[tihe [Indian Community Council] shall
have the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to review by the Secretary of Interior,
covering adoption of members." 8 Fay's at 7 (Corelo Indian Community). This provision
was included, using almost exactly the same language, in the following constitutions and by-
laws: Iowa Tribe of Indians of Iowa Reservation, 13 Fay's at 29; Omaha Tribe, id at 58a;
Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California, 12 Fay's at 23-24; Shosone-Bannock Tribes of Fort
Hall, Idaho, id at 44; Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho, id at 59; Tule River Indian Tribe, 8 Fay's at
47; and Me-Wuk Indian Community, 7 Fay's at 26.
'17 BIA Handbook (cited in note 180).
1-1 25 USC § 476 (1982); 25 CFR § 81.24(a)(3) (1988). Changes are underway. In Octo-
ber of 1988, Representative Morris Udall proposed legislation to limit the Department of
Interior, and that bill was enacted on November 1, 1988. Under Pub L No 100-581, 102 Stat
2938, modifying 25 USC § 476, the Department is required to hold elections for constitu-
tional ratification within a specified period of time and to approve all constitutions that do
not conflict with "applicable law" - defined as federal statutes, treaties, executive orders
and final federal court opinions. The statute arguably leaves a substantial amount of discre-
tion with the Department. See also the discussion of the proposed legislation, HR 2677,
100th Cong, 2d Sess in 134 Cong Rec 9844-49 (Oct 7, 1988). Until this legislation, the Secre-
tary had to call elections on constitutions but could subsequently withhold approval. See
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians v United States, 639 F Supp 165 (E D Cal 1986) and
BIA Handbook at chs 4, 6 (cited in note 180). If the Secretary denies approval, the tribe
may use the document it has generated as a document of governance, but the document is
not an IRA "constitution" and therefore could be changed without the more elaborate
amendment/election process. In addition to IRA approval requirements, some federal stat-
utes require certain tribal decisions to be approved by the BIA. See, for example, 25 USC §
81 (1982), which requires BIA approval of the contracts and fees when Indian tribes want to
employ counsel.
For criticism of the length of time taken to obtain recognition under the IRA, as cur-
rently administered by BIA, see Paul M. Rodriquez, Lumbees, 1988 States News Service
(Aug 12, 1988) (Senator Sanford proposed legislation to enable recognition of Lumbee In-
dian tribe, which complained that the BIA process would take eight to ten years). For dis-
cussion of the enactment of the IRA and criticism of the post World War II policies of the
BIA to recognize tribes, see Terry Anderson, Federal Recognition: The Vicious Myth, 4 Am
Indian J, No 5 at 7 (May, 1978).
8I BIA Handbook at 1-6 (cited in note 180). Under current Supreme Court preemption
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book further explains the "constitutional concepts" of delegated
authority from the people to their elected leaders, of written ex-
pression of that delegation, and of protecting the rights of the
members."" Although the Handbook also asserts as a constitu-
tional concept the protection of the "rights, resources, values and
culture of the tribe,"' 19' many of the documents generated pursuant
to the Indian Reorganization Act and under BIA's guidance resem-
ble more closely the "values and cultures" of the United States
than those of the tribes.
The BIA has provided Indian tribes with more than concep-
tual guidance. Detailed explanations of proposed provisions, for-
mat, and content are all offered by the Handbook, and have been
offered to tribes - even before the enactment of the IRA - and
consistently thereafter. 92 As the Assistant Secretary for Indian Af-
fairs explained in 1988, "[i]t is not unusual for the tribe to submit
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs numerous drafts of a proposed con-
stitution for informal review over an extended period of time prior
to the submission of a final proposed draft for formal re-
view. . ,,.""' The BIA encourages tribes to provide an "explana-
tion of how membership" is determined.19 4 Moreover, the BIA
Handbook underscores the centrality of membership in the eyes of
the Department of Interior. When "a major change in membership
requirements which would drastically alter or increase the size of
the tribe" is made, "central office" rather than branch office review
is required.195 Finally, when any "Indian group" seeks federal rec-
ognition as an "Indian tribe," it must submit a petition to the De-
partment of Interior including "a statement describing in full the
membership criteria" of the group. 96
The Santa Clara membership rules that were initially specified
doctrine, it may be to the advantage of Indian tribes to have federal involvement, because
federal involvement may protect their laws from state regulation. But see Canby, 62 Wash U
L Rev at 16-19 (cited in note 100). Canby argues that the Court's decision in Rice v Rehner,
463 US 713 (1983), limits the protection afforded by the preemption doctrine.
190 BIA Handbook at 2-1, 2-2 (cited in note 180).
191 Id at 2-2. The BIA also seeks to "encourage tribes to include in their constitutions
provisions that promote the development of a private sector economy." Id at ch 2-11.
192 See Tribal Court Survey at 23 (cited in note 148). John Collier brought drafts of
constitutions to tribes in the 1920s. Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice
at 140-160 (cited in note 95).
12 BIA Handbook at Appendix E, E-1 (emphasis in the original) (cited in note 180).
'94 Id at Appendix E, E-3.
19l Id at 6. Of the constitutions drafted in the 1930s under BIA supervision, the vast
majority required Department of Interior approval prior to the alteration of membership
rules. See generally Fay's (cited in note 186).
10 25 CFR § 83.7(d) (1988).
[56:671
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 714 1989
Dependent Sovereigns
in its 1935 Constitution did not draw distinctions on the basis of
gender and left discretion to the Pueblo to admit members.'97 The
1939 Ordinance did discriminate on the basis of gender and extin-
guished the possibility of Pueblo members deciding, on an ad-hoc
basis, to admit specific individuals. That ordinance was "ap-
proved" by the Secretary of Interior. What caused the change in
rules? And what import should be assigned to that "approval"?
Was the submission only pro forma and the approval a ministerial
act?
In 1935, the Department made a "declaration" of its views on
"Membership in Indian Tribes"; a circular addressed to all "en-
gaged in Indian Reorganization Act" stated that "Congress [has] a
definite policy to limit the application of Indian benefits .... "I
To implement that policy, the Department planned "to urge and
insist that any constitutional provision conferring automatic tribal
membership upon children hereafter born, should limit such mem-
bership to persons who reasonably can be expected to participate
in tribal relations and affairs."' 9 Suggested tests for such member-
ship included having both parents be recognized tribal members or
be residents of the reservation or that an individual possess a "cer-
tain degree of Indian blood."200 When those without blood or mar-
riage ties sought adoption, "provision for the adoption of non-
members should require approval by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. ' '20 1 That policy statement is dated November 18, 1935; Santa
Clara Pueblo's original constitution, with its inclusive membership
rules, was approved just a month later °. 20  Four years later, the
more restrictive rules were put into place. 20 ' Forty years later, the
district court concluded that the Pueblo had adopted the 1939 re-
19' In the 1940s, Felix Cohen commented that "[n]early all tribal constitutions provide
for adoption through special action by the tribe, subject to review by the Secretary of Inte-
rior". Cohen also believed that the "trend" was to recognize membership as a "political
relation rather than a racial attribute." Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law
136 (GPO, 1942; reprinted U New Mexico Press, 1971).
198 United States Department of the Interior, Circular No 3123 (Office of Indian Affairs,
Nov. 18 1935) ("Circular No 3123") (on file with the University of Chicago Law Review)
(cited in 1 Opinions of the Solicitor General [of the Department of Interior] at 813 (April
12, 1938)).
"' Circular No 3123 at 1.
200 Id.
20 Id. The Department stated that its declaration was made for the benefit "of the
Indians themselves . . . [who] shall appreciate its importance as it applies to their own
welfare through preventing the admission to tribal membership of a large number of appli-
cants of small degree of Indian blood." Id at 2.
202 Petitioner's Brief, Appendix at 1 (cited in note 155).
"' Id at 18.
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strictive rules "in response to a sudden increase in mixed mar-
riages, which had resulted in a proportionate strain on the eco-
nomic resources of the Pueblo."20 4 When arguing to the Supreme
Court in 1977, the Pueblo explained that the 1939 Ordinance re-
flects "the view that a woman member of the Pueblo is more likely
to leave it than a male member and the children are more likely to
be raised as cultural outsiders."20
Department of Interior rules and the Santa Clara rule were
congruent, but I do not know what if any role beyond "approval"
the Department had in framing the specifics of the Santa Clara
Ordinance. In other cases, the Department has upon occasion with-
held or rescinded its approval of Indian tribes' decisions. For ex-
ample, in the early 1980s, the Secretary of Interior "rescinded a
tribal ordinance of the Moapa Band of Paiute Indians that would
have permitted houses of prostitution on the Moapa Reservation
in Clark County, Nevada."20 6 Nevada is a state in which, under
certain circumstances, houses of prostitution are permitted.0 7 Al-
though regional offices of the Department of the Interior initially
approved the Moapa Constitution that included provisions for
prostitution, the Secretary of the Interior retracted that approval
on the grounds that such practices would engender political hostil-
ity to Indians and that the underlying activity, prostitution, was
"frowned upon by federal policy."2 8 Despite the policy of Indian
self-determination, the federal courts upheld the Secretary's deci-
sion as neither arbitrary nor capricious. 0 9 Similarly, federal courts
have upheld rulings by the Secretary of the Interior that over-
turned Indian tribes' decisions about the leasing of mineral rights
204 402 F Supp at 15.
205 Supreme Court Reply Brief of the Petitioners, Santa Clara v Martinez, No 76-682
13 (Oct Term, 1976).
'6 Moapa Band of Paiute Indians v United Siates Department of Interior, 747 F2d
563, 564 (9th Cir 1984).
207 Nev Rev Stat § 244.345(8) (1987).
208 Moapa Indians, 747 F2d at 564.
20 Id at 566-67. The decision turns, in part, on the Moapa Constitution, which provides
that the Department of Interior must approve all licensing ordinances, and that disapproval
was permitted for "any cause." Moapa Const, Art V, § 4 (quoted at 747 F2d at 564). The
appellate court applied federal analogues and decided that judicial review was not precluded
and that "arbitrary and capricious" was the correct standard to apply. Id at 565. When
deciding if the Moapa provision was a violation of federal policy, the court looked to federal
statutes - such as the Mann Act, which prohibits interstate transportation of women for
prostitution and the immigration act provisions permitting deportation of those connected
with prostitution. Id at 566. Compare 1 Opinions of the Solicitor General [of the Depart-
ment of the Interior] at 813 (April 15, 1938), admonishing the Secretary not to rescind ap-
proval of a tribal ordinance.
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and other tribal activities.21
One distinction between these examples (in which tribal deci-
sion making authority has been limited) and the 1939 Santa Clara
Ordinance is that federal "interference" often occurs when the de-
cision of a tribe has a substantial effect on non-Indians, while tri-
bal "self-governance" is often permitted when the primary impact
will be felt by members of the tribe or of other tribes. The exam-
ples of "interference" demonstrate that the Department of Interior
has chosen to exercise power when it perceives that Indian tribal
decisions jeopardize "federal policy." Apparently, in 1939 and sub-
sequently, decisions to treat women and men and their children
differently for purposes of membership did not implicate "federal
policy.
'211
Federal guidance about tribal membership is not exercised
only by the Executive. In 1973, Congress "restored" the tribal sta-
tus of the Menominee, who had been "terminated" in the 1950s.
212
In its restoration legislation, Congress also specified membership
criteria for the tribe, granting membership status to "any descend-
ants of an enrollee [of the tribe as of June 17, 1954] . . . provided
such descendant possesses at least one-quarter degree Menominee
Indian blood."213 Federal courts have also controlled membership.
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court upheld legislation
that empowered federal territorial courts to have final authority
over citizenship claims to the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek and
Chickasaw Nations.1 4 In short, however much the courts that con-
210 The IRA is not the only source of Interior Department control. See Yavapai-Pres-
cott Indian Tribe v Watt, 707 F2d 1072 (9th Cir 1983) (Indian tribe lacked authority to
terminate unilaterally commercial lease executed in accordance with federal law that re-
quired Secretary of Interior approval for leasing). See also Pawnee v United States, 830 F2d
187 (Fed Cir 1987) (upheld Secretary of Interior's approval power under statutes; Interior
did not have obligation to obtain highest price for gas sold). Compare Quantum Exploration
Inc. v Clark, 780 F2d 1457 (9th Cir 1985) (tribe can rescind proposed mineral agreement
prior to Interior Department approval or disapproval).
"2 Compare Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878); Cleveland v United States,
329 US 14 (1946) (religious belief in polygamy does not insulate that practice from federal
criminal prosecution), discussed in Weisbrod, 26 J Family L 741 (cited in note 140). Under
the recent amendments to the IRA (see note 188), the Department of Interior will have to
rely upon statutes, treaties, final court decisions, and executive orders to determine if tribal
constitutions conflict with federal "law."
21 Menominee Restoration Act, 25 USC §§ 903-903(f) (1982) (repealing the Act of June
17, 1954, 25 USC §§ 891-902 (1954), that terminated the tribe). See generally Note, Termi-
nating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 Stan L Rev 1181 (1983) (by Michael C. Welch).
213 25 USC § 903b(c). For the regulations on how to establish "an American Indian
group" as a "tribe," see 25 CFR § 83 et seq (1988). See generally Stephen J. Herzberg, The
Menominee Indians: Termination to Restoration, 6 Am Indian L Rev 143 (1978).
224 Stephens v Cherokee Nation, 174 US 445 (1899). The Court also found constitu-
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sidered the Santa Clara Pueblo case wanted to assume member-
ship rules were purely a function of that group's decisions, the his-
tory of membership rules for Indian tribes shows the pervasive
influence of United States law on the creation and codification of
such rules.
To acknowledge the United States' role in these rules is not to
deny the role of the Pueblo. Cultural interaction was, of course, at
work - and interaction "works" in two directions. Indian tribes,
such as the Iroquois Confederacy (which included the Mohawk,
Seneca, Onadaga, Oneida, and Cayuga tribes) had a structure of
government that predated and may have influenced the drafting of
the United States Constitution.2 15 Some Indian tribes, such as the
Cherokee in the nineteenth century, had detailed written laws that
were in some respects similar to those of the United States.2 16 The
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act affected the laws of
the Santa Clara Pueblo. Before 1935, it did not distinguish reli-
gious and political governance. 17 Then, when writing its constitu-
tion for purposes of organizing under the IRA, the Pueblo adopted
a formal codification of membership rules and the election of polit-
ical leaders, distinct from religious leaders, who hold specified, del-
egated powers.1 8 But in writing its constitution, the Pueblo was
tional a congressionally created commission with the authority to hear claims to citizenship
in certain Indian tribes. Id at 486. Stephens is a case of interest for those intrigued by the
constitutionality of "Article I" courts because the Article I court's "final" authority was
upheld. Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Courts, and
Article III, 101 Harv L Rev 915 (1988) (need for Article III courts to review at least some
aspects of decisions of Article I judges).
215 See Parker, Constitution of the Five Nations (cited in note 184); Bruce E. Johnson,
Forgotten Founders (Gambit, 1982). See also Kirke Kickingbird, "In Our Image.... After
Our Likeness". The Drive for the Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 Am Crim L
Rev 675 (1976).
'1 See Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Passed During the Years 1839-1867 (1868); see
also Acts and Resolutions of the Creek National Council of the Extra Session of April,
1894 and the Regular Session of October, 1894 (Scholarly Resources, 1973 reprint). See
generally Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 Am
Indian L Rev 17 (Number 2, 1974).
21 Dozier, Pueblo Indians, 68-78, 104-06, and especially 187-89 (cited in note 165).
218 See Hill, Ethnography at ch 9 (cited in note 165) (on political governance of the
Santa Clara). See also Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in
Tribal Courts and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18
NM L Rev 49, 55 (1988) ("most tribal constitutions were drafted by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs without tribal input and consequently reflected little, if any, direct local concern").
Tribal Court Survey at 27, 45 (cited in note 148) (notes Department of Interior's "pervasive
influence" over development of tribal governance-by the time of survey, 84 percent of
tribes had written constitutions). Recently, some tribes have been amending their constitu-
tions to limit Bureau of Indian Affairs powers over approving changes. Pommersheim, 18
NM L Rev at 55.
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also responsive to its own needs. One historian describes how the
Santa Clara Pueblo used the IRA process as a way to "solve inter-
nal problems" and, by its constitution, "protected traditionalist
values by requiring that each [member of the tribal] council speak
the Tewa language fluently.
'219
4. The Need for Membership.
The Santa Clara Pueblo has a long history. Anthropologists
and ethnographers trace its roots to the fifteenth century.22 o A sub-
stantial amount of information is available about the Pueblo's his-
tory, including its religious, social, and political organization. Dur-
ing the period prior to the codification of membership rules in the
1930s, scholars of the Santa Clara Pueblo did not discuss "mem-
bership" as an organizing feature of the society. Further, if the
Martinez family is illustrative, "membership" as defined in the
1939 Ordinance may still not be a central factor in some important
aspects of the community's life. The lower courts stated that the
children of the Martinez family spoke Tewa, the language of the
Pueblo, and participated in its religious and cultural life.22'
"Membership" itself is a category created by the Santa Clara
Pueblo in the context of its interaction with the United States.222
Membership is a category imposed by the United States, which has
"counted" Indians for a variety of purposes since the cavalry went
around naming and numbering Indians in the nineteenth century.
Indian "membership" is relevant to a myriad of federal jurisdic-
tional rules.223 United States rules also provide the basis for the
generation of restrictive "membership" practices, for the United
States offers a limited pool of resources to those who are "mem-
bers" of Indian tribes.224 The laws of the United States use lineage
219 Philp, John Collier's Crusade at 170 (cited in note 146).
220 Dozier, Pueblo Indians at 38-39 (cited in note 165). Determinations of the longevity
of the Pueblo turn on perceptions of the continuity of a delineated political community. See
Clifford, Predicament of Culture (cited in note 181).
211 Martinez, 402 F Supp at 14; Martinez, 540 F2d at 1047.
22 The point can be extended from membership rules to the conception of Indian
tribes. "The term 'tribe', a word whose origin is European and which by definition could not
have had meaning for Americans before 1492, emerges from human encounters - from his-
tory.... ." Hoxie, 13 Law and Soc Inquiry at 797 (cited in note 132). In some instances, the
United States expressly created "tribes." See Shoshone Tribe v United States, 299 US 476
(1937).
213 See Clinton, 18 Ariz L Rev at 513-20 (cited in note 108).
22" See, for example, 25 USC § 450b(a) (1982) (designating beneficiaries of Indian Self
Determination and Education Assistance Act as including any "member of an Indian
tribe"). The Interior Department also attempted to be involved with individual membership
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as one of the indications of whether an individual is an Indian.225
Moreover, assimilationist policies of the United States at-
tempted to weaken individuals' tribal identification based upon
shared work, shared culture, and shared language, thereby encour-
aging tribal identification based upon lineage ties. It has been the
policy of the United States to encourage Indian children to live
away from their homes, to go to boarding schools and to meet indi-
viduals other than those from their tribe.22 6 As anthropologists of
the Santa Clara Pueblo have noted, in the twentieth century inter-
marriages between Santa Clarans and non-Santa Clarans began to
increase, as mobility and larger cultural pressures affected the pre-
viously agrarian and self-contained society.227
5. The Benefits of Membership.
Federal involvement is not limited to the process by which
"membership" rules are defined and codified, nor to creating the
cultural backdrop that made "membership" an issue. Federal ben-
efits (some might call them "reparations""22 ) flow directly to those
who are counted as "members." While the federal government can
define Indian status differently than a tribe might,22 9 the federal
government also relies upon tribal definitions as a basis for the dis-
tribution of benefits.23 0
The availability of federal benefits is central to understanding
why the Martinez family tried to obtain recognition of its children
decisions and urged tribes to pass restrictive membership rules. See notes 198 to 201 and
accompanying text.
225 See 25 USC §§ 181-184, ("Indian" mothers may pass on rights to tribal property)
(see notes 246-49 and accompanying text); Menominee Restoration Act, 25 USC § 903(b)
(one quarter blood requirement). See also Article II of the Treaty with the Sioux Nation of
Indians of September 29, 1837 in Senate Executive Documents, 53rd Cong, 2d Sess, In Re
Sioux Mixed Blood Indians, Ex No 58 at 28 (payments to those "having not less than one
quarter of Sioux blood"). Compare Cohen, Handbook at 136 (cited in note 197) (urging
"political" rather than "racial" basis for membership).
220 The BIA had a variety of assimilationist policies in the 1920s, including trying to
ban Indian school children from speaking languages other than English. See Newton, 132 U
Pa L Rev at 227 (cited in note 99).
227 Hill, Ethnography at 155-157 (cited in note 165); Dozier, Pueblo Indians at 9-14
(cited in note 165).
228 See Boris I. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations 71-77 (Random House, 1973)
(exploring payments to tribes as model for United States' response to blacks). Much of the
payment to tribes is based upon treaty provisions and trustee obligations. See Prucha, The
Great Father, Vol II at 1016-23 (cited at note 22).
229 Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v Weeks, 430 US 73, 84-86 (1977).
220 See, for example, 25 USC § 450b(a) (beneficiaries of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Act are the "member[s] of an Indian tribe"); 25 CFR § 61 (1988) (listing the
few tribes for which the Secretary of the Interior will define membership).
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as members of the Pueblo." 1 According to the trial court opinion,
the "most important of the material benefits [that Ms. Martinez's
children sought] is that referred to as land use rights." '232 The
United States government holds the Pueblo land in trust for the
Pueblo as a whole. The Santa Clara Council has authority to spec-
ify individual use of land. The United States government, through
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, gives mone-
tary assistance to member Indians who build homes on Pueblo
land.2 3 Federal policy looked to tribal decisions; the Martinez fam-
ily argued that, without the Pueblo's recognition of them as mem-
bers, the Martinez children could not receive federal health and
housing assistance.3 4 Thus, being a "member" of the Santa Clara
Pueblo was not simply an event of moment for purposes of that
community.
Exactly how the lack of Santa Claran membership affected the
Martinez family was a matter of dispute between the parties. Julia
Martinez's lawyers argued in their Supreme Court brief: "Denial of
membership has caused hardship to the Martinez family, especially
in obtaining federal medical care available to Indians. In 1968 Julia
Martinez's now-deceased daughter Natalie, suffering from strokes
associated with her terminal illness, was refused emergency medi-
cal treatment by the [federally-funded and run] Indian Health
Service. This was solely because her mother had previously been
unable to obtain tribal recognition for her. '235 The Pueblo re-
sponded that it was not at fault, that it "had no control over
whether or not the Martinez children would obtain medical care.
This was a matter solely within the province of the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs.
'23 1
The Supreme Court did not probe the effects of Santa Claran
recognition of the Martinez children on federal benefits. Moreover,
while the Court assumed the primacy of membership for tribal sov-
231 Respondents' Brief at 2-3 (cited in note 160).
232 Martinez, 402 F Supp at 14.
233 24 CFR § 905 (1988).
234 Respondents' Brief at 2-3 (cited in note 160), and conversation with Richard Collins,
one of the Martinez' family's attorneys, Nov 19, 1988.
235 Respondent's Brief at 3 (cited in note 160). See generally U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Indian Health Care 24 (GPO, April 1986) ("To be eligible for [In-
dian Health Service] direct services, a person need only be of Indian descent and be re-
garded as an Indian by the Community in which he lives .... )
13' Petitioners' Reply Brief at 13 (cited in note 205). See also Petitioners' Brief at 33
(cited in note 155) ("It is extremely unfortunate that the Martinez family had difficulty
enrolling their children for purposes of Federal benefits . . . . [T]his is in no way ... the
fault of Santa Clara Pueblo").
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ereignty,2 37 the Court did not discuss how often federal law has
exercised control over Indian tribal membership or how federal
benefits are linked to tribal membership. s3 Ms. Martinez's request
that her children be "counted" as Santa Clarans had consequences
both for their interactions within the Santa Clara Pueblo and for
them as "Indians" in the United States, but such consequences did
not attract the Supreme Court's interest.
6. Membership and Gender.
The Santa Clara Pueblo choose to link membership with gen-
der and to limit membership to those who could claim that their
fathers were Santa Claran. I do not know the genesis of this rule.
Some suggest that the rule reflects the gendered hierarchy of the
Pueblo, that the male members of the Pueblo wanted to deter
women from marrying non-Santa Claran men.239 But questions
need to be asked about how the Pueblo's gendered hierarchy came
into being; the United States often singled out men to be desig-
nated as leaders of Indian tribes. Santa Claran men might have
held the power to make rules at least in part because the United
States assumed men and only men could be rulemakers.24 °
2317 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 72 n32.
238 For example, the Indian Health Service has proposed that it only provide services to
"members of a federally recognized Indian tribe," who "reside" in areas designated by the
Service as a "Delivery Area," and to non-member "natural" children, under the age of 18, of
those who are members of a federally recognized tribe and who reside within a "Delivery
Area." See the Final Rule of the Department of Health and Human Services, Indian Health
Service, 42 CFR § 36.12(a) (Oct. 1, 1988). See also 52 Fed Reg 35044, 35048-49 (Sept 16,
1987). That rule resulted in substantial controversy and its effective date was "suspended"
until October 15, 1988. 53 Fed Reg 37762 (Sept 28, 1988). Congress then limited the rule; a
rider was attached to an Interior Department appropriation bill. The rider provided that no
funds allocated for fiscal year 1989 could be used to implement the rule. Pub L No 100-446,
100 Stat 1817 (Sept 17, 1988). Subsequently, the Indian Health Care Improvements Act,
Pub L No 100-713, 102 Stat 4838 (Nov 23, 1988), directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to conduct a study to determine the impact of the eligibility requirements
on health services to Indians. See generally Indian Health Care 25-36 (cited in note 235)
(analyzing options to limit eligibility for services).
239 According to Alan Taradash, who was one of the attorneys who represented the
Martinez family, the Santa Clara Pueblo had begun to impose a patrilineal rule in 1928. In
the course of discovery for the lawsuit, Mr. Taradash reviewed the minutes of the Pueblo
council during the 1920s and learned that the councilmen were concerned about keeping
"their" women from marrying non-Santa Claran men and from having to share the Pueblo's
resources with outsiders. Conversation with Alan Taradash (Nov 23, 1988). See also Hill,
Ethnography at 20-1 (cited in note 165) (women as "second class" citizens).
0 See Rayna Green, Native American Women, 6 Signs 248, 253 (1980) (discussing
John Collier, "[a]rchitect of the Indian Reorganization Acts which supported tribal men and
virtually disenfranchised Indian women"; "matriarchal, matrifocal, and matrilineal societies
were neither acceptable nor comprehensible to members of European patriarchies." Id at
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The 1939 Santa Clara membership rules are also congruent
with United States' traditions of subordination of women. United
States common law rules were that the husband conferred status
upon the wife 41 and the father conferred status on the child. As
one nineteenth century lawyer explained, "[t]he rule is a very old
one, both by the Roman civil law and the English common law, too
elementary to require authorities ... that the offspring of married
parents takes the status of the father." '242 In contrast, some nine-
teenth century writers described the interests of Indian women in
tribal property to be great, and sometimes greater than, the inter-
ests of men. The writers also stated that such treatment of women
was further proof of Indian tribes' lack of "civilized" ways.24 s
When considering the genesis of the Santa Clara membership
rules, I wonder whether federal statutes, existing since the late
1880s and linking gender, lineage, and property rights, played any
role.244 In 1888, Congress enacted a statute (still on the books) that
provided that an "Indian woman" who married a citizen of the
250). See also Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, 187 US 553, 557, 564 (1903) (Congressional discussion
about whether a tribal resolution was signed by "three fourths of the adult males").
For discussions of roles of Indian women, see Shirley R. Bysiewisz and Ruth E. Van de
Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian Woman, 3 Am Indian L Rev 255, 266 (1975)
(Dakota Indian women had more political and social power within the tribe in nineteenth
century than did their non-Indian counterparts); Carolyn Thomas Foreman, Indian Women
Chiefs 53 (Zenger, 1976) ("Tonawanda Senecas are governed by thirty-four chiefs who are
elected by the women of the tribe"); Gretchen M. Bataille and Kathleen Mullen Sands,
American Indian Women: Telling Their Lives at viii (U Neb, 1984) (criticizing popular view
of women as inferior; "research about American Indian women ... have either ignored the
power of women within tribal structures or undervalued or inadequately valued it"); DeLo-
ria and Lytle, American Indians at 88-89 (cited in note 95) (Iroquois Constitution placed
"ownership of the seats on the council [the central decision making body] .. . in the clan
mothers so that women had a powerful voice in selecting who sat as representatives of the
people").
21 Barber v Barber, 62 US 582, 600-601 (1858) (Justice Daniel's dissent addressed the
issue of a wife's civil status and applied the English common law rules, "by which the hus-
band and wife are regarded as one person, and her legal existence and authority in a degree
lost and suspended during the existence of the matrimonial union.")
22 H. E. Dewey, attorney for a claimant in a land dispute. See Senate Exec Doc, In Re
Sioux Mixed Blood at 35 (cited in note 225).
113 Letter of Hoke Smith, Secretary, Commission on Indian Affairs, stating that the
common law rule was that children follow father, but perhaps the "civil law rule relating to
slaves prevails among the Indians, and the children follow the condition of the mother."
Senate Exec Doc, In Re Sioux Mixed Blood at 104 (cited at note 225). Smith also argued
that, to allow allotment of land to a particular woman would undermine "civilizing of Indi-
ans." Id at 107. See also Robert Cristy, detailing the "Indian Women, their tribal status and
rights of property," id at 41-42. For a discussion of Hopi women's control over property, see
Ernest Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance in an American Indian Tribe, 20 Iowa L
Rev 304, 305-08 (1935).
2"4 See 25 USC §§ 181-184 (1982).
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United States gained United States citizenship but retained her in-
terest in tribal property. 45 In 1897, Congress legislated that the
children of an "Indian woman" and a "white man" married prior
to the enactment of that legislation would have the same rights
and privileges as did other members of the mother's tribe. 46 This
legislation altered the United States' common law rule that the
"condition of the father prevails in determining the status of the
offspring. 2 47 Some federal officials explained the 1888 legislation
as aimed at encouraging assimilation of Indians.2 4s The thesis was
that women would follow men and that male heads of households
would provide the cultural framework for the household. It was
hoped and assumed that if "white men" could not by virtue of
marriage assert title over tribal property, white men would not live
with the Indian women to whom they were married on the reserva-
tion. When the women followed the men, they would then live and
raise their children in a white culture.2 49 Federal administrative
24 An Act in Relation to Marriage Between White Men and Indian Women, ch 818, 25
Stat 392 (codified at 25 USC § 182 (1982)). Women members of the "five civilized tribes in
Indian territory" were exempt because (according to Congress), the federal government had
granted those tribes "entire autonomy." Statement of Senator Dawes, 50th Cong, 1st Sess
(Jan. 17, 1988), 19 Cong Rec 512. For the statute to apply, women must be recognized by
the tribe as a member. See 1 Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
Relating to Indian Affairs 113 ("Intermarriage, enrollment of children born," June 16,
1924).
2-6 25 USC § 184 (1982). The legislative history of this section is sparse. Members of the
Senate expressed concern about the disabilities of children of Indian women, who, under the
1888 legislation, may not have been able to inherit their mother's interest in tribal proper-
ties. See 30 Cong Rec S 728 (April 15, 1897).
241 See letter of George H. Shields, Assistant Attorney General (Nov 27, 1891), in Sen-
ate Exec Doc, In Re Sioux Mixed Blood at 6 (cited in note 225).
248 Cohen, Handbook at 186-87 (cited in note 197) (noting that the 1897 legislation does
not bestow rights to tribal property on children born of marriages "contracted after passage
of the act"); United States v West, 30 F2d 989, 990 (DC Cir 1929); Pape v United States,
19 F2d 219, 220 (9th Cir 1927); Oakes v United States, 172 F 305, 308 (8th Cir 1909) (policy
of "inducing the Indians to abandon their tribal relations and adopt the customs of civilized
life"). This law did not apply to all tribes. See note 245. See also Cherokee Intermarriage
Cases, 203 US 76 (1906) (upholding Cherokee law that provided that those who intermar-
ried into the Nation after the enactment of the legislation did not gain property rights).
Prior to the 1888 legislation, the Act of March 3, 1875, ch 131, § 15, 18 Stat 420, published
at 43 USC § 189 (1982) and repealed effective Oct 21, 1976, by Pub L 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat
2787, stated that Indians who were twenty-one or the "head of a family and "abandon[ed]"
tribal "relations" kept rights to Indian property.
249 Another possibility is that this legislation was aimed at encouraging the provision of
sexual partners for "white men." The legislation did try to limit "white men's" control over
tribal assets. See 25 USC § 181 (1982). In 1885, the Secretary of the Interior reported that
"'squaw men,' who marry or act as husbands of Indian women [have an] evil influence...,
they foment discord ... and incite opposition on the part of the Indians to the measures
adopted ... by the Department ... for [Indian] advancement and civilization." Report of
the Secretary of the Interior, HR Exec Doc 1, pt 5, 49th Cong, 1st Sess, in 11 House Execu-
[56:671
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 724 1989
Dependent Sovereigns
regulations have also distinguished between "Indian men" and
"Indian women"; for example, the BIA provided families of Indian
men, married to non-Indian women, with general assistance more
readily than when Indian women married non-Indian men. 5
The 1939 codification of female subordination seems to have
been supported, if not influenced and encouraged, by the tradi-
tions of the United States, a country in which women have long
been expected to "follow their men," a country in which home,
name, income and status are for many women defined by the
home, name, income and status of the men to whom they are re-
lated as wives and daughters.
7. Joint Venturing.
As a non-Indian, I am conscious of what Mari Matsuda has
called the dangers of "intrusion and preemption." '' But I cannot
share the ease with which the Supreme Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo assumed the 1939 Ordinance to be an artifact of Santa
Clara sovereignty.2 52 The emergence of a codified, written, non-dis-
cretionary, gender-based membership rule is linked to the Pueblo's
decision to organize under guidance of the Department of the Inte-
rior, is linked to the Pueblo as a recipient of federal funds, and is
linked to the Pueblo as situated in a United States culture that has
made patrilineal and patriarchal rules so familiar that, to some,
they seem uncontroversial.
These interdependencies do not leap out from the pages of the
Supreme Court opinion in Santa Clara Pueblo. Rather, the Court's
construction of the legal issues submerges the traces of the federal
role in the Santa Clara decision to exclude the children of some of
its women members. The Court cast the statutory interpretation
tive Documents 28 (GPO, 1886). The Secretary recommended legislation that would make
"any Indian woman who shall hereafter marry a citizen of the United States... a citizen."
Id at 29. In the legislative debate, members of the House argued that the bill would discour-
age marriages between white men and Indian women, or, at least, would "civilize them both
together." See 19 Cong Rec pt 7 at 6885-86 (July 26, 1888). See also Sheppard v Sheppard,
104 Idaho 1, 655 P2d 895, 904 (1982) (legislative history of § 181). In 1887, as part of the
General Allotment Act, Congress conferred United States citizenship on all Indians, "born
within the territorial limits of the United States who have voluntarily taken up . . . resi-
dence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians ...and has adopted the habits of
civilized life." Act of Feb 8, 1887, ch 119, § 6, 24 Stat 388, 390. See also note 6.
20 Bysiewicz and Van de Mark, 3 Am Indian L Rev at 276-77 (cited in note 240).
"' See Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 Harv Women's L J 1, 13 (1988).
"' See 436 US at 72 n 32. Compare Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 245 (cited in
note 22) (membership rules as "product of federal manipulation").
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question as pitting a group's decision about how to describe its
membership against the rights of one of that group's members. 5 3
As the Court stated: "[E]fforts by the federal judiciary to apply...
[the Indian Civil Rights Act] ... may substantially interfere with a
tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically dis-
tinct entity." '254 Under that framework, the case has considerable
poignancy; decisions about membership, about inclusion and exclu-
sion, are at the core of self description. If the federal government
were serious about Indian tribes' rights of self constitution, how
could a federal court or even Congress intrude? Given the current
federal policy of support of tribal sovereignty, given some members
of the Supreme Court's ambivalence about women's rights, 2"5 and
given some members of that Court's unease about any "new" im-
plied federal causes of action,256 the Court's construction of the
problem is understandable.
But the majority's description is too simple, too easy, and ulti-
mately deceptive. The "Santa Clara Rule" is intertwined with
United States' rules and culture. James Clifford has said it well:
"Modern Indian lives - lived within and against the dominant
culture and state - are not captured by categories like tribe or
identity. '257 Implicit in the Court's opinion, in its references to
Santa Clara Pueblo as a distinct political entity, is what Clifford
calls the erroneous "idea of cultural wholeness. '25 The restrictive,
gender-discriminatory membership rule "of' the Santa Clara
Pueblo is generated out of conditions of adversity, conditions im-
posed by centuries of United States policy towards Indian tribes.
The rule is written in the light of limited federal benefits to be
divided amongst those who bear the label "Santa Claran." The
rule is comprehensible to the "dominant culture" because it too
accepts subordination of women.
Many commentators sympathetic to tribal sovereignty have
heralded the Santa Clara Pueblo case as an important marker in
113 Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S Cal L
Rev 1001, 1035-36, 1046-47 (1983).
254 436 US at 72 (footnote omitted).
252 Three years later after Santa Clara Pueblo was decided, in Michael M v Superior
Court, 450 US 464 (1981), which was a constitutional challenge to California's statutory rape
law, the majority continued to evaluate distinctions based upon gender by an intermediate
rather than "strict" scrutiny, and all members of the Court ignored the violence that had
accompanied the rape. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U Pa L Rev 955 (1984); MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (cited in note 173).
216 See note 270 (court movement away from implying rights of action).
257 Clifford, The Predicament of Culture at 337 (cited in note 181).
258 Id.
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federal Indian law. From the perspective of tribes, the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 is an example of federal intrusion; Santa Clara
Pueblo is, to some extent, a buffer. I have not explored the Santa
Clara Pueblo case to offer a "better" answer on the tribal sover-
eignty/federal intrusion issue than that given by the Court, nor am
I claiming that the role the United States played in creating tribal
rules justifies further intrusion.259 Rather, my purpose is to demon-
strate that the case tells more about United States' norms than it
does about tribal norms. I am skeptical about how much of a safe
haven Santa Clara Pueblo provides for those seeking tribal sover-
eignty. Because federal norms about the treatment of women were
not really threatened by the Santa Clara Pueblo membership rule,
the case was an "easy" one for the Court to proclaim its commit-
ment to tribal sovereignty. For those of us who believe in women's
rights and are also concerned about federal government imperial-
ism, the case becomes hard.28 °
B. Separate but Assimilated
The case of Santa Clara Pueblo arose not only because of
1934 federal legislation supporting tribal sovereignty, but also be-
cause of 1968 federal legislation, the Indian Civil Rights Act, which
imposed federal rights on the relationship between tribal members
and tribes. A brief summary of the federal policy shifts from 1934
to 1968 is in order. As many have detailed,8 1 from 1934 until the
early 1950s, the IRA policy of tribal self determination held sway.
Then a new policy gained prominence, that of "termination.
2 62
Under "termination," some Indian tribes lost their status as feder-
ally recognized "tribes, ' 263 as the federal government once again
I' See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wisc L
Rev 187, 230 (1988) (how the Supreme Court used "the history of oppression of gay and
lesbian people... as its own justification" for continued and additional oppression).
210 "I find Martinez a difficult case on a lot of levels, and I don't always find cases
difficult." MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, at 66 (cited note 173). So did some of the
participants in the case before the Supreme Court. The American Civil Liberties Union
debated which side to take, as did the Department of Justice. Conversations with Steven
Tullberg, of the Indian Law Resource Center; and with Drew Days, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights, 1977-80; Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Spring, 1989).
See, for example, Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 112-37 (cited in note 22).
242 House Concurrent Resolution 108, 83rd Cong, 1st Sess (August, 1953), in 67 Stat
B132, declared that termination was the long range goal of Indian policies, that Indians
would eventually lose all distinct status and the tribes would be dismantled. See generally
Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-60 198-203 (U
NM, 1986); Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 125-133 (cited in note 22).
203 See notes 212-13 and accompanying text. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson and
Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 Am Indian L Rev 139 (1977);
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pursued the assimilationist goals that had animated the allotment
period.
Starting in the middle of the 1960s, an era during which civil
rights consciousness was great, members of Congress began to ex-
press concern about the rights of Indians vis-a-vis their tribes. One
result was the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).6 4 Billed
both as insuring civil rights of Indian tribe members and as pro-
tecting the sovereignty of Indian tribes, the ICRA made some, but
not all, of the Bill of Rights applicable to Indian tribe members. 26 5
As noted above, ICRA specified only one remedy, habeas corpus,
which reflected the particular concern that tribal decisions about
incarceration be made subject to reconsideration by a federal
court.
2 6 6
Before the Supreme Court heard Santa Clara Pueblo v Marti-
nez, many lower courts had implied remedies beyond habeas
corpus for breaches of rights enumerated in the ICRA. 67 However,
by the time Santa Clara Pueblo was before the Court, federal poli-
cies about tribal sovereignty and about federal rights had shifted
Felix Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
Yale L J 348 (1953).
264 25 USC §§ 1301-1341 (1982, and Supp 1986). The legislation had several provisions
other than those related to rights of tribes against members; for example, one aspect of the
legislative packet was to limit states' ability to assert jurisdiction over activities on Indian
lands. Senator Sam Ervin, a Democrat of North Carolina, was centrally involved in the leg-
islative effort on "civil rights". Beginning in 1961, Senator Ervin, with the help of his legis-
lative assistant, Helen Scheirbeck (a member of the Lumbees), began hearings for what
ICRA legislative history called "the most neglected minority group in the history of the
Nation." Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S Rep No 721, 90th Cong, 1st Sess
(Nov. 2, 1967) in 1968 USC CAN 1837-39, 1862-67. See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Histori-
cal Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9 Harv J Leg 557, 574-82 (1972).
265 The rights are enumerated at 25 USC § 1302; they include protection from interfer-
ence with the free exercise of religion, from self-incrimination, from deprivations of property
without compensation, from illegal searches and seizures, from cruel and unusual punish-
ment, excessive bail, bills of attainder, and from denial of liberty or property without due
process and denial of equal protection of "its" (i.e., a tribe's) laws. In addition, Congress
protected criminal defendants' rights to a jury of not less than six persons and to confront
and cross examine adverse witnesses. The "Indian Bill of Rights" is not identical to the
federal constitutional provisions; for example ICRA does not prohibit the establishment of
religion or require the provision of counsel in criminal proceedings. For discussion of
whether ICRA rights should be interpreted in accordance with counterpart provisions in the
federal constitution, see Duro v Reina, 821 F2d 1358, 1362 n 4 (9th Cir 1987) (en banc), cert
granted, 109 S Ct 1930.
2 6 See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC §§ 1301-1303 (1982 and Supp 1986). For differ-
ing descriptions of the legislative history, compare Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court
with Justice White's dissent in Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 49 and 72.
267 See generally Note, Implication of Civil Remedies Under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 75 Mich L Rev 210 (1976). See also G. Kenneth Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 Ariz L Rev 617 (1968).
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once again. In 1968, President Johnson had termed Indians "the
forgotten American," and in 1970, President Nixon's executive
proclamation steered federal policies again toward tribal sover-
eignty.2"' Stating that "[s]elf-determination among the Indian peo-
ple can and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual ter-
mination," Nixon announced a legislative package to permit Indian
tribes to administer federal service programs.6 9 Soon thereafter,
justices appointed by President Nixon to the Supreme Court
turned that institution's attention away from articulation of indi-
vidual rights, away from implication of remedies from federal stat-
utory schemes, 270 and towards an emphasis on state sovereign pow-
ers.271 In the 1978 Santa Clara Pueblo decision, the federal policy
of tribal self-determination, ambivalence about women's rights,
and the limited federal court willingness to imply remedies coa-
lesced, and Julia and Audrey Martinez were told that the federal
courts could not help them.
1. Sovereignty and Jurisdiction.
But federal court support for the principle of tribal sover-
eignty has limits as well. Just two months before deciding Santa
Clara Pueblo, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes lack au-
thority to punish non-Indians who commit crimes on tribal reser-
vations. Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe 72 arose when two
268 The Forgotten American, Message from the President of the United States, HR Doc
No 90-272, 114 Cong Rec 5394-98 (March 6, 1968) (President Johnson); The American Indi-
ans, Message from the President of the United States, H Doc No 91-363, 116 Cong Rec
23131 (July 8, 1970) (President Nixon). President Reagan stated his administration's com-
mitment to those policies. See Proclamation 5049 of April 14, 1983, 3 CFR 40 (1983); State-
ment of the President, January 24, 1983, in 19 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments (Fed Reg 1983); Proclamation 5577 of Nov. 24, 1986, 3 CFR 160 (1986).
269 Presidential Message on American Indians, H Doc No 91-363, 116 Cong Rec at
23132 (July 8, 1970). As noted at notes 234-35 and accompanying text, the availability of
federal benefit programs was one of the factors that triggered the lawsuit in the Martinez
case.
270 Compare Cort v Ash, 422 US 66 (1975); Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US
677 (1979); Texas Industries, Inc. v Radcliff Materials Inc., 451 US 630 (1981); Middlesex
Cty. Sewerage Auth. v Sea Clammers, 453 US 1 (1981); and Karahalios v National Federa-
tion of Federal Employees, 109 SCt 1282 (1989). A similar retrenchment has occurred in the
implication of causes of action from the Constitution. See Chappell v Wallace, 462 US 296
(1983); Bush v Lucas, 462 US 367 (1983); and U.S. v Stanley, 483 US 669 (1987).
271 Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971) began a series of cases that limited federal
courts' ability to consider issues pending before state tribunals. See Huffman v Pursue, Ltd.,
420 US 592 (1975); Middlesex Ethics Comm v Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
272 435 US 191 (1978). Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court; Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed a brief dissent, in which he argued that "[i]n the
absence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view that Indian tribes
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non-Indian residents of the Suquamish Tribe's reservation sought
habeas corpus relief from criminal convictions in the tribal court.
In a much criticized decision, the Supreme Court held that crimi-
nal jurisdiction to try non-Indians for crimes committed on an In-
dian reservation was "inconsistent" with the status of Indian
tribes.27 3 While the Court drew upon a number of sources, its un-
derlying assumption is that tribal sovereignty is not unbounded
but limited - because the tribes are not fully another government
but a dependent group.2 74 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court stated that tribal powers were not "limited only by specific
restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments"; tribal powers
could not "conflict with [the] . .. overriding sovereignty" of the
United States. 75 Justice Rehnquist spoke of the United States' in-
terest in protecting citizens (implicitly, non-Indian citizens) from
"unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty. 2 76 While Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that "some Indian tribal courts have become
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their
state counterparts," his concern was that tribal justice would not
always comport with United States definitions of due process.277
Since Oliphant, the Court has had several occasions to deline-
ate the respective jurisdictions of the federal, state, and tribal
courts regarding litigation to which Indians are parties. The issues
are made complex by federal statutes, some of which assert juris-
diction over "major crimes" by Indians on Indian land, 78 some of
enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all
persons who commit offenses against tribal law within the reservation." Id at 212.
273 435 US at 208.
274 435 US at 208-11. For an analysis of Oliphant, see Richard B. Collins, Implied Lim-
itations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 Wash L Rev 479 (1979). For criticism of
Oliphant, see Catherine Baker Stetson, Decriminalizing Tribal Codes: A Response to "Oli-
phant", 9 Am Indian L Rev 51 (1981); Robert Laurence, "Martinez, Oliphant," and Federal
Court Review of Tribal Activity under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 Camp L Rev 411
(1988); Williams, 1986 Wisc L Rev at 269-72 (cited in note 89); for criticism of both Oli-
phant and Santa Clara Pueblo, see Canby, 62 Wash L Rev at 8-10 (cited in note 100); for
discussion of Oliphant-generated law enforcement problems, see Steven M. Johnson, Juris-
diction: Criminal Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the
Wake of "Oliphant", 7 Am Indian L Rev 291, 292 (1979) ("relatively minor infractions of
state and tribal law, such as traffic offenses, trespasses, even petty thefts and simple assault,
will probably never rouse the attention of a federal prosecutor").
271 435 US at 209-210.
276 Id at 210.
21 Id at 210-12.
278 The Major Crimes Act of 1948, 62 Stat 758, codified at 18 USC § 1153 (1982 and
Supp IV 1986) was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's finding in Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 US 556 (1883), of a lack of jurisdiction to try an Indian accused of a crime against
another Indian on Indian lands.
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which cede federal jurisdiction to some states if they exercise the
option,2 79 and some of which - including the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 - could be read to permit tribal jurisdiction to be at
least a first, if not a final, forum. 80
The recent major jurisdictional cases have probed the relation-
ships between non-Indians, who are either doing business with
tribes or living on reservations, and Indians. From National Farm-
ers Union Insurance Company v Crow Tribe2el and Iowa Mutual
Insurance Company v LaPlante,2  the rule has emerged that fed-
eral courts should not exercise civil jurisdiction over activities aris-
ing on tribal lands at least until after tribal remedies have been
exhausted, and possibly not thereafter.283 While many issues about
the overlapping jurisdictions remain open,28 4 federal courts stu-
27 See Act of August 15, 1953, Pub L No 83-280, 67 Stat 588 (1953). Analyzed in Carole
E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22
UCLA L Rev 535 (1975).
280 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 72.
281 471 US 845 (1985). This lawsuit was in the federal courts by virtue of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction; the issue arose under federal common law.
282 480 US 9 (1987) (in federal court by virtue of diversity jurisdiction).
283 The issue is how to read a sentence in Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in
Iowa Mutual: "[u]nless a federal court determines that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction,
however, proper deference to the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised
by the LaPlantes' bad-faith claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts." 480 US at 19. Charles
Wilkinson's view is that "federal judicial review is extremely limited" - to the question of
tribal court jurisdiction to hear the case; the "basic fairness of the tribal action is not sub-
ject to review in federal court." Wilkinson, 21 Creighton L Rev at 778 (cited in note 82). For
unsuccessful efforts to limit the application of Iowa Mutual and LaPlante to instances when
claims were pending in both tribal and federal courts, see U.S. v Turtle Mountain Housing
Auth., 816 F2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir 1987). While the federal courts agree that they retain
jurisdiction to determine if the invocation of tribal jurisdiction is appropriate, see Brown v
Washoe Housing Authority, 835 F2d 1327 (10th Cir 1988), the question is under what cir-
cumstances "deference" is not required and whether Little Horn Bank v Crow Tribal Court,
690 F Supp 919 (D Mont 1988), discussed in text at notes 329-34, is idiosyncratic. See also
A. & A. Concrete v White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir 1986).
Another issue that future cases will have to explore is whether full faith and credit will
be afforded, should efforts be made to enforce tribal court decisions in other forums. See
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 66 n 21 ("Judgments in tribal courts, as to matters properly
within their jurisdiction have been regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith
and credit in other courts." (citations omitted)). See also Issues in Mutuality, prepared by
the American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc. 10-12 (Nov 1976) (discussing the pres-
sures on tribal courts to become "courts of record" under state law to have state courts
enforce tribal court judgments); Red Fox and Red Fox, 542 P2d 918 (Or App 1975) (accord-
ing full faith and credit to the decree of a tribal court in marriage dissolution).
284 One question is the extent to which a tribal court can exercise criminal jurisdiction
over Indian nonmembers. Compare Greywater v Joshua, 846 F2d 486, 488 (8th Cir 1988),
with Duro v Reina, 821 F2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir 1987), cert granted, 109 S Ct 1930 (1989),
for their interpretations of dicta that an Indian tribe "cannot try a nonmember in tribal
court" in United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 326 (1978) (which held that the "dual
sovereignty" exception to double jeopardy permitted both tribal and federal courts to prose-
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dents and scholars will find the modes of analysis familiar. Federal
court jurisdiction is understood to be intrusive to the decision
making of another sovereign; rules of comity mandate deference to
that other court system. 85 Federal courts do not "lack" subject
matter jurisdiction but, as a result of prudentially based comity
doctrines, must defer to another court system. 86
The Indian tribe comity cases offer more than familiar ana-
lytic exercises, for the differences between sovereigns - federal
and tribal-enable an understanding of why courts' exercise of ju-
risdiction can be described as "jurispathic." The term is Robert
Cover's 287 and its meaning is that courts can kill law created by
communities. For many of us who think about the interaction be-
tween federal and state systems, it is often difficult to perceive fed-
eral courts as jurispathic vis-a-vis states. Given federal regulatory
structures in place since the New Deal and federal civil rights rul-
ings, the differences between "New Jersey," "California," or "Vir-
ginia" justice and "federal" justice seem small, and the "harm" to
any state, if federal courts "intrude," seems more theoretical than
real. Federal and state lines have blurred, at least for those who
move from state to state and often have affiliations with more than
one jurisdiction.28
In contrast, as both the Santa Clara Pueblo and Oliphant
cute an Indian for the same offense). Recently, the Court held that tribal courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction in adoption cases involving children of tribal members who reside on the
reservation. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 109 S Ct 1597 (1989).
See also Fisher v District Court, 424 US 382 (1976) (state court lacked jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings in which all parties were members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe).
For discussion of the jurisdictional confusion, see Barbara Atwood, Fighting Over Indian
Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L Rev 1051 (1989);
Michael J. Dale, Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction over Reservation-Based Claims: The Long
Walk to the Courthouse, 66 Or L Rev 753 (1987) (tort and contract issues); Kevin Gover,
Jurisdiction: Conflicts of Law and the Indian Reservation: Solutions to Problems in Indian
Civil Jurisdiction, 8 Am Indian L Rev 361 (1980); Richard M. Brimsrud, Doing Business on
an Indian Reservation: Can the Non-Indian Enforce his Contract with the Tribe?, 1981
BYU L Rev 319; James W. Zion, Harmony Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45
Mont L Rev 265 (1984).
286 See, for example, Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971).
288 See, for example, Wellman v Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F2d 577, 578 (9th Cir 1987)
(upholding dismissal of lawsuit but correcting trial court's reasoning. "The dismissal should
have been based on comity, rather than lack of subject matter jurisdiction.").
287 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 Harv L Rev 4, 40 (1983).
288 Some do insist upon the distinctiveness of states or regions. See E. Grady Jolly,
Feelings for Flem, Faulkner and Federalism, 4 Miss Coll L Rev 217, 224 (1984) ("The
Faulkner lawyer had a general antipathy toward the federal government . . . because it
threatened the distinctiveness of the South;... because it undermined the responsibility of
individuals and localities to take care of their own wrongs and injustices").
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opinions insist (albeit drawing different conclusions), Indian tribes
are "other." Their culture and norms are not federal culture and
norms; their rules are theirs. Given the possible divergences in cul-
ture between tribal modes of governance and federal norms, the
use of jurisdiction as a means of control is more apparent than the
claimed interference when federal courts preclude state court deci-
sion making.28 9 Jurispathic courts seem not an exaggeration but a
real threat; federal court reluctance to exercise jurisdiction seems
like an appropriate response to a claim that these people really do
have a federally recognized place as "not federal."
But that place is unevenly respected. In some instances, fed-
eral court rules accord greater deference to tribal courts than to
state courts, while in others, less solicitude for tribal authority is
expressed. For example, some forms of comity, in which a federal
court defers to a state court, are premised upon an assumption
that the state court will apply federal law; the explicit vision is
that a state court is equal to the federal court in fidelity to and
enforcement of federal norms."' Further, the state court decisions
on federal law can, at least in theory, be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.291 In contrast, when federal courts defer to
tribal courts under both Santa Clara Pueblo and Iowa Mutual In-
surance v LaPlante, the tribal courts may not always follow fed-
eral law292 and, whether obliged to or not, their decisions in non-
criminal cases are not reviewable by the federal courts.2 93 The Oli-
phant case, however, exemplifies the other version - when federal
courts are less deferential to tribal courts than to state courts.
289 See, for example, the Supreme Court's discussion in Fisher v District Court, 424 US
382 (1976) (describing federal policy of Indian tribe control over affairs on Indian
Reservations).
290 "[T]here is 'no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should
make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect'" to federal constitu-
tional rights than a state judge. Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 494 n 35 (1976) (citation
omitted).
281 Absent an independent and adequate state ground for decisions. See Michigan v
Long, 463 US 1032 (1983).
292 In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court noted that the Pueblo conceded that ICRA "mod-
ifies the substantive law applicable to the tribe." 436 US at 58. The Court further stated
that ICRA "has the substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these [tribal]
forums are obliged to apply." Id at 65. Yet the Court also stated that especially in "a civil
context," resolution of statutory issues under ICRA "will frequently depend on questions of
tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than
federal courts." Id at 71.
213 Canby, 62 Wash L Rev at 10 (cited in note 100). Mechanisms other than federal
court oversight exist to enforce the provisions of the ICRA. On the role of BIA enforcement,
see Alvin J. Ziontz, After "Martinez". Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 UC Davis
L Rev 1 (1979).
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Under Oliphant, tribes cannot enforce their criminal laws against
non-Indians but must instead depend upon other sovereigns' law
enforcement interests.294 Yet, when criminal defendants in state
court come to federal court to assert protection from state prosecu-
tion, the federal court declines - because of the centrality of crim-
inal law to the states as "sovereign."2 95
2. Tribal Courts, Federal Courts, and State Courts.
Doctrines of deference to other court systems assume that
those court systems are "other." Just as the 1939 membership or-
dinance at issue in Santa Clara Pueblo must be seen not as a pure
artifact of Santa Clara Pueblo culture but as a product of the in-
teraction between Santa Clara Pueblo and the United States, so a
closer look at the Indian tribal courts reveals many aspects of their
operation to be a product of the interaction between tribal customs
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of Interior, and
federal Indian policy.
Many commentators have described the tribal courts," 6 and I
will simply sketch the outlines. The 1883 case of Ex Parte Crow
Dog 297 is often credited with bringing attention to Indian tribal
dispute resolution. The federal court for the Territory of Dakota
convicted an Indian for the murder of another Indian on Indian
lands. The Supreme Court interpreted the governing statutes and
treaties as not authorizing federal jurisdiction and therefore voided
the conviction.9 8 In response, in 1884, the Secretary of Interior is-
294 See Oliphant v Schlie, 544 F2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir 1976) (Tribe sought local,
county, and federal assistance for protection during upcoming celebration but without suc-
cess: "Without the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribe and its courts, there could have been
no law enforcement whatsoever on the Reservation during this major gathering. . ).
295 Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971). While Younger was a criminal case, its doctrine
has been expanded to apply to non-criminal proceedings. See, for example, Ohio Civil
Rights Com'n. v Dayton Christian Schools, Inc, 477 US 619 (1986). Federal concerns for
state enforcement of criminal laws have been partially responsible for restrictive interpreta-
tions of federal officials' statutory removal rights. See Mesa v California, 109 S Ct 959, 969
(1989) ("We are simply unwilling to credit the [federal] Government's ominous intimations
of hostile state prosecutors and collaborationist state courts interfering with federal of-
ficers . . . ").
299 See generally Tribal Court Survey, pt II at 11 (cited in note 148); Clinton, 18 Ariz L
Rev at 553-63 (cited in note 108); Pommersheim, 18 NM L Rev 49, 50 (cited in note 218);
Pommersheim and Pechota, 31 SD L Rev 553 (cited in note 28); James W. Zion, Harmony
Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 Mont L Rev 265 (1984).
297 109 US 556 (1883), superseded by Major Crimes Act, 18 USC § 1153 (1982). For
additional discussion of criminal jurisdiction, see Clinton, 18 Ariz L Rev 503 (cited in note
108).
299 Crow Dog, 109 US at 570 (determining the validity of § 2146 of the Revised Stat-
utes, which "excludes from the jurisdiction of the United States the case of a crime commit-
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sued regulations establishing "courts of Indian offenses" and staff-
ing those courts with Indian judges.29 9 The purpose of these courts
was expressly jurispathic; to "civilize" tribes by banning tribal cus-
tom and imposing federal norms.s0  In 1885, Congress passed the
"Major Crimes Act,"30' which conferred federal jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country for seven specified felonies. The Su-
preme Court upheld that grant of jurisdictional control as an ap-
propriate exercise of federal guardianship powers over Indians.302
Two mechanisms were used to infuse federal norms into In-
dian dispute resolution. The first was divesting tribes of jurisdic-
tion over issues deemed outside their competence, either by mak-
ing that jurisdiction federals or by turning jurisdiction over to the
states.304 The second was to instruct and to influence tribes about
how to exercise what jurisdiction remained theirs. 05
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,30 6
federal control over tribal courts was pervasive. By 1926, seventy
Indian judges were paid by federal funds and worked in Indian
ted in the Indian country by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian").
See also Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The
Historical Perspective, 17 Ariz L Rev 951 (1975).
'19 See Tribal Court Survey at 17 (cited in note 148).
300 Id at 17-18; Clinton, 18 Ariz L Rev at 553 (cited in note 108). The tribal justice
system had required the Indian to support the victim's dependent relatives (in some sense a
predecessor of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 USC §§ 1503 et seq
(1982)), and that sanction had inspired or been used to legitimate hostility towards Indian
customs. See Newton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 212 n 81 (cited in note 99).
301 As amended, now codified at 18 USC § 1153 (1982).
302 United States v Kagama, 118 US 375, 383-84 (1886). See also United States v Ante-
lope, 430 US 641 (1977) (again upholding federal criminal jurisdiction); United States v
Wheeler, 435 US 313, 330-31 (1978) (upholding the right of federal prosecutors to try an
Indian who had been prosecuted in the tribal court).
103 For limits on tribal courts power in criminal matters, see 25 USC § 1302(7) (1986)
(punishment cannot exceed fines of $5000 or prison sentences of one year or both). See
generally Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54
Wash L Rev 479 (1979) (discussing history of tribal jurisdiction and forecasting that tribal
authority would be sustained over non-Indians in civil litigation).
304 For example, in 1953, during the era of "termination" of federal recognition of
tribes, Congress enacted Public Law 280, which permitted state courts to assert jurisdiction
over Indian tribes. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub L No 83-280, 67 Stat 588, upheld in Wash-
ington v Yakima Indian Nation, 439 US 463 (1979).
311 William T. Hagan, Indian Police and Judges: Experiments in Acculturation and
Control (Yale, 1966).
304 See Kickingbird, 13 Am Crim L Rev at 675-90 (cited in note 215); Francis Paul
Prucha, ed, Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the "Friends of the Indian"
1880-1900 at 295-305 (Harvard U, 1973) (reprinting 1882 directives of Henry M. Teller, Sec-
retary of the Interior, on "courts of Indian Offenses" in 1882, and regulations for those
courts promulgated by Thomas J. Morgan in 1883).
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courts run pursuant to Interior Department regulations.307 After
the 1934 enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, the Depart-
ment of the Interior provided model regulations for tribes to struc-
ture justice systems. Although some tribes retained their tradi-
tional tribal courts, many tribes adopted court structures based
upon the Interior Department regulations. These courts have be-
come known as "CFR courts," after the sections of the Code of
Federal Regulations that set forth the court procedures, the selec-
tion and removal of judges, and a compilation of "Indian Tribal
Offenses."30 8 Indian justice rules "were copied verbatim or pat-
terned to a considerable extent upon the [then] new Departmental
rules."30 9 Indeed, some Indian tribes adopted Interior Department-
inspired codes and constitutions that limited Indian court jurisdic-
tion and made Indian tribal decisions dependent upon approval by
the Secretary of the Interior.3 10 The enactment, in 1968, of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act exerted additional pressures to adopt the
United States' modes of dispensing justice. As one group of com-
mentators who surveyed tribal courts in the late 1970s describes:
"[T]he 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act implies to many Indians that
self-determination is acceptable only to the extent that tribes de-
velop sophisticated, anglicized tribal court systems." 311 Only a few
tribes followed customary law, while the majority adopted justice
mechanisms like those in the United States - albeit with ex-
tremely limited funding and resources. 12
So7 Tribal Court Survey at 20-21 (cited in note 148).
308 25 CFR § 11 et seq; Pommersheim, 18 NM L Rev at 56-57 (cited in note 218)
(" 'CFR' courts . . . are the successors to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Courts of Indian
Offenses, . . . [and] are ... widely regarded as entities subject to extensive and excessive
Bureau of Indian Affairs control and influence"). See also Clinton, 18 Ariz L Rev at 557-64
(cited in note 108).
09 Tribal Court Survey at 24-27 (cited in note 148).
310 Id at 27-28. See also Moapa Band of Paiute Indians, 747 F2d 563 (1984).
"' Tribal Court Survey at 35 (cited in note 148).
"' Id at 36-54. As of 1975, two thirds of seventy-three chief judges reported earning
$8000 or less annually. Id at 64. See also Lis Wiehl, Indian Courts Struggling to Keep Their
Identity, NY Times B7 (Nov 4, 1988); Richard B. Collins, Indian Courts in the Southwest,
63 ABA J 808, 809-10 (1977).
Several training manuals provide instruction on procedures. See, for example, Ralph W.
Johnson and Jay V. White, Cases and Materials for Indian Court Judges (National Ameri-
can Indian Court Judges Assoc., 1976) (a casebook to provide "legal education" to Indian
Court judges; the cases will be a "useful starting point," but judges should "make an inde-
pendent judgment" in each case. Id at 3-4); Ralph Johnson and Sue Crystal, Criminal Law
& Procedure for Indian Tribal Courts (Natl Am Indian Ct Judges Assoc, 1977) (describing
the role of the judge, appropriate procedures). These manuals were updated in John W.
Milne and Ralph W. Johnson, Criminal Law for Indian Courts (Natl Am Indian Ct Judges
Assoc, 1980) (summarizing evidentiary rules, Miranda rights, burdens and presumptions,
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Yet these tribal courts are not simply federal products, for
they developed from an interaction between federal regulation and
Indian tribal customs. As a consequence, many Indian tribal courts
have aspects that are not so familiar to those schooled in United
States' court practices. Most notably from the perspective of the
United States, federal traditions of separation of powers are not
commonplace. Some commentators report that tribal councils in-
fluence tribal court decision making in a variety of ways, including
judicial selection, retention, and recall.3 13 Further, in some in-
stances, tribal councils act as appellate bodies as well as executive
decision makers. The sources of law,3 1' permissible styles of argu-
ment, and structure of the proceedings"i ' may vary substantially
from what practitioners have come to expect in federal courts." 6
Thus, when the federal courts require litigants to submit to
tribal courts in the name of tribal sovereignty, many of those court
systems have been framed and regulated by the BIA but also
maintain proceedings and procedures at some variance from fed-
eral and state courts. The question is whether the federal govern-
ment will tolerate such deviations by respecting and deferring to
tribal court jurisdiction, or whether federal rules of deference and
search and seizure rules); and in Milne and Johnson, Criminal Procedure for Indian Courts
(Natil Am Indian Ct Judges Assoc, 1980) (with a section entitled "the Necessity of Indepen-
dence" of the judge, id at 20-38; and recommending that the "judicial branch should be
independent of other parts of the tribal government whenever consistent with tribal custom
and tradition." Id at 23.).
31 Gregory Schultz, The Federal Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of Non-
Indian Civil Litigants in Tribal Courts after "Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez", 62 Denver
U L Rev 761, 769 (1985) (citing also the Tribal Court Survey). But see Michael Taylor,
Modern Practice in Tribal Courts, 10 U Puget Sound L Rev 231, 262 (1987) ("interference
by other branches of tribal government is a constitutional worry rather than a practical
problem"); Pommersheim, 18 NM L Rev at 66 (cited in note 218) (increasingly there is a
move toward "de facto, if not de jure separation of powers").
Zion, 45 Mont L Rev at 269-73, 275-79 (cited in note 284).
"1 Pommersheim, 18 NM L Rev at 61-64 (cited in note 218). See also Ralph W. John-
son and Kathy Imig Perkins, The Northwest Experience, 63 ABA J 811, 812 (1977) (many
tribes have "completely revamped" their codes from those that had been in effect under the
BIA era); James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accom-
modation to the New, 11 Am Indian L Rev 89 (1983) (relying upon traditional mediation).
An empirical study, comparing tribal courts to local state courts of similar size and caseload,
would clarify how much variance actually exists.
318 Pommersheim, 18 NM L Rev 49 (cited in note 218). Apparently, there are also ten-
sions within Indian tribes about the legitimacy of the tribal court processes; some accuse the
courts of being "'white men's' creations," while others believe that the courts are "illegiti-
mate because they fall, or appear to fall, far below recognized state and federal standards."
Id at 60. See also Pommersheim's discussion of one tribal court judge's efforts to explain his
court to the communities in the tribe. Id at 61. See generally Pommersheim and Pechota, 31
SD L Rev 553 (cited in note 28).
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comity depend upon the similarity between the two court systems.
3. Federal Oversight via Relitigation.
One vehicle for federal review is the habeas corpus provision
of the Indian Civil Rights Act; by that provision, Congress author-
ized federal courts to consider "the legality of . . .detention by
order of an Indian tribe." '17 In August 1988, Senator Orrin Hatch,
who is often identified with legislation aimed at stripping, rather
than conferring, federal court jurisdiction,3 18 suggested that an ad-
ditional route to the federal court be provided. He introduced
S 2747, entitled "The Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments of
1988."311 The proposed amendments would overturn Santa Clara
Pueblo to a large extent by authorizing jurisdiction in the federal
courts over "civil rights actions alleging a failure to comply with
rights secured" by the legislation.2 0 The Hatch proposal requires
exhaustion of tribal court remedies and then permits return to the
federal courts for "any aggrieved individual . . .or the Attorney
General on behalf of the United States. '3 21 Such plaintiffs could
obtain declaratory and equitable relief against tribes or their offi-
cials for a variety of failings of tribal court decision making, in-
cluding the failure of a tribal court to be "fully independent from
the tribal legislative or executive authority," the failure to "resolve
the merits of the factual dispute," the failure to "adequately de-
velop material facts," and the failure to afford "a full and fair
hearing. '32 2 In short, the proposed legislation would permit exten-
317 25 USC § 1303 (1982).
318 See, for example, S 37, 99th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 1, 1985) (restricting lower federal
court jurisdiction to issue orders about busing in school desegregation cases); S 583, 97th
Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2, 1981) (to eliminate Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over cases
challenging state laws that restrict access to abortions).
319 See 134 Cong Rec S 11652 (Aug. 11, 1988). See Robert A. Williams, Documents of
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narra-
tive Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 Ariz L Rev 237 (1989) (criticizing the proposal
for generalizing upon a few isolated incidents and for assuming that differences between
tribal and federal justice mean that tribal justice is inferior).
320 S 2747 § 204(a), 134 Cong Rec S11656 (Aug 11, 1988). On March 6, 1989, Senator
Hatch reintroduced this bill, retitled the Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1989,
S 517, 135 Cong Rec S 2186.
311 S 2747, 134 Cong Rec S 11656.
3122 Id. For discussion of current means (without legislative changes) to avoid the Santa
Clara Pueblo rule, see Kevin Gover and Robert Laurence, Avoiding "Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez" The Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 8 Hamline L Rev 497 (1985). For suggestions similar to those of Senator Hatch for
legislation overruling Santa Clara Pueblo, see Schultz, 62 Denver U L Rev at 783-87 (cited
in note 313) (advocating "appeals" to federal trial courts of adverse decisions at the tribal
court level).
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sive federal court "oversight" of or "intrusion" into tribal courts.
The Hatch proposal has a familiar ring to those versed in fed-
eral court jurisprudence. In many respects, his bill is modeled after
federal habeas corpus legislation, 28 USC § 2254. Section 2254 pro-
vides for federal court jurisdiction of alleged violations of federal
constitutional rights in state court adjudication of criminal defend-
ants' rights. After petitioners have exhausted state court remedies,
federal judges may review state court decisions if "the merits of
the factual dispute were not resolved";"'3 the "material facts were
not adequately developed at the State court hearing"; s24 or "the
factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing. 3 2 5 The reasons animating
federal review of tribal decisions track those given for federal court
review of state court decisions - fear that the "other" forum will
not accord the process that the federal government believes is nec-
essary to justify the exercise of coercive enforcement powers. How-
ever, unlike federal habeas corpus legislation, no representatives of
the tribes will have the power to vote on enactment of the Hatch
legislation.
Senator Hatch has co-sponsored legislation that would limit
federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. 26 In con-
trast, his proposed amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act
S 2747 will increase federal court jurisdiction over claims that In-
dian tribunals deprived individuals of rights. When introducing
S 2747, Senator Hatch said it was needed to check power and to
protect against civil rights abuses, especially when non-Indians
were involved.3 27 Senator Hatch also voiced strong objection to dif-
3 28 USC § 2254(d)(1) (1982).
324 28 USC § 2254(d)(3).
325 28 USC § 2254(d)(2). Other provisions of the Hatch proposal also track § 2254.
Compare § 2254(d)(6) with S 2747(c)(7) and § 2254(d)(3) with S 2747(c)(6).
3, See, for example, S 1970, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987), 133 Cong Rec S 18412 (Dec
18, 1987); S 260, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987); S 2301, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (1986), 132 Cong
Rec S 4211 (April 14, 1986); S 238, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (1986), 131 Cong Rec S 481 (Jan 22,
1985). These bills sought to impose statutes of limitation on habeas filings and increased
other procedural barriers to habeas corpus relief. In support of S 2301, Senator Hatch stated
that the "abuse of the habeas process is making a mockery of the principles of finality and
certainty in the American judicial system." 132 Cong Rec S 4212 (April 14, 1986).
7 134 Cong Rec at S 11654 (Aug 11, 1988). The U.S. Civil Rights Commission has held
a series of hearings to investigate alleged "civil rights" abuses. See Hearings Before the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights: Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act (Washington, DC,
Jan 28, 1988; Portland, Oregon, March 31, 1988; Flagstaff, Arizona, July 20, 1988 and Aug
13-14, 1987; Rapid City, South Dakota, July 31-Aug 1, Aug 21, 1986). See also Robert N.
Clinton, Speech on Tribal Courts and Civil Rights: Prepared for Delivery at AALS Con-
vention 1 (AALS Native American Rights Section, January 8, 1989) ("AALS Speech") ("I
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ferences he perceived between tribal justice and federal justice. He
was particularly concerned about a lack of separation of powers -
about tribal judiciaries more obviously connected to the tribal
councils than is customary in the federal system.
3 28
Senator Hatch's introductory comments to the legislative pro-
posal illustrate his concerns. He discussed in detail the case of Lit-
tle Horn State Bank v Crow Tribal Court,329 which involved a
bank's effort to obtain a forklift from a defaulting debtor.33 0 There,
despite United States Supreme Court mandates of deference to tri-
bal court decision making, a federal trial judge declined to defer
and instead enjoined enforcement of the tribal court order protect-
ing the alleged debtor. Senator Hatch quoted at length from the
federal court opinion, in which the judge characterized the tribal
court as a "sort of 'kangaroo court' [that] has made no pretense of
due process or judicial integrity.... It would appear that the Crow
Tribal government changes judges at a whim, to the detriment of
non-Indian litigants, and of the Tribe. As a result, the Tribal Court
lacks any continuity and uniform precedent which is the founda-
tion of our judicial system.... If the Crow Tribe wishes to earn
the respect and cooperation of its .non-Indian neighbors, it must do
more to engender that respect and cooperation . . ."331
want to focus attention on the investigation, some might call it an inquisition, into tribal
governmental compliance with the Indian Civil Rights Act that the United States Civil
Rights Commission has conducted for the last two and a half years") (on file with the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review).
28 Senator Hatch stated: "Real power in many tribal government rests with the tribal
council or legislative branch .... Where courts do exist, they are often a creation of the
tribal council and therefore subject to and dependent on the council." 134 Cong Rec at
S11652 (Aug 11, 1988).
32 690 F Supp 919 (D Mont 1988), vacated pursuant to parties' stipulation, 708 F Supp
1561 (1989). Senator Hatch also discussed (at 134 Cong Rec S11654) Shortbull v Looking
Elk, 677 F2d 645, 650 (8th Cir 1982) (no federal cause of action when non-enrolled tribal
member was denied permission by Tribal Executive Committee to run for tribal office and
tribal judge who ruled he could run was removed from office); and Dry Creek Lodge Inc. v
Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F2d 682, 685 (10th Cir 1980) (distinguishing Santa
Clara Pueblo and permitting federal litigation because dispute involved non-Indians con-
testing tribes' closure of access to their guest lodge).
330 For discussion of the role of tribal courts as small claim courts for non-Indian credi-
tor collections, see Jesse C. Trentadue, Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Collection Suits by
Local Merchants and Lenders: An Obstacle to Credit for Reservation Indians?, 13 Am In-
dian L Rev 1, 47 (1987) ("Although those attorneys who have practiced before a tribal court
do not express overwhelming dissatisfaction with the Indian court system, a majority of all
attorneys surveyed had a low opinion of tribal courts... [which was] transmitted to banks,
savings and loans, and other business clients these counsel represent").
31 Little Horn Bank, 690 F Supp at 923-24. After a motion for reconsideration was
filed in that case, the parties agreed to a settlement. Conversation with Natasha J. Morton,
counsel for Little Horn State Bank (January, June 1989). Compare Shortbull v Looking Elk,
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I know nothing of the merit of the trial judge's description of
the Crow Tribal Court's methods.,s 2 Nor do I know whether the
informality and the connection between tribal council and tribal
judge that the federal court found offensive are so very different
from small town state court proceedings,333 or how frequently such
informality is found in tribal courts. What is plain is that the fed-
eral trial judge found the Crow tribal processes very different from
those that he identified as essential to "judicial integrity" and that,
given the absence of similarity between the two systems, the fed-
eral judge declined to permit the tribal ruling to stand a.3 3  Further,
the federal judge was remarkably unrestrained in his language; he
did not employ the polite discourse common when federal judges
speak of state court decision making. The Hatch proposal builds
upon the assumptions of the Little Horn Bank case; the proposal
would authorize the position taken by the federal judge in that
case. Like federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions, the
Hatch proposal is designed to insure that another sovereign's court
system follows the norms of the federal sovereign. Both the habeas
statute and the Hatch proposal are efforts to assimilate-to permit
"independence" only upon condition that the "other" process mir-
rors the federal one.
Of course, in federal/state habeas corpus jurisprudence, some
677 F2d at 650 (finding no federal cause of action and concerned about federal court inabil-
ity to enforce ICRA).
311 According to papers filed by the tribe, the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not give its
approval (as required by 25 USC § 81) to the tribe's selection of an attorney and hence the
tribe was unable to have an attorney to present its side of the case to the federal district
court. Rule 59 and 60 Motion [to set aside the judgment] of the Crow Tribal Court (July 29,
1988) (on file with the University of Chicago Law Review). For praise of tribal courts, see
Clinton, AALS Speech at 9-10 (cited in note 327) ("What is most remarkable about the
twenty year history of the enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act is ... how close [tribal
governments] have come in a very short twenty year[s] ... to reaching a level of develop-
ment in enforcement of civil liberties that took almost a century and half of development in
federal and state courts").
33 See also Collins, 63 ABA J at 808, 810 (cited in note 312).
331 Other federal judges have also criticized Indian tribal court processes. See, for exam-
ple, Greywater v Joshua, 846 F2d 486, 489 (8th Cir 1988) (exhaustion of tribal remedies not
required for habeas corpus petitioners, who were members of Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians and who were defending criminal charges in the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal
Court). The Greywater court stated, id at 488, that the Sioux Tribal Court had denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss "without a hearing and without a record" (an event, I must
note, not without precedent in the federal and state court systems). The court then com-
mented that "[e]ncouraging the exercise of sovereignty by a tribal court through develop-
ment and upgrading of its procedures is not served where the tribal court itself fails to do
so." Id at 488-89. See also Schultz, 62 Denver U L Rev at 778-82 (cited in note 313) (lower
court cases concerned about the limits of federal court jurisdiction after Santa Clara
Pueblo).
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of us may well cheer when the federal government exerts its pres-
sures to require state courts to treat members of minorities fairly,
to require enforcement of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amend-
ments, and to demand that procedures accord with that which is
deemed "just and fair. '3 5 What must be recognized is that, in fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction, the exercise of federal power is
aimed at revising the underlying decision or the decision making
processes to conform to what federal courts deem appropriate. The
question that the Hatch legislative proposal poses is whether the
federal government should attempt to require tribal courts to "imi-
tate the interpretive strategies and canons displayed in federal and
state settings."''
IV. THE LESSONS LEARNED
A. Familiar But Altered Themes
Those familiar with federal courts' jurisprudence can easily
feel at home with federal Indian law, despite its absence from the
canon. Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction expanded when federal
courts and Congress perceived state courts as inhospitable to en-
forcement of federal rights.3 7 Relitigation of state court civil rights
decisions expanded, briefly, when federal courts questioned state
courts' adherence to federal rights enforcement 38 and receded in
face of claims of state court "parity."33 9 Federal court relitigation
"I Compare Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976) with Kaufman v United States, 394 US
217 (1969).
331 Pommersheim, 18 NM L Rev at 70 (cited in note 218) (tribal courts should not have
to "blindly imitate" and that, when the "interpretive strategies and goals" of tribal courts
differ, tribes should consciously decide what their differing choices are and why). See also
Williams, Documents of Barbarism, (cited at note 319) (rejecting the assertion of federal
power over tribes and describing the assimilationist discourse as racist).
337 William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 248-273 (Greenwood
Press, 1980). See the evolution from Frank v Magnum, 237 US 309 (1915), and Moore v
Dempsey, 261 US 86 (1923), to Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963). Compare Wainwright v
Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977).
38 Until Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90 (1980), held that 42 USC § 1983 should not be
treated as an exception to full faith and credit rules, some lower federal courts had permit-
ted such relitigation. Under current interpretations of the interaction between federal
rights, state preclusion law, and 28 USC § 1738, some claims can still be considered in fed-
eral court. See Haring v Prosise, 462 US 306 (1983) and McDonald v West Branch, Mich.,
466 US 284 (1984).
339 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105 (1977).
Compare the comments of Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for
the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L Rev 233 (1988) and Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity,
Litigant Choice and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Consti-
tutional Rights, 36 UCLA L Rev 329 (1988).
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of claims of discriminatory employment practices, decided ad-
versely in state and federal administrative agencies, is still availa-
ble.3 40 If Little Horn Bank is illustrative of federal courts' atti-
tudes, or if the Hatch proposal is enacted, federal court relitigation
of tribal court decisions may similarly expand, as federal judges
and members of Congress perceive tribal courts to be inhospitable
to United States forms of procedure and to the enforcement of fed-
eral rights.3 4'
Again and again, in the contexts of both state and tribal
courts, we watch the interplay between multiple court systems, be-
tween expansion and contraction of jurisdiction, sometimes to af-
firm norms of diversity and, at other times, to encourage assimila-
tion by the application of nationwide norms. The state/federal and
Indian tribe/federal patterns are not identical, but at many points,
doctrine and explanation overlap.
More, however, than familiar themes are evident. From the re-
iteration of patterns, the enormous power of the federal system -
in federal/state and in federal/tribe relations - emerges with
greater clarity. While some cases in current federal courts' juris-
prudence may question some aspects of state sovereignty,3 4 2 the
underlying "story" is undisturbed. 43 The "story" is of two "sover-
eigns," state and federal, each with a discrete identity and joined
as co-venturers, with the federal government having supreme pow-
ers only to the extent granted by the Constitution. 4' The inclusion
of Indian tribe cases challenges some of this narrative. Listen to
Justice Marshall in Santa Clara Pueblo: "Congress has plenary au-
340 Title VII, 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (1982). See also Kremer v Chemical Construction
Corp, 456 US 461 (1982) (relitigation may only occur if the claimant has not sought state
court review of state agency decisions); University of Tennessee v Elliot, 478 US 788 (1986)
(unreviewed state administrative factfinding could have preclusive effect on claims brought
under § 1983, but not under Title VII).
31 It will be interesting to see whether a federal common law of commercial transac-
tions between Indians, Indians who are members of different tribes, and non-Indians results.
See Swift v Tyson, 41 US 1 (16 Pet) (1842), overruled by Erie R. Co. v Tompkins, 304 US
64 (1938).
341 See, for example, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US
528 (1985).
343 See Smith, Contingencies of Value at 51 (cited in note 37) ("However much canoni-
cal works may be seen to 'question' secular vanities such as wealth, social position, and
political power, . . . they would not be found to please long and well if they were seen
radically to undercut establishment interests or effectively to subvert the ideologies that
support them.") (emphasis in original).
3,, See, for example, the scholarship aimed at creating structural limits to federal au-
thority. Rapaczynski, 1985 S Ct Rev 341 (cited in note 79); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as
a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 S Ct Rev 81.
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thority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-gov-
ernment which the tribes otherwise possess."3"" The question is
whether such a statement can also be made in the context of fed-
eral/state relations. Federal power over the states is not "legally"
as "plenary" as it is over the Indian tribes, but finding the limits of
federal power over states has proven difficult. Federal infusions of
funds, federal joint programs, federal incentive grants, federal
court commerce clause review, and federal lawmaking powers over-
whelm notions of states as self-defined, autonomous, "sovereign"
actors. In Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 4 ' the Supreme Court rejected state efforts to obtain the
Court's protection from Congress. States were told to make their
arguments to Congress and then to be bound by its decision mak-
ing. 4 7 What is baldly stated in cases involving Indian tribes about
the power of Congress is implicit in cases involving the states. His-
torians, such as Aviam Soifer, have detailed the evolution of fed-
eral powers and argued that the Constitution has not functioned to
impose many limits on Congressional activity. 4 The question is
not whether unlimited federal power exists over states, but how to
use it. 4e
Identifying the stated vastness of federal powers vis-a-vis both
states and Indian tribes does not require a conclusion that federal
power ought to be used identically. For example, when Indian
tribes and states go to the Supreme Court to obtain protection
from Congress, should the Court respond with equal deference to
Congress?350 One response is that the differing histories of the rela-
3' 436 US at 56.
3,6 469 US 528 (1985).
3" See Kaden, 79 Colum L Rev 847, 862-67 (cited in note 77), on whether the Congress
is a forum responsive to states' interests. After Garcia, lobbying efforts did succeed in over-
turning portions of the statute that had formed the basis for that litigation. See Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub L No 99-150, 99 Stat 787 (Nov 13, 1985) amending 29
USC §§ 203, 207. Further, as Martha Field has explained, "if the Court does want to protect
state interests, it has ample opportunity to do so without inventing new constitutional im-
munities." Field, 99 Harv L Rev 84, 115 (cited in note 20).
348 Soifer, 57 U Colo L Rev 793, 797 (no historical basis for claim that constitution
limits congressional power) (cited in note 80).
"I See Cover, 95 Yale L J 1601 (cited in note 94).
31o A distinct question is to whom the tribes might go to obtain protection from the
Supreme Court. See Ball, 1987 Am B Res F J at 137 (cite in note 21) ("Now the Court
threatens to move against Indians when Congress refuses to do so and to employ equity, one
of the great heads of the law, as its weapon."); Clifford M. Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tri-
bal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country, 8
Am Indian L Rev 65 (1980); Karl J. Kramer, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional
Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional
Determinations, 1986 Wisc L Rev 989. For commentary on the inadequate protection af-
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tionships between "sovereigns" should yield different understand-
ings of the limits of congressional authority. Unlike states, Indian
tribes have no official protection in Congress from the Supreme
Court. Moreover, Indian tribes are part of the federal government
by virtue of conquest and by continued federal reliance on and in-
terpretation of that conquest. Some have used the fact of conquest
to argue for the unmitigated power of the federal government to
control Indian tribal life. 51 Others have taken the same fact of
conquest to bolster the claim of a moral right to separatism.52 The
oft-told story about the states is that they are a part of the federal
government by virtue of consent. While some would revise that
history,35 1 the claim of consent has given rise to arguments of lim-
ited federal power, that only some powers were ceded and the rest
"reserved." Yet that very same constitutive event, consent, has
also been the basis for findings of great federal power.354 Argu-
ments based upon earlier moments in the history of the United
States provide some, but not total, answers; something more than
past wrongs and past covenants 5 is needed to decide whether the
federal government should support multiple governments and how
much variation in governing structures and norms to encourage.
B. The Question of the Survival of "Other" Courts
With fluctuations over time, the federal government and its
courts have consistently permitted other (lesser) power centers to
function and sometimes even to flourish. Federal courts have
crafted doctrines of comity and deference, 56 and have ceded juris-
forded by state courts to Indian tribes's federal rights, see John J. Gibbons, Federal Law
and the State Courts, 1790-1860, 36 Rutgers L Rev 399, 427-436 (1984).
311 See, for example, Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Oliphant, 435 US at 197 (juris-
diction of tribes depends upon what Congress has given).
352 Williams, 1986 Wisc L Rev at 293 (cited in note 89) (the federal government should
"surrender" the doctrine of "discovery," which is Eurocentric, and accept the Indian tribes
as possessing co-equal status). See also Rachel San Kronowitz, Joanne Lichtman, Steven
Paul McSloy, Matthew G. Olsen, Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsider-
ing the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 Harv CR-CL L Rev 508 (1987) (relying on
principles of international law to restructure relations between the United States and Indian
tribes).
'5' See Ackerman, 93 Yale L J 1013 (1984) (cited in note 124); Ackerman, Discovering
the Constitution, (cited in note 123).
354 Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Garcia, 469 US at 530; 557 (Powell
dissenting).
35 See Michael Walzer, Exodus and the Revolution (Basic Books, 1985) (are Jews
bound to tell the Passover story because of the covenant at Mt. Sinai or do they bind them-
selves when they tell the story?).
"' For interpretation of Eleventh Amendment doctrine as founded upon notions of
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diction and authority to other court systems - state and tribal -
and to quasi-court systems, such as agencies and arbitration. 5
What animates this support for other decision centers? An-
swers vary over time and with different actors. For some, the hope
is that community-based processes still thrive in smaller units of
government.35 8 Others claim a commitment to an "ethic of promis-
ing," '5 9 that the federal government entered into compacts with
both the states and the tribes and must honor those compacts even
though it might try to exercise the power of rescission. Yet another
explanation comes from the uses that the federal government can
find for states and tribes. For example, the federal system does not
want to decide all the disputes in the country, but wants to main-
tain its elite status by having only a subset of cases and, some-
times, final authority over cases otherwise distributed.6 0
Responses to the question about the continuing vitality of tri-
bal and state governments emerge not only from the perspective of
comity rather than constitutionally-demanded jurisdiction divestiture, see Jackson, 98 Yale
L J 1 (cited in note 20).
' Concern about federal court reconsideration of arbitration decisions parallels some
of the issues raised by federal habeas corpus and the Hatch proposal. See United
Paperworkers Intern. Union v Misco, Inc, 108 S Ct 364, 374 (1987) (court of appeals could
not decline to enforce arbitrator's decision on public policy grounds); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v
Air Line Pilots Ass'n Internat'l., 861 F2d 665 (11th Cir 1988) (reversing, as violative of
public policy, arbitrator's decision that airline lacked "just cause" to fire a pilot who flew
while intoxicated). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel:
Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 Tulane L Rev 29 (1988).
"' See Lawrence Rosen, Individualism, Community and the Law: A Review Essay, 55
U Chi L Rev 571, 582-83 (1988). For discussion of claim that local and state governments
give more "voice" to minorities and women, see Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev 1, 8 (cited in note
81). See also Soifer, 57 U Colo L Rev at 796 (cited in note 80) ("Any accurate historical
review of states' rights must include long traditions of racism and malapportionment,
stretching well into the post-World War II era. . . ."). Compare the claim of "civic republi-
canism" that participatory processes can function on a national scale. See also Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court: 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
Harv L Rev 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539
(1988).
"I Wilkinson, American Indians at 121 (cited in note 22) ("These old laws emanate a
kind of morality profoundly rare in our jurisprudence. It is far more complicated than a
sense of guilt or obligation.... Somehow, those old negotiations [of treaties] ... are tremen-
dously evocative. Real promises were made on those plains, and the Senate of the United
States approved them, making them real laws"). See also Wilkinson, 21 Creighton L Rev at
796 (1988) (cited in note 82). See also Clinton, 33 Stan L Rev at 1027 (1981) ("great nations,
like great men, should keep their word") (cited in note 93).
"I For arguments to send "routine" cases, such as those involving federal statutory
claims and low monetary amounts, away from the federal courts, see Antonin Scalia, An
Address, 34 Fed Bar News & Journal at 252 (July/Aug, 1987); Robert Bork, Dealing with
the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 FRD 231, 238-39 (1976) ("someone far less qualified
than a judge" can assess such cases). For discussion of the need to keep final review in the
federal courts, see Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev 916 (cited note 214).
[56:671
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 746 1989
Dependent Sovereigns
the federal government, but also from the perspective of the tribes
and states. The tenacity of tribal governance, despite sustained ef-
forts by the federal government to extinguish it, 61 is remarkable.
Given that Indian tribes are politically dispersed, have limited re-
sources, and must contend with oppressive majoritarian rules,362
explanations of the resilience are needed. Similar exploration of
the persistence of state governments is also needed, but the issue is
less obvious. Just as Indian "tribes" are "historic inventions, ten-
dentious and changing,"363 so are states. Once the instability of the
construct "tribe" is used to demonstrate the instability of the con-
struct "state," then one is free to ask why and when to support the
construction of either of those entities. Again, the answers need
not be parallel, nor is the question solely one for the dominant cul-
ture to answer.
C. The Assimilationist Pressures
Inclusion of Indian tribal cases also clarifies the force of as-
similationist pressures.364 Just as the federal government self-con-
sciously cedes power, so it presses the "other" government to act as
its surrogate. For better or worse, federal support for other court
systems turns out, in many instances, to be contingent upon their
performance as measured by federal court standards. This assimi-
lationist pressure is desirable if one is enthusiastic about the stan-
dards imposed. Many of us celebrated the imposition of federal
norms on communities that said that their culture, their custom,
was to treat whites differently than blacks. Many of us are pre-
pared to celebrate the imposition of federal norms, if they exist,
that demand the non-subordination of women.6 5 Many of us worry
about courts in which judges are dependent upon the executive or
legislative branches, and many of us have a deep commitment to
the values that go under the label "due process of law." State
M81 See Dozier, The Pueblos Indians at 19-22 (cited in note 165) ("The Pueblos have
thus persisted, despite factional disputes, and appear to be as vigorous and vital today as
during any period of their past." Id at 20). On efforts by first Spanish and then Anglo cul-
ture to change the Pueblos, see id at 106-18. See generally, Francis Paul Prucha, The Indi-
ans in American Society (U Calif Press 1985) ("The Indians, once facilely thought to be a
vanishing race as a result of disappearance into the dominant white society, are instead
persistent and clearly identifiable groups within the nation." Id at ix).
3"2 Barsh and Henderson, The Road at 220-25 (cited in note 22).
3" Clifford, Predicament of Culture at 339 (cited in note 181).
' See Williams, 1986 Wisc L Rev at 279 (cited in note 89).
115 See, for example, the requirement that business and civic organizations not discrimi-
nate against women. Rotary International v Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S Ct 1940 (1987);
New York State Club Association v City of New York, 108 S Ct 2225 (1988).
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courts have, upon occasion, failed to insist upon racial and gender
equality and on due process in decision making. Hence, one might
look to the federal government in an effort to persuade it to exer-
cise its power and insist upon such rules.
Watching the interaction of federal, state, and tribal courts"'6
is instructive because one sees that the decision of the federal sys-
tem to trump an "other's" decision varies with the strength of the
federal norm at issue. When racial equality came to be seen as a
national norm, toleration of the states' interest in racial inequality
waned.367 When racial oppression was tied to criminal justice sys-
tems, federal attention was turned to state conviction processes. 6
When federal interest in both racial equality and its impact on the
administration of criminal justice wane, state sovereignty emerges
again as a theme. 69
When "federalization" is occurring, one has to ask whether the
idea of "dual sovereigns," meaning state and federal courts, really
has much meaning. Are these "other" court systems simply sub-
systems of the federal courts? Once again, the context of Indian
tribe law sharpens a question implicit in federal courts' jurispru-
dence but often not articulated: We say we have dual sovereigns,
with dual court systems, dual norm generation, and dual citizen-
ship,370 but are the forces of federalization so strong that the dual-
ity is more true on paper and in rhetoric than in reality? Santa
Clara Pueblo and Little Horn Bank help make plain that policies
described as "theirs," as those of a sub-community, are always the
product of interaction between a larger and a smaller group. The
wealth of interdependencies demonstrates the complexity of "we"/
"they" distinctions and reminds us to be skeptical of the dominant
38 Some of the issues are also relevant to the experiences of religious communities in
the United States. See Weisbrod, 26 J Family L at 741-750 (cited in note 140). See also
Employment Division, Oregon Dept of Human Resources v Smith, 307 Ore 68, cert granted,
109 S Ct 1526 (1989) (does federal constitution prohibit state from denying unemployment
compensation to Native Americans who ingested peyote in religious ceremony?).
367 See Jolly, 4 Miss Col L Rev 217 (cited in note 288) (describing the desire of the
South to be left alone, and the South as distinct from larger nation).
368 See Henry v Mississippi, 379 US 443 (1965); Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963).
369 See McClesky v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987) and death penalty litigation in general.
370 When criminal defendants seek to defeat sequential prosecution by tribes and the
federal government, by the state and federal government, or by state and state, those claims
are rejected on the theory that the defendant has "dual citizenship" and each "sovereign"
can prosecute without violating the double jeopardy bar. See United States v Wheeler, 435
US 313 (1978); United States v Lanza, 260 US 377 (1922); Heath v Alabama, 474 US 82
(1985). See generally Ronald J. Allen and John P. Ratnaswamy, "Heath v Alabama": A
Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J Crim L & Criminol 801
(1985).
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group when it purports to be supporting the sovereignty of the
"other."
D. The Utility of the "Other"
Given these interdependencies and assimilationist pressures,
the question emerges: What is the point of the "other"? A large
part of the record of tolerance of the "other" is of tolerance of sim-
ilarity, not dissimilarity. The effort is to make the "other" like
"us" - in the case of United States interaction with the Indian
tribes, explicitly to "civilize" them. 7' Understanding the attempts
to change the "other" is important for federal courts jurispru-
dence, which assumes the actual existence of an "other" - the
"other" branches of the federal government and the "other" sover-
eignty, the states. In the 1980s, "otherness" may be more formalis-
tic than true. It is not only that, in separation of powers cases such
as the special prosecutor and sentencing guideline cases 72 the Su-
preme Court has embraced non-formalistic overlapping powers,
but also that the branches themselves have generated redundant
institutions that readily find homes in any and all of the three
branches.3 73 One could similarly argue that the differences between
state and federal courts are so marginal that only miniaturists
could articulate the distinctions. Indeed, the claims of similarity
are used by both federal judges and federal courts commentators
to justify the authority given to state courts.7 4
One possible conclusion from acknowledging the assimilation-
ist pressures is to perceive the states as not really "other," but as
subdivisions of the federal government. If one believed that subdi-
visions were all that existed, then the argument for their continua-
tion would rest upon a claim of efficiency - that the scale of the
smaller units is better able to govern than the larger unit. Decision
"I' Prucha, The Indians In American Society 10 (cited in note 361) (federal Indian
policy rested upon three premises; one premise, "paternalism," assumed that the "Indians'
culture could and should be transformed to equal or approximate that of their white neigh-
bors"). See generally Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the
Subjugation of the American Indian (Knopf, 1975).
"' Morrison v Olson, 108 S Ct 2597 (1988); Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 647
(1989).
373 For example, the Sentencing Commission was attacked for wrongly being in the ju-
dicial branch and for wrongly being out of the judicial branch. Mistretta, 109 S Ct 647
(1989). Similarly, adjudication could be based in either courts or agencies. See Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v Shor, 478 US 873 (1986).
"' See, for example, Justice Powell's discussion in Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976);
Henry M. Hart, The Power of the Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362 (1953).
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making in cases about federalism would then be governed by views
about whether the smaller unit's claim enhances its capacity to
serve as a subdivision of the federal government.
But there is a risk of overstatement. The state courts are not
totally clones of the federal courts. At some points, state courts
announce rules of law and of practice that are at some distance
from the federal courts.3 7'5 And, despite enormous federal pres-
sures, tribal courts are still "struggling to maintain their iden-
tity."3 6 There are assimilationist pressures but not complete as-
similation. Something more than subdivisions of the federal
government currently exist.
How can one capture the differences? This question can be
clarified by an example from feminist discussions of how to de-
scribe "women." Some feminists compare women's and men's
methods of acquiring knowledge and making decisions and then
make claims about "women's ways. '377 Other feminists comment
that what are ascribed to "women" are attributes of the powerless,
who lack the ability to exercise control and are always supplicants
to the powerful.37 8 Both female and male identities are forged out
of this interaction, and reordering the relationships of power re-
quires changes on both sides. Similarly, "state," "Indian tribe,"
and "federal government" are identities forged in relationship to
each other. As James Clifford has written, "[g]roups negotiating
their identity in contexts of domination and exchange persist,
patch themselves together .... Metaphors of continuity and 'sur-
vival' do not account for complex historical processes of appropria-
tion, compromise, subversion, masking, invention, and revival. 37 9
From the perspective of the dominant society, the question is
how much "subversion" and "invention" should be tolerated and
encouraged. At the core of federal courts' jurisprudence is a ques-
"' See, for example, differing standards on fugitive slave laws, described in Robert M.
Cover, Justice Accused 211-225 (Yale U, 1975) and in Gibbons, 36 Rutgers L Rev at 436-447
(cited in note 350); differing standards on illegal searches and seizures, as set forth in Michi-
gan v Long, 463 US 1032 (1983), and in People v Long, 419 Mich 636, 359 NW2d 194 (1984)
(especially Kavanaugh, J, concurring).
Wiehl, NY Times at B7 ((cited in note 312).
37 See, for example, Gilligan, In a Different Voice (cited in note 41). See also Mary
Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule,
Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind, (Basic Books,
1986).
178 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 432-45 (cited in note 173). See also Christine
A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 Stan L Rev 751,
762 (1989).
37 Clifford, Predicament of Culture at 338 (cited in note 181).
[56:671
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 750 1989
Dependent Sovereigns
tion that has often gone under the name of "sovereignty"380 but
may more fruitfully be explored in the context of difference. 8 ' If
the word "sovereign" has any meaning in contemporary federal
courts' jurisprudence, its meaning comes from a state's or a tribe's
ability to maintain different modes from those of the federal gov-
ernment. The United States has often made claims about the rich-
ness of its pluralist society - made claims that the loss of state or
tribal identity would not only be a loss to states and tribes, but
would also harm all citizens because of the benefit of living in a
country in which not all are required to follow the same norms.
Some deep-seated emotional respect for group governance may be
at work here, some sense that these self-contained communities are
"jurisgenerative" (again, to borrow from Robert Cover) ss2 and that
their traditions and customs must sometimes be respected and
preserved.3 83 In the tribes, cities, states, and regions of the country,
one can find not only individuals, but also the individual as part of
a community - a community that has had continuity over time. In
these communities there are social ties, there is a shared history,
there is a network of relatedness. In contrast, the federal system
appears to some as individualistic and atomistic. We are attracted
by these smaller institutions, these subsets, these multiple sover-
eignties; we like the scale, the sense of history, the intimacy.38 4
But we also know that some communities are communities of
oppression. In Marilyn Friedman's words, "[b]esides excluding or
suppressing outsiders, the practices and traditions of many com-
munities are exploitative and oppressive toward many of their own
members. This problem is of special relevance to women." s 5 Of
course, interpretations of communities as "exploitative and oppres-
sive" depend upon the perspective of the viewer.38 6 While one
"I' See Rapaczynski, 1983 S Ct Rev 341 (cited in note 79) (discussing limited utility of
term "sovereignty").
M8' See Minow, 101 Harv L Rev 10 (cited in note 168).
382 Cover, 97 Harv L Rev 66 (cited in note 287).
18' See Ball, 1987 Am B Found Res J at 138 (cited in note 21) ("Tribes ... offer us
hope.... Tribalism offers the hope of empowerment"). See also Garet, 56 S Cal L Rev at
1062-65 (the values of sociality and communality) (cited in note 253). Compare Cover's dis-
cussion of when courts should be "jurispathic," 97 Harv L Rev at 66-68 (cited in note 287).
384 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 Yale L J 1713, 1714 (1988)
for discussion of the different legal treatment accorded "[t]wo sorts of 'groups,' "involun-
tary" ones, based upon national origin, gender, race, ethnicity, and "voluntary" groups, in-
cluding families, social and political clubs, religions, and unions. See also Garet, 56 S Cal L
Rev 1001 (cited in note 253).
385 Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community,
99 Ethics 275, 281 (1989).
86 See Minow, 101 Harv L Rev at 45 (cited in note 168).
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reading of Julia and Audrey Martinez's decision to go to federal
court to obtain alteration of membership rules could be that they
found the Santa Clara Pueblo to be oppressive to women, many
interpretations are possible. In one sense, the very act of asking
the federal court to dictate to the Pueblo could be understood as
an act of self exclusion. By seeking federal court assistance, Ms.
Martinez signaled that she stood outside the community in which
she sought to have her children included and perceived the com-
munity as a source of oppression. In another sense, the decision to
seek federal court help could be understood as demonstrating how
deep Ms. Martinez's affiliation with the Pueblo was, for she was
willing to risk a good deal of hostility to enable her children to
continue to live on the Pueblo and to inherit land as members of
the Pueblo.3 8 7 Ms. Martinez was not alone in seeking federal court
relief from tribal decisions. Many other cases have been filed by
Indians challenging the decisions of their communities, indicating
that, at least for some, embeddedness in a jurisgenerative commu-
nity may be problematic, that "communities of place" may not al-
ways be responsive to the needs of their members. 88
How are we to interpret the Supreme Court's instruction to
Ms. Martinez? "You are a citizen of the United States, but go back
to your community and make your claims there." We must ac-
knowledge that the decision is an act of exclusion, that Ms. Marti-
nez's claim of connection to the United States was rejected at the
same time that the Court affirmed both her affiliation with the
Santa Clara Pueblo and federal power to control the relationship
between her and the Pueblo - had Congress chosen to exercise its
power.-" 9 How are we to interpret the Supreme Court's instruction
387 "... [Wlhen an Indian woman attempts to claim that her family is an Indian family,
... [why is it] called a threat to cultural survival?" MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, at
67 (cited in note 173). In yet a third reading, one could see the interaction with the federal
court as irrelevant; Ms. Martinez's children continue to live on the Pueblo, speak its lan-
guage, and participate in its religious life.
388 Friedman, 99 Ethics at 284-290 (cited in note 385) makes a distinction between
"communities of choice" and those of "place" and urges some skepticism of the vogue of
communitarianism and republicanism in political thought. See also Mark Tushnet, Red,
White, Blue 314 (Harvard, 1988) ("revitalizing federalism might be a bad idea overall.
Under current political circumstances a program favoring decentralization might end up
with a system in which political authority is decentralized while economic power remains
tightly controlled").
389 The testimony of Robert Walters, before the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, captures this problem. The Navajo tribal council removed Mr. Walters from his
position in its court. He criticized the lack of federal rights enforcement and stated: "Why
are we [Indian tribes] being treated as an outsider within the United States?" U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights Hearings at 141 (Aug 13-14, 1987, Flagstaff, Ariz) (cited in note 327).
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to Lloyd Powell and David Rice, habeas corpus petitioners in the
Stone v Powell case? The Court said in essence that they had fed-
eral Fourth Amendment rights which the lower federal courts had
found to have been breached,390 but that, since state courts had
decided the claims, no federal review was permitted. These seem to
be federal statements enforcing the continued importance of "com-
munities of place" and ignoring claims that those communities are
at least nonresponsive if not outright oppressive. These also seem
to be statements to which the federal courts are reluctant to re-
spond - because they are too busy, too important, too tired, too
besieged, too confused. Yet we know that sometimes the federal
courts do respond, that federal judges responded when New York
habeas corpus petitioner Charles Noia claimed his confession had
been physically coerced 391 and when "non-Indian" Mark David O1-
iphant sought to avoid a tribal court.3 9 2 The task for federal courts'
students and scholars is to try to understand what animates fed-
eral decisions to sustain the power of the "other," what prompts
decisions to diminish that power, and what criteria should lead us
to praise or criticize such decisions.
For example, if one believed in the utility of the "other" be-
yond that as a subdivision of the federal government, then the un-
derlying reasons for that utility would shape how the federal gov-
ernment should respond when conflicts emerge. If notions of
"checks and balances" are at work, if the "other" must have power
so as to limit and diffuse the power of the federal government,
then federal courts should sustain differences that enhance the
ability of the other to hold power sufficient to check the federal
government. 93 One of the problems with the Santa Clara Pueblo
decision is that the Court never confronted the claim that the
Pueblo was being used for some purposes as a subdivision of the
federal government - to distribute Indian benefits for the govern-
ment.3 94 Yet another problem in Santa Clara Pueblo was the im-
3. See Powell v Stone, 507 F2d 93, 96 (9th Cir 1974) and Rice v Wolff, 513 F2d 1280,
1289 (8th Cir 1975), both reversed in Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976).
... Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963). See generally Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeus
Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991 (1985); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S Cal L Rev 837 (1984).
" Oliphant v Suquamish, 435 US 191 (1978).
... See, for example, Robert F. Nagel, 1981 S Ct Rev 81 (cited in note 344). See also
Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innova-
tion, 22 Wm & Mary L Rev 639 (1981).
3' One possible solution would have been for the Supreme Court to have distinguished
between the implications of membership for the Pueblo and for the federal government.
The Court could have required the provision of federal money to the Martinez family. The
suggestion does not respond to all that the Martinezs sought; they wanted federal money to
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plicit public/private distinction endorsed by the Court. The arena
in which tribes have most authority are "intratribal disputes,"
matters including issues such as membership, marriage, and family
matters. 5 To cut off that set of activities from federal rule making
is to assume that the structures of families and communities are
not decisions of national political importance. Hence, "letting"
tribes have control over these issues is not recognizing them as se-
rious power holders, but only as holding power over that which has
little import.
But Santa Clara Pueblo did not send only Julia and Audrey
Martinez's claim for non-discriminatory membership rules back to
tribal governments for decision. The Supreme Court said that, ab-
sent Congressional direction, no federal court could entertain any
private civil action for violation of the ICRA, whether those claims
are of denial of equal protection, deprivations of free speech, illegal
searches and seizures, wrongful takings, or denial of due process.396
One might then conclude that Santa Clara Pueblo is evidence of a
serious commitment to the tribal courts as competing power cen-
ters for the enforcement of different cultural norms. However, the
Court justified its refusal to permit federal court jurisdiction by
stating that "[t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights cre-
ated by the ICRA [which had] . . . the substantial and intended
effect of changing the law which these forums are obliged to ap-
ply. ' 397 Tribal courts have the power to decide, but their decisions
must be in accordance with the federal law, albeit with no federal
court supervision of compliance.
If tribal courts are simply vehicles for federal lawmaking, what
is the definition of tribal "sovereign" interests that the Court
claimed in Santa Clara Pueblo to respect? "Sovereignty" in this
context seems to mean that a tribe need not explain itself to the
federal courts, but must follow federal law. (Will tribes, like state
build housing on the Pueblo and wanted the children to inherit that housing. Further, this
suggestion requires believing that the individual Indian should be the appropriate recipient
of at least some benefits, rather than believing that the benefits belong to the Pueblo, as a
community, to allocate as it wishes. See Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations, 71-87
(cited in note 228) ("compensation to groups or individuals?").
395 436 US at 59-61. Justice Marshall included "matters involving commercial and do-
mestic relations" as central to self governance. Compare Brendale v Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S Ct 2994 (1989) (limits on tribal power when
controlling reservation land owned by non-members).
"6 Id at 69. See 25 USC § 1302 (1986).
436 US at 65 (footnote omitted). As the Court knew, the Martinez family had been
unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain relief from the tribe. For discussion of the assimilationist
goals of ICRA, see Burnett, 9 Harv J Leg at 588-89 (cited in note 264).
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courts, be presumed by federal judges to be equal to federal courts
in their fidelity to federal law?) But perhaps a stronger definition
of sovereignty can be pulled from the lines of the Santa Clara
Pueblo opinion. If the tribal courts are the interpreters of the
meaning of federal law, can use tribal law, and have the authority
to interpret without federal court oversight,39 then divergent, idio-
syncratic expressions can emerge. "The vast gulf" that Justice
Marshall referred to "between tribal traditions and those with
which the federal courts are more intimately familiar" ' can be
preserved and even enlarged. But, as Oliphant and Little Horn
Bank remind us, when non-Indians are involved and tribal crimi-
nal law is invoked, or when non-Indian creditors seek enforcement
of their claims, federal court interest in "tribal sovereignty" wanes.
One way that the federal government can use the "other" sov-
ereign is to learn something about itself. Santa Clara Pueblo and
Little Horn Bank help to clarify that what the federal government
is prepared to tolerate in "them" depends upon how it defines it-
self and what effect it perceives "their" decisions to have. When
federal and "other" norms converge, toleration and claims of "sov-
ereignty" are easy to make. One explanation of Santa Clara
Pueblo is, in general, that Indian tribes' treatment of their mem-
bers is not of central concern to federal law, and, in particular, that
membership rules that subordinate women do not threaten federal
norms4 00 (either because federal law tolerates women holding lesser
status than men or because federal law has labeled the issue one of
"private" ordering and non-normative). How long can this federal
disinterest be maintained? On several reservations, non-Indians or
non-members of a governing tribe comprise a substantial and
sometimes a majority of the population; "they are an integral part
of the community. '40 1 Further, feminists hope that illumination of
398 Other mechanisms for federal oversight, arguably equally as intrusive, exist. The
Secretary of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Civil Rights Commission have
taken on administrative review of tribal courts. See Alvin J. Ziontz, After "Martinez". Civil
Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 UC Davis L Rev 1, 29-33; Clinton, AALS Speech at
15-24 (cited in note 327); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Hearings (cited in note 327).
39 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 72 n 32.
400 Another is to understand the Court's decision that no private right of action was
available as an exercise of "passive virtue," for it avoided a ruling on the merits of the
underlying claim. For comments questioning both the passivity and the virtue of the "pas-
sive virtues," see Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inade-
quate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L J 425 (1974); Sunstein, Interpreting the
Regulatory State (cited in note 10). Compare Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v Halder-
man, 465 US 89 (1984) (state sovereignty interests require that federal courts not decide
whether state officials violate state law).
401 Greywater v Joshua, 846 F2d 486, 493 (8th Cir 1988), discussing the Devils Lake
1989]
HeinOnline -- 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 1989
The University of Chicago Law Review
the political content of the "personal" will result in legally-man-
dated reordering. The Supreme Court's tacit reliance upon dichot-
omies such as Indian and non-Indian, public and private, demon-
strates the ways in which the Santa Clara Pueblo opinion avoided
responding to the underlying problems: the coherence of the con-
ception of Indian tribes as a "separate people"40 2 (in the sense of
disconnected) and the assumption of a "domestic sphere" as
apolitical. Interconnections weave together Indians and non-Indi-
ans, families and the "market."'40 3 The clashes are not avoided, but
only postponed.0 4
While Santa Clara Pueblo illustrates deep underlying conver-
gences between the tribal conception of its role and the federal
conception, Little Horn Bank and the Hatch proposal exemplify
moments when normative divergences are closer to the surface. 0 5
At some point, from the perspective of the dominant group, the
"vast gulf" becomes too vast - differences emerge that the federal
government tries to obliterate. At such points, the federal govern-
ment attempts to remind the dominated group of its dependence
upon the larger collective and works to bring the smaller group
into compliance with federal norms. Implicit in the Little Horn
Bank decision is a view that courts with procedures different from
the federal ones may cause harm to creditors' ability to collect
debts and may undermine the fluidity of commercial transactions.
Toleration of such differences in this "public" arena of debt collec-
tion were not to be countenanced by at least one federal district
court. Further, the techniques for assimilation need not always be
judicially or legislatively based. Economic pressures may also be
exerted to try to bring tribal courts into compliance with federal
norms; banks can refuse to do business if their debt collection ef-
forts will be thwarted by tribal or state courts.0 6 As a descriptive
Sioux Reservation.
402 Kagama, 118 US at 381.
403 Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Re-
form, 96 Harv L Rev 1497 (1983).
404 See, for example, the disputes about the reach of tribal jurisdiction over non-mem-
ber Indians, discussed in note 109. See also United States v Mazurie, 419 US 544, 557
(1975) (authority of Wind River Tribes over issuing liquor licenses to nonmembers).
405 For discussion of the depth of the tribal "challenge to the core values and tradi-
tional norms assertedly embodied in American legal thought," see Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 Ariz L Rev 165, 167 (1987).
4'0 Trentadue, 13 Am Indian L Rev 1, 49 (cited in note 330) (Indian tribal "govern-
ments certainly are vested with authority, but the individual members and perhaps the
tribes as a whole are paying a price for their separate system of government. This price
seems to include not only a reduction in consumer credit to tribal members, but a corre-
sponding denial of private sector development moneys as well").
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matter, we must note these assimilationist pressures; as a norma-
tive matter, we must debate the desirability of them.
An "other" sovereign serves a valuable purpose for the federal
government. The degree of toleration of the "other" sovereign's de-
cisions enables the federal government to make plain what its own
values are.4°7 One version of this relationship is the "laboratory"
that Brandeis described408 - in which the states are places of ex-
perimentation. An alternative conception is the dialectic interac-
tion that Robert Cover and Alexander Alienkoff mapped.4 °9 If one
believes in the utility of that dialogue, then one would be support-
ive of enabling two voices, of cohabitation rather than domination,
of having governments with different "interests" and "ideology"
thus enabling "innovation. ' 410 The most difficult issues for federal
courts' jurisprudence are to explain how to engender differences,
how deep the respect should be for difference, when the federal
government's right to assert a baseline exists, and then to ascertain
where that federal floor should be. Constitutional and case law exe-
gesis alone cannot accomplish these tasks. Rather, on-going rela-
tional struggles illuminate the changing shapes of the floors that
are continually to be sought.
Article III established the federal courts as the second set of
courts in the federal system. Federal courts were at first the
"other" courts, in the feminist sense of the word.411 "Other" - and
generating deep suspicion and hostility, during the era when state
courts were more entrenched, had a longer history, commanded
equal or more loyalty. Over time, the federal courts, and the gov-
407 Note that the idea of a federal "floor" of norms might engender differential levels of
scrutiny of "other" courts' activities. A variable standard of review is akin to what was ar-
gued by the ACLU in its amicus brief, on behalf of the Martinez family, to the Supreme
Court in Santa Clara Pueblo. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union,
Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, No. 76-682, 18-20 (Oct Term, 1976). In contrast, the many
Indian tribes that filed amicus briefs on behalf of the Pueblo argued that any federal scru-
tiny was impermissible. Amicus briefs filed on behalf of the Pueblo included those by Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, the National Tribal Chairmen's Associ-
ation, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation, and the
National Congress of American Indians.
408 New State Ice Corp v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).
," Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeus
Corpus and the Court, 83 Yale L J 1035 (1977).
410 See Cover, 22 Wm & Mary L Rev 639 (cited in note 393).
410 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex xviii-xix (Knopf, 1952) ("Thus humanity is
male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him ... he is the Subject, he is
the Absolute - she is the Other") (footnote omitted). See also Marilyn Strathern, An Awk-
ward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropology, 12 Signs 276, 290 (1987)
("the conscious creation of self by seeing its difference from the Other").
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ernment whose power they deploy, have emerged as "the" courts,
with the power to define the roles of the "other" courts. Federal
courts constantly define themselves in the context of the other in-
stitutions that resemble them. Federal courts are not state courts,
not agency courts, not legislative courts, not tribal courts, not local,
but national tribunals. Out of this relationship comes descriptions
of what norms are deeply held and of the being itself.412 But the
lines are not etched in stone; the boundaries do not remain stable,
the "other" changes and with it the self.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts jurisprudence is about the uses of courts as ve-
hicles of culture and is about the culture the courts carry. When
Felix Frankfurter, Wilber Katz, Harry Shulman, Henry Hart, and
Herbert Wechsler framed a course of study about the federal
courts, they were preoccupied with the courts' role in forging a na-
tional identity while maintaining a sphere of activity for the states.
Since the era in which these law professors worked, a wealth of
federal legislation, of Supreme Court decision making, of economic
nationalization, of personal mobility has transformed the country.
Whole areas of law have become "federalized," as constitutional
interpretations and legislative enactment have made federal rules
paramount. The federal government is a pervasive force in the life
of cities, states, and citizens.
Given this "federalization," the question remains: why have
two sets of courts and sets of government? But rather than wither
away, state courts seem to be actively in the litigation business.
And the federal courts have upon occasion supported the decision
making authority of yet another set of courts, tribal courts, and,
more recently, of arbitration and agency-based adjudication. Thus,
students of the federal courts have much to learn about the longev-
ity and the persistence of these multiple structures.
Thus far, the official canon of the federal courts has not in-
cluded the relationship between the federal courts and Indian
tribes. Little is said about the federal courts' role - sometimes
destroying Indian tribal culture and occasionally respecting it. We
412 James Clifford, in Predicament of Culture at 281 (cited in note 181) quotes the
following exchange, between a lawyer and a member of the Mashpee tribe, during the trial
to establish the Mashpee claim to Massachusetts' land.
"Question: How was your youth different from that of any small-town youth?
Answer: We were different. We knew we were different. We were told we were
different."
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have also not much spoken of the sources of federal power over
Indian tribes: conquest, violence, force. In the context of states,
basic aspects of the power relationship are similarly not much dis-
cussed; when the Supreme Court imposes federal rules, it refers to
parts of the Constitution, not to the Civil War. Yet it was the Civil
War and then again the use of federal force in the 1960s that es-
tablished the federal power to insist that federal norms trumped
"state sovereignty."
It is time, I think, to review the stories we have been telling
about the federal courts, to acknowledge the role played by brute
force, to make plain the limits of constitutionalism and of history
in explicating constitutionalism. It is time to revise the canon, to
include texts less noble than the ones we have preferred, and with
their inclusion, learn more about the present and what future we
want to craft.
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